(1) The decision on land policy in the anti-Japanese base areas, adopted by the Central Political Bureau on January 28, is a conclusion drawn from the experiences of various regions over the past five years. Its fundamental spirit is first to be able to mobilize the broad masses of peasants. If the masses cannot be roused, then nothing can be achieved. After the masses are truly mobilized, care must also be taken to ensure that landlords can survive. Therefore, economically, the aim is only to weaken (and it must be weakened) the feudal forces, not to eliminate them. As for rich peasants, the feudal part of their operations is weakened, while the capitalist part is encouraged. Economically, our Party's current policy is mainly to reward capitalist production, while at the same time preserving certain rights of the landlords—it can be said to be a policy of seven parts capitalism and three parts feudalism. Politically, the "three-thirds system" is implemented, so that the landlord bourgeoisie feels there is still a future. All of this is to break the alliance between the landlord bourgeoisie and the enemy and diehards, to win over the majority of the landlord bourgeoisie to stand on the side of the anti-Japanese democratic regime rather than go over to the side of the enemy and diehards—and if they do go over, then to win them back.

(2) Uniting with the landlords to resist Japan is our Party's strategic policy. However, in implementing this strategic policy, a tactical policy of first striking and then drawing in, striking and drawing in alternately, with drawing-in within striking and striking within drawing-in, must be adopted. When the broad masses have not yet been mobilized, the landlord class generally resolutely opposes the reduction of rent and interest and democratic politics. At such times, we must actively assist the masses in striking at the landlords, destroying their reactionary rule in the countryside, and establishing the preponderance of mass strength, so that the landlord class feels that unless they submit to our policies, they cannot preserve their interests and have no other way out. In the fervent struggle of the broad masses, some excessively left-leaning actions will inevitably occur. If these excessively left-leaning actions are truly conscious and voluntary actions of the broad masses, and not the reckless acts of a few people divorced from the masses (which is a matter of principle absolutely not to be permitted), then they are not only harmless but beneficial, because they serve the purpose of weakening the feudal forces and mobilizing the masses. At such times, if one is overcautious and afraid of mass participation, that is a right-deviation error. This is the first stage of the tactical struggle (the stage of striking). However, this stage should be limited by the strategy of uniting to resist Japan. It must not be allowed to develop unchecked, to the point where the landlord class is forced to run over to the enemy and diehard side and resolutely oppose us, or, after running over, is unwilling to return, thereby harming the anti-Japanese war and the consolidation of the anti-Japanese base areas. Therefore, the Party's tactic is not to prevent in advance the occurrence of such excessively left-leaning actions, which would hinder the full mobilization and full arousal of the masses, but rather, after the masses have been fully mobilized and fully aroused, to be able to persuade the masses in a timely manner, correct the excessively left-leaning actions, grant the landlords the ability to pay rent and interest and the political "three-thirds system," guarantee the landlords' rights of person, political rights, land rights, and property rights, so that they feel grateful and willing to cooperate with us, thereby achieving the strategic aim of resisting Japan. This is the second stage of the tactical struggle (the stage of drawing in). In the first stage of the tactical struggle, it is not an across-the-board overthrow, but rather to win over a part of the landlords who are inclined toward us (striking with drawing-in within it), to neutralize and paralyze a part of the wavering and irresolute landlords, and to concentrate firepower on striking at the most diehard landlords (though the content and form of striking at the landlords are different from those in the period of the civil war). In the second stage of the tactical struggle, we must display the utmost magnanimity, earnestly implement the "three-thirds system" and the payment of rent and interest, earnestly guarantee human rights, political rights, land rights, and property rights, openly criticize internal sectarianism ("closed-doorism"), and correct excessively fiery actions. At such a time, if we do not lay emphasis on persuading Party members and persuading the peasants to win over the landlords, we cannot break the alliance between the landlords and the enemy and diehards, and there is the danger of our Party and the peasants falling into isolation and even defeat. However, when correcting excessively fiery actions and conducting self-criticism, we must at the same time pay attention to protecting the initiative and the fervent mood or zeal of cadres and the masses. It must be understood that our correct criticism of excessively fiery actions and sectarianism is by no means dousing this zeal with cold water, leading to a situation where cadres become negative, the masses become disappointed, and the landlords counter-attack. In the normal course of struggle, there should be a preparatory stage for brewing the struggle. In this stage, the landlords still hold superiority, and the peasants are preparing for struggle. If this is regarded as the first stage, then the carrying out of the struggle (striking) is the second stage, and unity for resisting Japan (drawing in) is the third stage. In the Jin-Cha-Ji region, except for Yanbei and Pingxi, where land problems have not yet been universally and thoroughly resolved in accordance with our Party's policies, the other basic regions have all passed through these three stages of preparation, struggle, and unity. These are models of normal tactics. Similar models also exist in several other base areas. All of these are tactical stages that should be given the utmost attention during the overall process of implementing the strategic policy of uniting to resist Japan.

