Streamlining the Administration and Simplifying the Organizational Structure Are the Central Links of Our Present Work

(August 23, 1942)

It has been quite some time since the Party Central Committee put forward the policy to streamline the administration and simplify the organizational structure. If we examine how this policy has been carried out in the anti-Japanese base areas, we will find that in some areas it has been seriously implemented and notable results are already being achieved. Facts have proved that this policy of the Party Central Committee suits the conditions in the base areas and is practical. But at the same time, we can also see that in some areas or departments, this policy is being carried out is a very reluctant and passive way, and thus cannot be fully implemented. There are even a few places where, regardless of the Central Committee’s decision, they still “leave things the way they are” and “go their own way,” considering themselves as “exceptions” to the rule. In our opinion, the reason for this failure to fully carry out the policy or for considering themselves as “exceptions” is a lack of understanding and stems from insufficient recognition of the significance of the policy to streamline the administration and simplify the organizational structure put forth by the central Party Committee. Therefore, in order to thoroughly implement this policy, we must all achieve a better understanding of its great significance.

Why did the Party Central Committee put forward this policy?

First, as a result of the past 5 years of resistance, our various anti-Japanese base areas and the enemy-occupied territories are now checkered with each other. The enemy, depending on the railways, highways and strongholds, are encircling us, while we, depending on the vast rural areas, are encircling the enemy, so that a stalemate has been created and each side is encircling the other. We are locked in a seesaw war. Those early days of guerrilla warfare pushing forward into the enemy’s rear and developing dynamically are over. The problem for us today is to preserve our forces, overcome the difficulties and survive the final hardship, whoever can survive this extremely grave difficult period will win victory. At present, the enemy is conducting brutal “mopping-up” and step-by-step expropriation. Shrinkage of the base areas and reductions in our human and material resources are inevitable. Therefore, we must cut back on staff and make ourselves capable of adapting to the changed conditions. Only in this way can we maintain our efforts. Such necessary cutbacks are now for the purpose of preserving our forces, surviving the difficulties and also preparing a future counteroffensive. Our present cutbacks are precisely for future greater development.

Second, fighting is frequent behind enemy lines. The battle fronts are not fixed, and the army units and government offices must be highly mobile. A unwieldy administrative set-up cannot be tolerated under these conditions, nor can the army have too many non-combatants, whose presence makes it heavy and slow-moving, nor suitable for the war conditions. Therefore, it must be cut back to meet wartime needs. We must understand that institutions and army units are organized to carry out certain duties, not just to have such institutions and army units. If, at the time of expansion, we generally paid attention to the number of personnel, the “framework” in order to unfold our work, then during the period of cutbacks, we must pay attention to quality. An organization need not be large, but it should be crack and capable. If conditions have changed, but we still persist in following the beaten tracks, unwilling to make any changes, then we are out-and-out dogmatists!

Third, due to the shrinkage of the base areas as a result of the brutal war and the increased difficulties in obtaining manpower and material resources, and the relative limited wealth of the peasants in these economically backward rural areas, the number of people who can be withdrawn from production in each base area can only be limited to a certain proportion, and it must not be excessive, otherwise the small pond cannot hold so many big fish. The enemy’s policy of “kill all, burn all and loot all” against our basic base areas is aimed at destroying our “conditions for survival” and is designed to “drain the pond to catch the fish.” Our cutbacks are precisely a countermeasure against this venomous policy of the enemy. Proceeding from the above three understandings, long ago the Party Central Committee formulated the decision that all people withdrawn from production in the various base areas should not exceed three percent of the local population. After putting forward the policy to streamline the administration and simplify the organizational structure, the Central Committee again stipulated that the main forces should cease expanding, and that from now on the focus in military construction should be placed on strengthening the local armed forces and developing a militia that does not leave production. This is a policy that has been consistently advocated and suited to the needs of the war behind enemy lines. The base areas must thoroughly carry it out. Up to now, our comrades in the base areas have not yet all understood the significance of the streamlined administration and simplified organizational structure and the Party Central Committee’s consistent stand on this policy. That is why they have been half-hearted. At the same time, some comrades still hold some incorrect opinions and one-sided understanding, which constitute an obstacle to implementing the policy of streamlined administration and simplified organizational structure. We must explain why these views are incorrect.

Some say: “Although my army unit or office is somewhat ‘topheavy,’ the upper level is large and the lower level is not substantial, you should take the future into account! It will expand in the future.” We think this opinion is wrong. The future is a matter for the future, but we should stress the solution of today’s problems! If we don’t think of ways to overcome today’s difficulties and to survive these hard times, then there can be no future. If we only go around daydreaming about the future and turn a blind eye to the present concrete situation, if we don’t see the reality before our eyes, in a word, if we are farsighted in this sense, then we will never be able to solve any real problem.

