Refutation of the Third “Left” Deviationist Line (Excerpt) (1941) I. According to our longstanding understanding, assessing a situation means conducting investigations and studies of the objective realities that exist, forming in our minds an internal conception of these realities and their interrelationships.
These internal connections exist independently of our subjective perceptions and cannot be arbitrarily affirmed or denied by us.
Whether they are favorable or unfavorable to us, whether they can mobilize the masses or not, we must investigate them, consider them, and pay close attention to them.
If we wish to change the objective situation, we can formulate a course of action based on this accurate assessment of its internal dynamics, thereby influencing and transforming the external reality.
If the objective conditions are conducive to our advance, we tell the masses: “Press forward!”
If they are unfavorable, we either advise them to “pause” (bordering on wait-and-see tactics) or to “retreat” (strongly suggestive of opportunism). In my view, this constitutes the most basic Marxist perspective.
II.
It must be understood that in all areas where the Japanese and the Kuomintang maintain firm control—covering more than ninety percent of the country—it is absolutely impermissible to resort to violent armed struggle; only non-violent peaceful struggle is permissible.
Peaceful struggle takes two forms: legal, open struggle, and illegal, clandestine struggle.
Both are non-violent, non-revolutionary, and unarmed methods.
Together, they constitute the strategic line to be followed within enemy-controlled territories.
Every area under Japanese or Kuomintang domination must adopt legal, open forms of struggle.
Although China is not a democratic, rule-of-law state, and the people lack political freedom—especially under Japanese occupation—the laws and social norms still offer numerous avenues for exploitation.
There are many contradictions, gaps, and loopholes that we can utilize.
Only by engaging in legitimate, publicly visible forms of struggle can we attract participants, generally avoid arrest and dissolution by the authorities, and preserve or accumulate our strength.
However, the Provisional Central Committee [1] vehemently opposed this approach.
Many struggles that were originally intended to be clandestine could achieve victory only when conducted openly and legally.
For example, strikes are inherently illegal.
Yet, if we aim to secure success and avoid failure, we must carefully assess local economic, political, and social conditions at the time.
We should strike only when feasible and cease immediately if unsuccessful.
By proceeding in a well-reasoned manner and adhering to principles of fairness, benefit, and moderation, we can sustain our efforts and ultimately prevail.
In contrast, the Provisional Central Committee simply issued blanket orders such as “Mobilize all forces to organize anti-Japanese strikes,” without regard for local circumstances.
Similarly, anti-Japanese activities are illegal, but they can sometimes succeed by leveraging public opinion and exploiting political fissures.
Nevertheless, the Provisional Central Committee merely shouted slogans and acted impulsively, resulting in the complete failure of any sizable or sustained anti-Japanese movement.
Moreover, open actions must be complemented by covert operations—namely, the Party’s secret organizational work, the secret organizing efforts of the masses (which serve as the core of public organizations), secret joint initiatives among different factions, intelligence gathering, and preliminary clandestine preparations for public demonstrations.
Without such covert work, open activities lose their purpose and meaning, and the Party cannot survive in enemy-held territory.
Unfortunately, the Provisional Central Committee not only refused to engage in legal, open struggle but also neglected serious covert operations.
They reveled in exposure, flaunted their power, glorified themselves as heroes, and constantly anticipated imminent victory.
As a result, over a period of more than three years, they completely dismantled the Party’s presence in enemy-controlled areas, leaving not a single shred of grassroots support behind.
Clearly, the Provisional Central Committee’s so-called “diverse forms of struggle” were nothing more than empty rhetoric; in reality, they had only one tactic: shouting, clamoring, and making a fuss—and nothing else.
They utterly failed to grasp that China’s unique strategy lies in the integration of armed and peaceful struggle, with peaceful struggle further divided into open and covert approaches.
This intricate political science is essential for the Communist Party of China to succeed.
How, then, could the Provisional Central Committee’s simplistic, one-sided, and reckless approach possibly “make the working class the backbone of the anti-Japanese movement” or “elevate the proletariat to the role of leader and organizer of the Chinese nation”?
On the contrary, it rendered the working class useless and turned the proletariat into mere mouthpieces for empty calls to national liberation, leaving them powerless to effect real change.
Why, then, do some comrades even shy away from mentioning the word “nation”?
If leaders [2] advocate for overthrowing everything, embracing extreme sectarianism and reckless adventurism, what right do they have to speak of nationality?
And what good would it do to invoke the term anyway?
III.
Let me ask these leaders: Why is distributing land equally to everyone labeled as “a thoroughly opportunist viewpoint” and “a complete disregard for proletarian leadership”?
Frankly, I would like to lecture them!
You know nothing about reality.
Completely detached from the peasantry, you forcibly imposed the erroneous policy of “no land for landlords, inferior plots for rich peasants” across the Soviet areas, arrogantly proclaiming it as a “clear class line.”
Meanwhile, you branded the equitable redistribution method—“take from the rich, give to the poor”—endorsed and supported by farmers in southern regions like Jiangxi, as “the rich-peasant line” and “pure opportunism,” forcibly suppressing it.