(3) The excessively left-leaning errors that occurred in various places in the past in implementing land policy have by and large been corrected. Today, matters that are supported by the broad masses and over which the landlords no longer seriously dispute should be regarded as already resolved, with no further changes, so as to maintain good anti-Japanese order. However, matters where the "three-thirds system" has not been thoroughly implemented, or where major disputes between landlords and peasants still exist, must still receive emphasis in correcting errors.

(4) At present, a serious problem is that in many areas, the mobilization of the masses to struggle against the landlords has not been earnestly carried out, and the zeal of Party members and the masses has not been aroused. This is a serious right-deviation error. This error not only exists to a serious extent in the poorer base areas, but even in the best base areas, there are some regions where the reduction of rent and interest and the mobilization of mass struggle have not yet been implemented. Therefore, at present, it is necessary to stress opposition to this right deviation and to demand that in all areas where the reduction of rent and interest has not been carried out and mass enthusiasm has not been aroused, the reduction of rent and interest shall be promptly implemented, and mass enthusiasm shall be quickly aroused, based on the conscious and voluntary participation of the broad peasant masses, not on arbitrary action monopolized by a few people. Party headquarters in all areas must examine this issue. If some people adopt an indifferent and bureaucratic attitude, they must be clearly pointed out and corrected.

(5) In areas where the peasants have been fully mobilized, the reduction of rent and interest has been thoroughly implemented, and the stage of "striking" has passed, thereby entering the stage of "drawing in," as we carry out self-criticism to correct excessively fiery actions, thoroughly implement the "three-thirds system," and guarantee the landlords' rights of person, political rights, land rights, and property rights, the landlord class will inevitably seize on the aspects of the new policy that are favorable to themselves to expand and struggle against the peasants. In this stage (the stage of drawing in), the disputes among the various classes can only be conducted through democratic, cooperative, and reasonable means. However, the culturally backward peasant masses, and even cadres at the district and village levels, can easily be deceived by cunning and treacherous landlords, or be bought off by landlords to manipulate district and village political power, or be attacked by landlords and dare not strike back. Therefore, it is necessary to educate cadres at the county, district, and village levels to learn the skills of conducting legal struggles against landlords, to be familiar with the government's decrees, and to be familiar with the tactic of "striking within drawing-in," so as to deal with the unreasonable attacks of certain cunning landlords, and to guard against being bought off.

(6) The reduction of rent applies to the future, not to the past. The reduction of interest applies to the past, not to the future. Broadly speaking, the dividing line is around the period before and after the War of Resistance. On the question of interest reduction: First, peasants should be allowed to clear up old accounts (including public and private accounts) as a means of mobilizing the masses. Once the masses have been fully mobilized, then mediate the disputes between the two sides and bring them to a peaceful settlement. Second, the problem after the War of Resistance began has been the inability to borrow money, not the limitation of interest rates. All base areas failed to recognize this truth and imposed mandatory regulations, such as stipulating that the interest rate must not exceed ten percent or fifteen percent per annum. This is a policy harmful to ourselves. In the future, peasants should be allowed to handle matters themselves, and interest rates should not be stipulated. At present, as long as peasants can obtain loans, even if the interest is thirty percent or forty percent, and it is clearly known to be of a usurious nature, it still benefits the peasants by relieving their urgent needs. At the same time, each year, seventy to eighty percent of the government's construction funds should be invested in the countryside as low-interest loans to peasants (including loans to cooperatives), in order to develop the basic agricultural economy of the various base areas, while twenty to thirty percent should be invested in publicly run industry and commerce and private commerce. It must be understood that developing agriculture is not only in the interest of the peasants, but also the best and most reliable source for expanding government tax revenue; it is the basic policy for solving the problems of the financial and economic departments.

(7) The Central Committee's decision on land policy in the anti-Japanese base areas and its three appendices have all been published openly. All areas should immediately promulgate them, publicize them widely, and diligently implement them. This is our Party's long-term land policy during the stage of the new-democratic revolution, which must be implemented not only today but also for a very long time to come. As for this directive, it is specifically intended for the Party and must not be published openly. Within each base area, meetings, Party schools, and documents should be used to ensure that the basic cadres of the Party understand the Party's strategic and tactical policy. Then, through them, enable the lower-level cadres to understand, so that this concrete tactical education truly achieves results.