Everyone is now studying the Party’s history, and this study is essential.

If we do not clarify the Party’s history or understand the path it has taken in history, we cannot handle affairs better.

Of course, this does not mean that we can only handle affairs after thoroughly clarifying every single event in history; rather, we must clarify the historical development of the Party’s lines and policies.

This is necessary for studying today’s lines and policies, strengthening education within the Party, and advancing work in all fields.

We must study which were past successes and victories, and which were failures, so that the setbacks of the past may serve as lessons for the future.

We have not done this work in the past; we are now beginning to do it.

From the time *Since the Sixth National Congress* was issued until now, the senior cadres’ study group and the Central Party School have been reading it for half a year, and other units have now also begun to read it.

This is a good thing, and today we have already begun to see positive results.

After reading it, comrades have experienced a sudden realization, and it has played a role in enlightening their thinking.

Now we must consider the path we have walked and our experience, and we must do so systematically.

The path was walked step by step, and although at each step we considered how yesterday was walked and how tomorrow should be walked, no one has ever considered the entire history of the Party.

Last August and September, after discussion in the Central Committee, the book *Since the Sixth National Congress* was printed and studied in the Central Senior Cadres’ Study Group.

How do we study it?

We take the entire development process of the Party as the object of our study and conduct objective research—not studying only one step but the whole process, not studying individual details but lines and policies.

We must use such study to enable us to gain a better understanding of today’s lines and policies, so that work may be done better and with more progress.

How should we study Party history?

The fundamental method has already been explained by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin—it is the comprehensive historical method.

When we study the history of the Communist Party of China, we must naturally follow this method as well.

What I am proposing today is just one aspect of this method; colloquially, I would like to call it the "ancient-modern, Chinese-foreign method"—that is, to clarify the specific time and specific space in which the problem under study arose, and to study the problem as a historical process under specific historical conditions.

What is called "ancient and modern" is historical development, and what is called "Chinese and foreign" refers to China and foreign countries, that is, our side and the opposing side.

According to the sequence of historical development, I think the history of our Party can be divided into three stages: the period of the Great Revolution is the first stage; the period of civil war is the second stage; and the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan is the third stage.

Whether this division is appropriate can be discussed by everyone; I am only putting it forward as an opinion, not as a resolution of the Central Committee.

If there is a more suitable division for the historical process of the Party, that would be better.

As for the tasks of the revolution, all three stages were about opposing imperialism and its running dogs.

In the first stage, the direct manifestation was opposing the Northern Warlords; in the second stage, the direct manifestation was opposing the Kuomintang; in the third stage, it manifested as opposing the Japanese aggressors and the traitors like Wang Jingwei.

As for the masses in the united front, the first stage involved all democratic classes nationwide, with cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; the second stage saw a narrowed united front, with the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the nation divided into two large parts—one under the leadership of the Kuomintang and the other under the leadership of the Communist Party, confronting each other and waging civil war; the third stage was the united resistance of the entire nation against Japan, restoring the form of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.

As for the targets struck by the revolution, in the first stage it was mainly the Northern Warlords, and our policy was a broad united front.

In the second stage it manifested as opposing the Kuomintang, and our policy was a narrow united front, an alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry and the lower petty bourgeoisie.

The third stage is the present policy, with the Japanese aggressors and traitors as our targets to strike.

The revolutionary front is Kuomintang-Communist cooperation and all patriotic forces across the nation.

This is our line.

In the first stage we had both correct aspects and mistaken aspects.

The correct aspects were achieving Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, having the right targets to strike, and having the right organization of the revolutionary ranks.

Later, the Chen Duxiu line emerged, and in the first half of 1927 the Party’s line was incorrect.

When the Kuomintang was preparing to betray the revolution, to abandon the proletariat and the peasantry, to abandon us and the revolutionary masses, we still united with it—this was right opportunism.

The situation had changed, but our policy line did not change accordingly.

The rightist tendency was to ally with all and oppose struggle.

The fundamental characteristic of the Chen Duxiu line was to ally with all and oppose struggle—that is, when the big landlords and big bourgeoisie had already betrayed, we still united with them.

The policies of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie had changed, but our policies remained unchanged.

When the big landlords and big bourgeoisie struck at the revolution, our policies still remained unchanged.

Thus we committed a rightist error.

In the course of alliance, we should have both united with them and struggled against them.

In the second stage, the nation was divided into two camps.

After the May 21st Incident [2], there was a kind of putschism that claimed, "Where there is land, there are tyrants; where there are no gentry, there are none that are not evil."

Then the Li Lisan line demanded insurrections nationwide when they should not have been launched.