Do you even understand the implications?
Denying landlords any land effectively amounts to physically eliminating them.
Which Marxist-Leninist principle justifies such a measure?
Logically speaking, if you do not intend to destroy their digestive systems, you should at least allow them to eat.
I have heard that after the October Revolution, Lenin sent certain landlords to Siberia to chop wood, providing them with both labor and sustenance—a true manifestation of Leninist principles.
Our so-called “Leninists,” however, did not follow suit.
They neither assigned any wood-chopping tasks to the landlords nor granted them any land to cultivate.
Consequently, these landlords were driven to become guerilla fighters, taking up arms against the Soviets.
What benefit could possibly arise from such a policy?
As for giving inferior plots to rich peasants, this effectively reduced them to poverty, turning them against us as well.
To treat landlords and rich peasants in this manner—denying the former land altogether and assigning substandard plots to the latter—during a period of democratic revolution, before its ultimate victory, and amidst fierce enemy offensives where the outcome remains uncertain, which Leninist principle does this align with?
Can your approach even be considered a display of leadership?
No!
It is a destructive act—one that undermines the leading role of the proletariat and sabotages the very foundation of the revolution!
Regarding land distribution, the Sixth National Congress of the Party resolved: “In regions with large numbers of unemployed and impoverished farmers, a movement advocating ‘equal land distribution’ is bound to emerge.
When this slogan gains widespread support among the peasantry, the Party should actively endorse it, as it represents a thorough eradication of feudal remnants and directly challenges the private ownership system.”
Most of these statements are correct, particularly given China’s demographic characteristics—limited arable land per capita.
In northern China, each person typically has only three mu of land, whereas in the south, the average is just one mu.
However, the final sentence contains a flaw: Equal land distribution does not dismantle the entire private ownership system; it merely erodes feudal private holdings, replacing them with peasant-owned land.
Moreover, rural areas still face the choice between capitalist and socialist paths, let alone the fact that urban private property belonging to the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie remains untouched.
The Sixth Congress also emphasized the need to explain to farmers that true equality is unattainable under current conditions, thus discouraging attempts at absolute egalitarianism (such as infringing upon the interests of middle peasants or prohibiting land sales after redistribution, which would prevent the emergence of new wealthy farmers). The Provisional Central Committee, in direct violation of the Sixth Congress’s resolutions, concocted a “left-opportunist” line of “no land for landlords, inferior plots for rich peasants,” coupled with flawed political, military, and organizational strategies.
The result was the collapse of the revolution—an outcome they nonetheless claimed was “completely justified.”
IV.
The purpose of understanding the world is to transform it.
Human history is created by humanity itself.
However, without understanding the world, transformation is impossible.
As Lenin famously stated, “There can be no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory” [3]. In this regard, our leaders remain utterly clueless.
The transition from the realm of necessity to that of freedom requires both comprehension and practical application.
Ancient European philosophers [4] had already recognized the truth that “freedom arises from the understanding of necessity.”
Marx’s contribution did not lie in denying this truth, but rather in supplementing it by adding the principle that “freedom entails transforming the world based on that understanding” [5]. “Freedom is the understanding of necessity” was the proposition of the ancient philosophers.
“Freedom is the understanding of necessity and the transformation of the world” is the Marxist thesis.
A Marxist who fails to recognize the world through the lens of transformation, and to transform the world through the lens of understanding, cannot be considered a true Marxist.
Similarly, a Chinese Marxist who cannot comprehend China through the process of transforming it, nor transform China through the process of comprehending it, cannot be regarded as a genuine Chinese Marxist.
Marx pointed out that humans differ from bees in that we first conceive of a house in our minds before actually building it [6]. Likewise, to construct the edifice of the Chinese revolution, we must first have a blueprint for it.
This blueprint consists not only of a comprehensive master plan but also of numerous detailed sub-plans.
These blueprints are, in essence, dynamic reflections of objective realities derived from our practical experience in the Chinese revolution—reflections concerning domestic class relations, ethnic relations, international relations among various countries, and the interactions between China and other nations, among other aspects.
The reason our leaders are mere subjectivists is that all their revolutionary blueprints, whether grand or minute, general or specific, lack grounding in objective reality and often contradict it.
They harbor only a vague, subjective desire to transform the world, China, North China, or a particular city, yet possess no coherent, scientifically grounded plans.
Their “blueprints” are arbitrary, haphazard, and entirely subjective.
By attempting to reshape the world without truly understanding it, they not only damage their own mental faculties but also mislead countless others.
Treating themselves as guides to the inevitable path of the Chinese revolution while remaining blind to its true nature is akin to “leading a blind horse into a deep pit at midnight.”
V. The so-called “two-front struggle” advocated by the leaders of the “left-opportunist” line from the September 18 Incident to the Zunyi Conference was fundamentally subjective.
First, they relied on their own subjective criteria—rather than objective facts—to evaluate everything, crafting these criteria whimsically.
Applying an opportunistic mindset to judge others inevitably leads to the conclusion that everyone is an opportunist, much like how a believer in ghosts sees them everywhere.
