Shandong May Become the Pivot for
Strategic Redeployment
(July 9, 1942)
Comrade Hu Fu:1
1. I received your telegram of June 9 some time ago, and all the comrades in
the Secretariat have read it. Because I have been thinking about it, I am rather
late in replying.
2. We would like very much for you to come to Yan’an to participate in the
Seventh Party Congress, but since the road is not safe, you should not risk it.
Better to remain in the enemy’s rear and rely on our troops.
3. As for your activities, you should give first priority to your safety and then
to your work. These should be the criteria by which you decide whether to stay
in Shandong or to return to army headquarters.
4. There is, however, one point on which we need to consult with you. This is
the question of the importance of Shandong. The situation both at home and
abroad is very advantageous. There is hope that the anti-Hitler struggle will
triumph in the winter of this year or the spring of next year. If this should
happen, then there is real hope that Japan will be defeated in the fall or the
winter of next year. The Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States have united
very well, and this cannot hurt the relationship between the Guomindang and the
Chinese Communist Party, which will not be very bad either. Our policy is to do
our utmost to unite with the Guomindang, to find a way to improve relations
between the two parties, and to emphasize that after the war is over we will still
need to cooperate in national reconstruction. When the war is entirely over, the
international situation will still be in the phase of democratic republics, in which

various democratic forces will collaborate in a united front, so China will need all
the more to go through the stage of a democratic republic before entering
socialism. Under such overall international conditions, it is still possible that after
the end of the war the Guomindang will cooperate with our Party. Although
there is the other possibility of civil war, we should work to bring about the
realization of the first possibility. Therefore, we need to take into consideration
the possibility that after the defeat of Japan and the withdrawal of its forces from
China, we may only be able to secure the conditions for continued cooperation
between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party by concentrating
the New Fourth Army and other forces from south of the Yellow River in North
China, and even by concentrating the whole of the Eighth Route Army and the
New Fourth Army in the three provinces in the eastern provinces [Manchuria]
(no need to tell anyone else this point at present). If this is the case, then
Shandong will be the pivot for redeployment. At the same time, we need to take
into consideration the possibility that the Guomindang may then take advantage
of the situation to eliminate the New Fourth Army. If Chiang [Kaishek] moves
heavy troops out of Shandong to sever the route of the New Fourth Army’s
northward advance, then the New Fourth Army would be in a very dangerous
situation. Hence, it is really necessary to plan ahead and to take control over
Shandong and all the forces in Shandong (the 115th Division, the Mountain
Column, and the Yang-Su Column) so as to create secure conditions for the
northward redeployment of the New Fourth Army.
5. We request that you assume responsibility for the task of securing control
over Shandong as mentioned above. As for the execution of this task, it would be
most convenient for you to operate out of Shandong. However, if north Jiangsu is
safer, you may also work from there. Or you may operate in Shandong for a
while, then return to north Jiangsu, and finally move back to Shandong. Please
make a decision on this after evaluating the situation. After you have finalized
your plans, the Central Committee will notify the Central China, Shandong, and
Northern bureaus to entrust you with the power to command overall affairs in
Shandong and Central China.
6. The Japanese bandits are now actively preparing to launch an offensive
against Jiangsu. One report puts the timing for this at the end of this month. You
need to prepare to deal with this situation.

7. One of the policies of the Japanese bandits in their offensive against us is to
seek out our main commanding organs for attack. The sudden attack on the
headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the death of Zuo Quan are a serious
lesson.2 This spring, the division headquarters of the 115th Division also
encountered similar dangers. Please give this serious attention. All main leading
organs and main leaders should give first priority to safety.
8. The study of the twenty-two documents in Yan’an has been very effective
(10,000 cadres in Yan’an have participated in this study). In the process of study,
various erroneous ideas have been discovered and corrected. The overwhelming
majority of cadres say that these two months of study have been more effective
than the three years of study undertaken in the past. Please pay attention to
guiding this kind of study in accordance with the characteristics of life behind
enemy lines. Grasping ideological leadership is the most important step in
grasping leadership over everything.
Mao Zedong
Notes

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 434–36, which is based on a handwritten
manuscript.

1. That is, Liu Shaoqi.

2. Japanese forces destroyed the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and killed Vice Chief of Staff Zuo Quan
in an attack on the Taihang base area in May 1942.