From the September 18th Incident to the Zunyi Conference, when a national enemy invaded and the national bourgeoisie and upper petty bourgeoisie had already changed, our policy did not change accordingly and remained the old set of practices—this gave rise to "leftist" things.

The leadership line at that time was to struggle against all and deny alliance.

After the September 18th Incident, conditions changed; the upper petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie openly leaned toward us, figures like Sun Ke and Huang Yanpei.

But we called them reformists and said they were our main targets to strike.

Treating these people as the main targets to strike was incorrect.

Also, at that time it was proposed to eliminate the rich peasants, which was also overly leftist.

The third stage is neither to ally with all and forsake struggle, nor to struggle against all and forsake alliance, but rather a synthesis of alliance and struggle, with alliance as the primary and struggle as the secondary, requiring independence within unity.

Unity means alliance, and independence means struggle.

What does independence mean?

If you stand here and no one tells you to move away, then the question of independence does not arise; if someone else wants to stand in your spot and tries to push you away, then the question of independence arises.

Struggle and friction are for the sake of unity; they are the means of unity—this is called striking and pulling, striking while pulling, with reason, with advantage, and with restraint.

Independence and self-reliance that do not obstruct unity are precisely what we hope for to achieve better solidarity.

When Party history is divided into these three stages, it conforms to the facts and makes sense in terms of the targets of struggle, the objects to strike, and the Party’s political line.

Before the Great Revolution from 1925 to 1927, there was also a preparatory stage.

The period from 1921 to 1924 was the direct preparation for the Great Revolution and can be combined with the Great Revolution that began in 1925 into one stage.

Before the July 7th Incident, after the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, the situation of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation had largely taken shape; this can be considered for merging into the third stage, without need for further division.

Speaking of the preparation for the revolution, the first stage that began in 1921 was actually prepared by the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth Movement.

Especially the May Fourth Movement—the ideas, cadres, masses, and young intellectuals of the Great Revolution all began to be prepared from this time.

So strictly speaking, if we study Party history starting only from 1921, we cannot fully explain the issues; I am afraid we need some of the materials from the preceding part to explain the forerunners of the Communist Party.

If we go too far back in this preceding part, it might become too long; it would be about right to start from the 1911 Revolution, and perhaps even better to start from the May Fourth Movement.

The 1911 Revolution occurred at a time when the Chinese proletariat had not yet awakened and the Chinese Communist Party had not yet taken shape; when the proletariat worldwide, after the failure of the Paris Commune, had not yet taken practical revolutionary action and was only preparing for revolution; and when the revolutionary movements in the colonies and semi-colonies were still the reserve army of the world’s bourgeois revolution.

The May Fourth Movement, however, occurred after the European War and the October Revolution; by this time, the revolutionary movements in the world’s colonies and semi-colonies were no longer the reserve army of the world’s bourgeois revolution but had become the reserve army of the world’s proletarian revolution.

The May Fourth Movement was a response to Russia’s October Revolution, so it was more profound than the 1911 Revolution.

The 1911 Revolution only overthrew the Qing emperor politically, and not thoroughly.

When we write history, we often say that the 1911 Revolution was a failure; actually, we cannot say it was a complete failure. The 1911 Revolution had its victories—it overthrew the Qing emperor who directly relied on imperialism.

But later it failed, it did not consolidate its victory; feudal forces replaced the revolution, and Yuan Shikai replaced Sun Yat-sen.

At that time, the proletariat did not step onto the political stage as a self-conscious class.

The May Fourth Movement occurred under the influence of the October Revolution.

The October Revolution had a tremendous impact on the awakening of the world and on the awakening of China.

During the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese proletariat began to gain consciousness; the May Fourth Movement took place in 1919, and in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was born.

The May Fourth Movement was a broad united front, with left-wing, right-wing, and middle forces within it.

A month after the "May Fourth" event, the June Third Movement occurred—nationwide strikes, class boycotts, and shop closures.

The strikes at that time were still spontaneous movements of the proletariat.

We should study the attitude of the workers in the May Fourth Movement.

Although the strikes then lacked Communist Party leadership, there were nonetheless leading figures among them.

In the May Fourth Movement, the leadership role was played by some progressive intellectuals.

Although university professors did not take to the streets, they rushed about, raised their voices, and did many things.

Chen Duxiu was the commander-in-chief of the May Fourth Movement.

Now is not yet the time for us to publicize Chen Duxiu’s history; in the future, when we compile Chinese history, we must speak of his contributions.

The Kuomintang did not play a leading role in the May Fourth Movement; it stood on the sidelines.