Secondly, their subjective approach extended to organizational matters as well.
Using the same subjective framework, they formulated both their political line and their factional organizational strategy, consequently labeling anyone who did not align with their preferences as an “opportunist.”
They never employed the materialist dialectical method—neither in analyzing events nor in evaluating people.
Consequently, any attempt to engage in a two-front struggle without relying on this rigorous method would amount to mere chaos, yielding no meaningful results.
Thirdly, they lacked even a basic understanding of what a two-front struggle entailed.
In the eyes of a Marxist, a two-front struggle involves analyzing and synthesizing the historical and contemporary developments of a particular phenomenon as it unfolds across time and space, thereby determining its inherent stability—that is, its essence and defining characteristics.
For instance, to ascertain the nature of contemporary Chinese society, one must conduct a meticulous, scientific analysis of its past and present conditions.
Only then can one discern that it differs from a purely feudal society (the first front) and a purely capitalist society (the second front), ultimately concluding that it is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal entity.
Similarly, to understand the nature of the ongoing Chinese revolution, one must begin with the premise that Chinese society is a unique blend of semi-colonial and semi-feudal characteristics.
From there, a thorough analysis reveals that it is distinct from a nation where feudal oppression prevails without ethnic suppression and where the proletariat remains unaware—such as France two centuries ago, where the bourgeoisie led a revolution to overthrow feudal rule and establish bourgeois dictatorship (first front). It also differs from cases where the proletariat’s awakening enables the establishment of a socialist system after the overthrow of feudalism, as seen in Russia during the October Revolution, where the proletariat spearheaded the overthrow of bourgeois rule and the founding of proletarian rule (second front). Only through such comprehensive analysis can one arrive at the conclusion that the current Chinese revolution is a new-democratic revolution led by the proletariat, opposing imperialism and feudalism while establishing a united front of various revolutionary classes.
For every concrete issue or individual, if one seeks to understand its essence, one must employ the two-front struggle methodology—conducting detailed analysis and synthesis—to reach a definitive conclusion.
Any deviation from this approach, or any mismatch between the method and the actual circumstances, renders a correct judgment impossible.
The leaders of the “left-opportunist” line recklessly embraced the two-front struggle in a highly subjective manner, completely disregarding concrete, scientific investigation.
Consequently, their conclusions were invariably flawed.
Furthermore, their subjective interpretation of the two-front struggle caused profound confusion and ambiguity within the Party regarding this very concept.
While many were aware of the need to engage in a two-front struggle, few knew precisely how to do so, reducing it to an empty slogan.
Lastly, the Provisional Central Committee’s subjective, chaotic implementation of the two-front struggle—as described in the “History of the CPSU(b)” [7]—was incompatible with the Party’s stated objectives.
The book emphasizes the need to combat and crush “opportunistic factions within the Party—economic opportunists, Mensheviks, Trotskyists, Bukharinites, and nationalist elements” (paragraph four of the epilogue), as well as to foster criticism and self-criticism to rectify errors made by Party members and cadres (paragraph five of the epilogue). The Provisional Central Committee’s chaotic approach, however, blurred the distinction between confronting external enemies and addressing internal shortcomings.
They applied the same aggressive tactics to both, treating fellow comrades as adversaries, thereby fostering a culture of indiscriminate conflict throughout the Party.
Regardless of the matter at hand, whether significant or trivial, everything was met with “the most resolute and ruthless struggle,” permeated by “hatred” and “zealous militancy.”
This resulted in growing disunity and anxiety within the Party, leaving members feeling lost and insecure.
Unless this anti-scientific, petty-bourgeois subjectivism is eradicated, true unity and cohesion within the Party will remain unattainable.
Printed according to the original documents preserved in the Central Archives.
Notes [1] Refers to the Provisional Central Political Bureau of the CPC, established in Shanghai in September 1931 at the suggestion of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. [2] Refers to the “left-dogmatic” ideologues represented by Wang Ming. [3] See Lenin’s “What Is to Be Done?”
Chapter 1, Section 4 (“Collected Works of Lenin,” Volume 1, People’s Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 241). [4] Refers to Dutch materialist philosopher Spinoza and German classical idealist philosopher Hegel, among others. [5] See Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” (“Selected Works of Marx and Engels,” Volume 1, People’s Publishing House, 1972 edition, pp. 16–19) and Engels’s “Anti-Dühring,” Part I, Section 11, “Morality and Law.
Freedom and Necessity” (“Selected Works of Marx and Engels,” Volume 3, People’s Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 154). [6] See Marx’s “Capital,” Volume 1, Chapter 5, “The Labor Process and the Process of Value Creation.”
The original text reads: “The bee’s ability to construct its honeycomb puts many human architects to shame.
Yet, the most inept architect surpasses even the most skillful bee in one crucial respect: he conceives the structure in his mind before he begins to build it with wax.” (“Complete Works of Marx and Engels,” Volume 23, People’s Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 202). [7] Namely, the “Concise History of the CPSU(b).”