The Main Points of Propaganda of the
Propaganda Department of the Central
Committee
(January 26, 1942)
1. The main points of propaganda of this department used to lay primary
emphasis on propaganda outside the Party. From this period onward, we have
decided to add propaganda within the Party. We hope that comrades from all
regions will pay attention.
2. In view of the fact that, before the Zunyi Conference, the losses caused to
the Party and to the revolution by errors of subjectivism and sectarianism were
enormous; and given that although after the Zunyi Conference the line of the
Party has been correct, the remnants of subjectivism and sectarianism have by no
means been eliminated and still exist to a very substantial extent within the
entire Party, especially in certain special regions and certain special departments.
The Politburo of the Central Committee has discussed this problem repeatedly
and emphatically during the past year. It has issued a Decision on Enhancing
Party Spirit, a Decision on Developing Investigations and Research, a Decision on
Cadre Schools, and a Decision on High-Level Study Groups. In addition,
Comrade Mao Zedong, in accordance with a decision of the Central Committee,
delivered a speech at the Consultative Congress of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia
Border Region opposing sectarianism. These decisions and this speech have
already played a guiding role throughout the Party, have attracted the attention
of many comrades, and have been concretely correcting the remnants of
subjectivism and sectarianism that still exist to this day. This is a good thing, but
it is only one side of the phenomenon. On the one hand, the decisions of the

Central Committee and the speeches by comrades of the Central Committee have
not made a deep impression on many comrades. The reasons for this may be that
some comrades who committed rather serious errors of subjectivism and
sectarianism still refuse for the moment genuinely to recognize their errors, are
unwilling to conduct genuine self-criticisms, and refuse to correct their errors
quickly. On the other hand, it may be that some comrades think that they have
by no means committed any subjectivist and sectarian errors of line, and
therefore they consider that this matter does not concern them and they are
above it all, failing to recognize the subjectivist and sectarian elements in their
own thoughts and actions both in the past and in the present and the fact that
they have also been guilty of mistakes. For example, they may be easily aroused,
substituting their personal feelings for policy, understanding very little about the
circumstances of the three sides—enemy, friends, and ourselves. They may lack
the spirit of scientifically and carefully investigating and researching objective
things, but have the spirit of always considering themselves in the right. All these
are precisely the sources of subjectivist errors. Furthermore, such errors may
consist, for example, of asserting one’s independence inside the Party and
confusing correct things, such as developing the ability to work independently
and developing Marxist creativity, with erroneous things, such as disobeying
one’s superior, disobeying the majority, disobeying the Central Committee,
setting oneself against the Party, and putting the individual above the Party
(giving prominence to the individual), and individual heroism (as opposed to
national heroism and the heroism of the masses). In relations between cadres
from outside and cadres from local areas, in relations between military cadres
and cadres of the localities, in relations between cadres of the same forces and
cadres of friendly forces, and in relations between veteran cadres and new cadres,
they do not pay attention to helping one another and uniting with one another,
but they look down on one another or even bully one another. Here, we did not
increase the responsibilities of cadres from the outside, military cadres, cadres of
the same force, and old cadres; neither did we do more to forgive and assist
cadres from the local areas, cadres from the localities, cadres of friendly forces,
and new cadres in the expectation of uniting them and promoting them so that
they will overcome various weaknesses in the course of struggle. Because in
many places there still exist various abnormal internal relations, these are but

manifestations of remnants of sectarianism within the Party. As far as relations
between Party members and non-Party members and between Party cadres and
non-Party cadres are concerned, there further exist enormous estrangement,
misunderstanding, lack of concern, and looking down on one another. For this,
Party members and Party cadres should be held primarily responsible. That the
“Three-Thirds” system1 has by no means been carried out completely,
thoroughly, and earnestly is a manifestation of the existence of this sectarianism.
It is a fact that this type of serious sectarian error in relations between those
inside and outside the Party has not attracted serious attention of all or of the
majority of our comrades. All these subjectivist and sectarian thoughts and
actions cannot be overcome if we do not initiate a thorough, earnest, and deep
struggle against them, and as a result we cannot win victory for the revolution.
Moreover, if we want to carry forward the struggle and overcome these thoughts
and actions, it will not have much effect if we do not mobilize the entire Party.
For this reason, we hope that all the leading organs and all the leading comrades
of the whole Party and the whole army will pay attention to this problem, carry
out propaganda, and carry on the work. Regarding this problem, our department
will successively provide the materials stated as references for our comrades’
work.
Notes
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 389–91, where it is reproduced from Mao’s
handwritten manuscript.
1. The “Three-Thirds” system (san san zhi), publicized in a March 6, 1940, Central Committee directive,
required all public political offices to be shared equally by three groups: Communists, non-Party Leftists, and
middle-of-the-road anti-Japanese patriots. See the account of this development in Vol. VII, pp. 432–34.