The May Fourth Movement prepared the Great Revolution; without the May Fourth Movement, there would have been no Great Revolution.

The Chinese Communist Party was born after the "May Fourth" period, and the May Fourth Movement itself emerged after Russia’s October Revolution.

The Chinese Communist Party was organized under Lenin’s call; the Communist International sent people to help with its organization, and international delegates attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party.

When studying the history of the Chinese Communist Party, we should also examine materials on the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth Movement before the Party’s founding.

Otherwise, we cannot understand the development of history.

Now many things are directly linked to that time—for instance, combating stereotyped Party writing; if we do not connect it to the May Fourth period’s opposition to old stereotyped writing, old dogmas, the dogmas of Confucius, and classical Chinese, I am afraid we cannot clarify the issue.

The assessment of the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth Movement requires study.

Was the 1911 Revolution a complete failure, or did it have some victories?

Did the May Fourth Movement have mass support or not?

I believe the May Fourth Movement had broad mass participation, though naturally it was less compared to the Great Revolution.

At that time, the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and proletariat formed a united front, but peasants had not yet joined, only broad numbers of workers.

By the time of the Great Revolution, peasants joined in.

During the Agrarian Revolution, the peasant participation was much broader, but the united front was not broad enough.

By the War of Resistance, peasants participated even more broadly than during the Great Revolution and broader than during the Agrarian Revolution, and at the same time, there was a broader united front than before.

The May Fourth Movement was a united front of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat, bearing a spontaneous character.

But this spontaneity differed from earlier times; it was somewhat more awakened—many people endorsed the October Revolution and approved of Lenin’s revolution.

Sun Yat-sen once said that Lenin was a sagely figure of revolution and that communism was a good friend of the Three Principles of the People.

He endorsed communism as an ally.

Under the influence of the October Revolution, the people of that time underwent a great awakening.

The development of the May Fourth Movement into the establishment of the Communist Party and the advancement of the workers' movement paved the way for the subsequent cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Therefore, without explaining the earlier Revolution of 1911 and the May Fourth Movement, it is impossible to clearly describe the establishment of the Communist Party and the subsequent history.

When discussing the Revolution of 1911, failing to address the domestic and international circumstances of the time would make it impossible to explain the outbreak of the revolution.

Similarly, without clarifying what kind of government existed during the May Fourth era, it would be impossible to explain the occurrence of the May Fourth Movement and the June Third Movement.

Consequently, important political documents of the time, such as the abdication edict of Emperor Xuantong, certain documents from the governments of Yuan Shikai and Duan Qirui, and several key declarations by Sun Yat-sen, must all be studied.

From 1921 to 1927, the targets of the struggle were imperialism and its lackeys, the Northern Warlords.

Without explaining how the landlords oppressed the peasants, how the capitalists oppressed the workers, how imperialism carved up China, and how the Northern Warlords dealt with the revolution, it would be very difficult to understand the struggles of that period.

To study the KMT-CPC cooperation at that time, it is insufficient to examine only the declarations of the Communist Party without also considering those of the Kuomintang.

At that time, Communist Party members joined the Kuomintang as individuals, and the Kuomintang was a large organization. Without clarifying this large organization, it would be impossible to understand the circumstances of the time and the inadmissibility of Chen Duxiu’s later mistakes.

Materials on the April 12 Incident and the Horse Day Incident must also be reviewed.

During the civil war, we opposed the Kuomintang and the lackeys of imperialism. Without explaining how the Kuomintang surrendered to imperialism and how imperialism, together with the Kuomintang, oppressed and exploited the Chinese people, the necessity of the civil war would not be apparent.

If we do not know in whose hands the primary agricultural means of production, such as land and livestock, were held, and if we do not clarify the ownership relations between landlords and peasants regarding land, we will not understand the necessity of the agrarian revolution.

Without recounting how the Kuomintang, after the September 18 Incident, continued to fight the Communist Party instead of resisting Japan, our opposition to the Kuomintang would seem unreasonable and baseless.

During the War of Resistance, the KMT and CPC cooperated to resist Japan. Both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party issued numerous documents.

Some of the Kuomintang’s anti-Japanese documents were positive, yet it also sought to oppose the Communist Party.

We must examine our own documents, as well as those of the Kuomintang.

Both the Kuomintang’s favorable documents and its anti-communist documents should be reviewed.

Without studying these materials, we would not understand the basis for opposing the Kuomintang’s anti-communist actions.

Because they first issued measures such as the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" and stirred up friction, it was necessary for us to emphasize struggle under conditions that did not harm unity or lead to a split. If we did not emphasize struggle, another instance of Chen Duxiu-ism would emerge.

