January 19, 1942. 27()1. Agree with the plan for a phased withdrawal. (1) However, we must anticipate that Chiang may order the arrest of all our personnel and be prepared to face such a scenario. (3) The group of 115 personnel who withdrew from Xi’an, led by Li Hua and carrying fully valid passports, was detained at Tongguan by the Sixteenth Army.

Commander-in-Chief Zhu has already sent telegrams to Xiong and Hu requesting their release; the outcome remains unknown. (4) If Article 11 is not implemented, resumption of negotiations will be impossible. This stance is entirely correct. (5) The contradictions between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek can still be exploited. According to reports, Li Zongren has concentrated over 20,000 troops—equipped with 100 artillery pieces, 30 tanks, and 110 aircraft—in Xin’andian after advancing north from Xinyang and Yingshan; this force continues to grow and appears to be planning an invasion of northern Henan.

All field armies are hereby instructed to deploy against the enemy. Tang Enbo’s main forces are currently establishing defensive positions north of Queshan. Mo Dehong reports that while our forces are engaged in sweeping up bandit groups in central China, the Japanese have massed their principal striking force near Xinyang. He has ordered the units stationed in Shangcheng to prepare for combat. Should the enemy launch a large-scale offensive, it would undoubtedly be a joint operation between the Japanese invaders and the pro-Japanese faction, aimed at coercing Chiang into compromise—and ultimately at destroying him. (6)

Our policy is to hold fast to the Jiangnan Incident and the “January 17th” Order, never letting go. The breakdown was initiated by Chiang. It was he who drove us into a position where we could no longer avoid confrontation with him. Our commanded troops have already been branded as rebels, and there is now absolutely no possibility of resuming relations with Chiang unless he rescinds the “January 17th” Order and implements Article 11. We have no room whatsoever for negotiation with him; Chiang has completely stripped us of that option. As for the staff of the Office, whether they choose to fight or to die is up to them. Each of us is prepared to face execution. If they also recognize the principle that envoys should not be put to death when two armies are in contact, then they should allow our people to return to Yan’an; otherwise, it is for them to decide. Until they formally declare a complete rupture—by abolishing the Eighth Route Army’s designation and officially labeling the CCP as traitorous—the Office will retain a small contingent on site, awaiting their change of heart. All of these points should be openly explained to Zhang Chong and others. (7)

The communiqué announcing the assumption of office by the New Fourth Army’s commanders and the proclamation denouncing the pro-Japanese faction are to be dispatched to your office without delay. (8) With regard to all such documents originating in Yan’an, if it is impractical for the Office to issue them directly, they are to be disseminated secretly through indirect channels, so as to safeguard the Office’s security.