•. We have received all your reports.

1. Our assessments are consistent: the anti-Communist stance will not change; the current high tide may subside, and the encirclement and suppression campaign against the Communists may come to a halt.

2. Once this high tide recedes and the suppression campaign is suspended, it will be much more difficult to rekindle another wave of such activity or to resume the suppression effort. Therefore, the present moment marks a critical juncture in the overall situation.

3. The enemy will certainly attack Chiang Kai-shek, as we have assessed; exploiting the contradictions between Japan and Chiang remains at the core of our policy.

4. However, making concessions to Chiang, as you point out, would be dangerous. Right now is the time to compel Chiang to make concessions to us, not for us to concede to him. If we can get through this phase, matters will become considerably easier.

5. Never before has Chiang been subjected to such intense criticism from both within and outside as he is today, just as never before have we enjoyed such broad popular support—both domestically and internationally.

6. Chiang will not launch a counteroffensive; his primary aim remains the preservation of his forces. That said, the likelihood of Japan attacking Chiang is very high, and he may be forced to engage, which would inevitably lead to further attrition of his military strength.

7. As Chen Bulei has noted, Sino–Communist relations are currently at an impasse. However, this stalemate will not last long: the day the enemy launches a major offensive will also be the day the impasse begins to shift (though if the enemy does not attack, the stalemate will persist).

8. At that time, when Chiang shows some signs of easing his stance toward us, we too may adopt a slightly more conciliatory posture; but the time for that has not yet arrived. For now, allowing the impasse to continue is actually advantageous: the more entrenched it becomes, the more it works to our benefit and to Chiang’s detriment.

9. The current impasse is primarily political and pertains to Sino–Communist relations; militarily, we are by no means in a stalemate, since we have not initiated any offensive operations against him.

10. Should Chiang once again order Tang’s corps to attack northern Anhui, he would be creating a new impasse for himself. Should the enemy then deliver another decisive blow, his defeat would be even greater. Conversely, if Chiang refrains from attacking northern Anhui, he could resolve his own military impasse immediately, leaving only the political one unresolved. A wise course of action for Chiang would be to proceed in this manner.

11. Our political offensive—the Eleven Points—has thoroughly outstripped Chiang’s counter-offensive, which included the “Haodian” and “Qidian” telegrams, the Southern Anhui Incident, the July 17th directive, the ultimatum for northward relocation, the disciplinary orders, and the Central China offensive, among other measures. Our offensive has already yielded results and will continue to do so. (11) Our objective is not for Chiang to acknowledge the Eleven Points, or even part of them—he will certainly never do so (though we naturally tell neither Party members nor the general public otherwise; we still formally demand his recognition). Rather, our aim is to repel his offensive with our own.

13. The current situation has indeed changed. Prior to January 17, it was Chiang who was on the offensive while we were on the defensive; after that date, the roles have been reversed: he has now been pushed onto the defensive, and this constitutes our greatest victory.

14. Only a military offensive would hinder Chiang’s resistance to Japan; such a policy would be profoundly mistaken. A political offensive, by contrast, serves only to pressurize Chiang into resisting Japan and does not impede his war effort. Therefore, adopting a defensive posture on the military front while pursuing a vigorous political offensive is entirely correct; these two approaches are, in fact, complementary rather than contradictory.

15. With regard to Sino–Communist relations, a defensive military posture combined with a political offensive will only serve to bring the two sides closer together, never to drive them apart. By forcing a powerful aggressor into a defensive position and preventing him from launching further attacks, we create the very conditions under which Sino–Communist relations can begin to improve. 16) It was with Chiang Kai-shek’s own hands that a breach was opened in Sino–Communist relations; only by our own efforts can this breach be mended. And our means of doing so is precisely the political offensive embodied in the Eleven Points. There is no other effective way forward.

17. Please provide an explanation of all the points outlined above and share your views on them.

18. Kindly prepare and submit details regarding the troop strengths and equipment dispositions of both the enemy and ourselves in North and Central China as soon as possible. ().