When discussing China’s anti-imperialist struggle, we must address how foreign capitalism and imperialism viciously invaded China.

When discussing the Chinese proletariat, we must also refer to the world proletariat. When discussing the struggles of the Chinese proletarian party—the Communist Party—we must refer to how Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin led the international proletariat in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism.

This is called the "domestic-foreign method."

China is "domestic," and foreign countries are "foreign."

By extension, it can also be said that the Revolution of 1911 is "domestic," while the Qing government is "foreign"; the May Fourth Movement is "domestic," while Duan Qirui and Cao Rulin are "foreign"; the Northern Expedition is "domestic," while the Northern Warlords are "foreign"; and during the civil war, the Communist Party is "domestic," while the Kuomintang is "foreign."

Without clearly understanding the "foreign," it is not easy to gain a clear understanding of the "domestic."

In the world, there is no one aspect without the other.

Thus, there is the "ancient-modern" dimension and the "domestic-foreign" dimension.

From the Revolution of 1911 onward, through the May Fourth Movement, the Great Revolution, the civil war, and the War of Resistance, this is the "ancient-modern" dimension.

China’s Communist Party and Kuomintang, peasants and landlords, workers and capitalists, and the world’s proletariat and bourgeoisie, etc.—this is the "domestic-foreign" dimension.

I believe that in order to systematically study the history of the Chinese Communist Party, two types of materials should be compiled in the future: one is intra-party materials, including those of the international communist movement; the other is extra-party materials, encompassing imperialism, landlords, the bourgeoisie, and so on.

Both types of materials should be arranged chronologically by year and month.

Studying the two types of materials in contrast is what is called the "ancient-modern, domestic-foreign method," which is also the method of historicism.

When we study Party history, we must adopt a comprehensive perspective. Only such an approach to Party history is scientific.

Our study of Party history must be scientific, not subjectivist.

When examining mistakes in Party history, we should not simply hold a grudge against a few individuals.

If we only resent a few people, that would mean viewing history as the creation of a handful of individuals.

The Marxist view of history is not subjectivist; we must identify the essence of historical events and their objective causes.

Is focusing solely on objective causes sufficient?

No, it is not. We must also recognize the role of leaders, which is very significant.

However, leading figures are also objective entities. Whether they veered to the "left," veered to the right, or committed certain errors, there are objective reasons behind it. Only by identifying the objective causes can we explain it.

Now we oppose subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotyped Party writing. When studying history, we should also pay attention to whether such phenomena existed historically.

Only by clarifying these issues can we acquire a scientific method.

This scientific method is not subjectivism, not sectarianism, and not stereotyped Party writing.

We must apply this method to study our Party’s strategic line in various periods and examine specific issues, such as military affairs, the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, and the peasants’ land question.

In studying the history of the Chinese Communist Party, we should take China as the center, anchoring our standpoint in China.

We must also study world capitalism and socialism, but we must clarify their relationship with the study of Chinese Communist Party history. This means determining on which side your standpoint lies. If it leans entirely toward foreign countries, then it ceases to be a study of Chinese Communist Party history.

When we study China, we must take China as the center and, rooted in China, study matters of the world.

Some of our comrades have a tendency to make foreign countries the center of everything, acting as mere gramophones, mechanically and uncritically transplanting foreign things into China without studying China’s distinctive characteristics.

If we fail to study China’s distinctive characteristics and instead import foreign things, we will be unable to solve China’s problems.

Without studying the historical development of the Chinese Communist Party and the Party’s ideological and political struggles, our research will yield no results.

We have studied the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*. It taught us that Bolshevism, using Marxism as its theory and method, created the socialist state of the Soviet Union.

This Bolshevism and this socialist state had never existed before; they were created in Russia by the Party led by Lenin.

Lenin integrated Marxist stands and methods with the concrete practice of the Russian revolution, creating Bolshevism. With this theory and strategy, he carried out the February Revolution, the October Revolution, and later, Stalin implemented the three Five-Year Plans, creating the socialist Soviet Union.

We must act in the same spirit.

We must apply the methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin to China and create something new in China.

Merely possessing general theory without applying it to China’s reality will not defeat the enemy.

But if we apply theory to practice, using Marxist stands and methods to solve China’s problems and create something new, then it becomes effective.

For example, our Party established the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army under conditions in which we had no artillery and no aircraft. This was something China created on its own.

Printed according to the journal *Party History Studies*, Issue 1, 1980.

Note:
[1] This is a speech by Mao Zedong delivered to the Central Study Group.
[2] For the Horse Day Incident, see p. 38, note [3] of this volume.