Some say: “The streamlining of the administration and simplifying the organizational structure that the Central Committee has called for is quite correct, but the situation here hasn’t become as serious as you estimate, we can still survive and carry on as usual. We can wait until the situation gets serious, why worry now? This opinion is also wrong. Because, judging from the trend in the situation behind the enemy lines in the past two years, we can already see clearly that serious conditions are bound to come. Indeed, they have already arrived in some areas. As of today, changes behind enemy lines are no longer a matter of estimates or forecasts, they have long been a lively reality! If we are not on guard against these changes in the situation and do not take appropriate measures on our own initiative, then when the situation takes a serious turn, we will not be able to cope with it! Foreseeing the future, adopting appropriate measures, consistently taking the initiative and reducing losses to the revolutionary forces – these precisely constitute the art of Bolshevik leadership. If we do not make a subjective effort and instead simply let things take their own course, then we are politically shortsighted, which is also wrong.

Some think: In this war of resistance, we should follow the principle that ‘the more troops, the better,’ just as the Han Dynasty general Han Xin said. How can we ‘have crack troops’? Of course, at certain times we need many troops. With a large army of powerful soldiers we can subdue the enemy. But when we say more, there is also a limit. There is no such thing as an unlimited number. The crucial question is whether or not we can feed them and whether we have enough material and financial resources to sustain them! If we ignore this basic question of survival and blindly seek more troops, then while an army of more troops, or an insufficient number of troops, cannot defend the base areas, an excessively large army will ‘sit idle and eat up our resources.’ In the end, this will exhaust the manpower and financial and material resources of the base areas, making them even harder to defend. Therefore, we should understand the theory of ‘crack troops’ and not the ‘more troops theory’. The ‘more troops theory’ must be opposed.

Some think: “Because work in the base areas is highly complex, we need big institutions and many cadres to do a good job. Don’t we everywhere feel a shortage of cadres? How can we talk about ‘simplifying the administrative structure’?” Yes, in some areas or in some departments, there is indeed a shortage of necessary cadres. This must be remedied. On the other hand, however, aren’t there generally the phenomena of many overlapping institutions and administrative systems and more staff than necessary? Therefore, the central issue in simplifying the administrative structure consists in reorganizing, redeploying cadres, cutting out or merging institutions and trimming the redundant staff, so as to heighten work efficiency and to solve problems more promptly. So, what we need today is simplified administrative structure and not a complex administrative structure. The “complex administrative structure theory” must be opposed!

All the above opinions are one-sided, an old failing. If we do not consider the whole picture, but stubbornly cling to only one aspect, these opinions may sound reasonable and plausible. However, if we carefully consider the whole picture, it becomes clear that all these opinions are inappropriate.

Only by streamlining the administration and simplifying the organizational structure on the basis of comprehensive consideration can we arrive at a policy which is suited to the present real conditions behind enemy lines and which also takes future development into account. We are Marxists-Leninists and must proceed from reality in solving all problems. A one-sided view on any problem will inevitably lead to the error of subjectivism. Therefore, implementing the policy of streamlined administration and simplified organizational structure demands, first of all, that we have a clear and thorough understanding and a sufficient appreciation of its significance. Only by truly understanding it can we carry it out thoroughly, conscientiously, actively and happily, and truly carry it out well.

Streamlining the administration and simplifying the organizational structure is indeed the central link of our entire work in the base areas at present. We must carry out this work in every field. For instance, administrative work, military work, financial and economic work, and so on, must all be re-examined in the light of this policy, which must be applied throughout. At the same time, the implementation of streamlined administration and simplified organizational structure must be geared in with such concrete work as cherishing and conserving the people’s resources, developing production, building up strength through self-reliance, and carrying out strict economy to combat waste.

The area behind enemy lines is in a cruel state of war, and the situation changes very rapidly, often there are abrupt changes. If the leading bodies and leading cadres cannot foresee the trend of development and “make prompt decisions” and change our policies in good time, then when a harsh situation suddenly develops, we will not be able to cope with it and we may even suffer unexpected losses!

Finally, we must point out once again: The policy of streamlined administration and simplified organizational structure is the correct policy for overcoming the present difficulties and striving for greater future development. It takes into account both the present and the future. It is a positive policy and not a negative one! It has already been determined that Japanese imperialism will be defeated and that there will be future development. During this arduous period between the present and the forthcoming counteroffensive, if we bring better order into our ranks and forge them into crack units, victory and development will be all the more assured.