()1. With regard to the Southern Anhui Incident and the Chongqing Military Commission’s January 17 declaration that the New Fourth Army had mutinied, please refer to the Yan’an Military Commission’s order and accompanying statement of January 10–11. We must firmly maintain that this was a plot hatched by the Japanese aggressors and the pro-Japanese faction (not to say Chiang Kai-shek himself). As for the so-called military discipline and orders compelling our northward movement, as well as the arrests and killings carried out in various localities—all counterrevolutionary acts—we insist that these were all perpetrated by the pro-Japanese clique under direct instructions from the Japanese. By adopting this stance, we place ourselves in a strong political position, forcing Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang to go on the defensive. It does not mean that Chiang has already made peace with Japan; even the slightest contradictions between Chiang and the Japanese can still be exploited by us.

(1) Our strategy of January 10–11 is capable of dealing with either of two possible scenarios: if Chiang is already preparing for a complete rupture, we will meet rupture with rupture; if he is not yet prepared for a full break, we will use sharp confrontation to secure a temporary easing of tensions.

(3) Over the past three months, our policy of concession—namely, the Jia telegraph and the withdrawal of the New Fourth Army from southern Anhui—won us the goodwill of the middle forces but also provided Chiang with an opportunity to launch an offensive against us. This approach must be immediately abandoned in favor of a position of acute antagonism and resolute struggle.

(4) The measures taken on January 17 constituted a major blunder on Chiang’s part. We must seize upon this mistake, pursue it relentlessly, without wavering or compromising in the slightest.

(5) Any change of course on our part can only occur if Chiang Kai-shek rescinds his January 17 order and makes other necessary gestures; otherwise, we shall not alter our position.

(6) Chiang’s scheme is to defeat us piecemeal, treating the New Fourth Army issue as a local matter. We, however, cannot adopt such an approach; we must regard it as a nationwide affair.

(7) Politically, we should take the offensive; militarily, we will continue to hold the defensive line for the time being.

(8) At present, Chiang has not yet mentioned either the Eighth Route Army or the Chinese Communist Party. Accordingly, we too will refrain from publicly criticizing the entire Kuomintang or the Nationalist Central Army, nor will any members of the Eighth Route Army or the CCP appear openly. We will respond to whatever moves Chiang makes, remaining essentially on the defensive in this regard.

(9) Within three months, Germany is certain to attack Britain, and Japan may also launch an offensive against China. The international situation is bound to undergo significant changes, which could weaken Chiang Kai-shek’s confidence. However, if Britain suffers a decisive defeat and Roosevelt proves unable to cope, the likelihood of Chiang’s capitulation would greatly increase.

(10) We should neither completely trust nor completely dismiss the words of the middle forces. Only by adopting a firm, uncompromising stance of resolute struggle can we truly win over the middle elements. Otherwise, their vacillating position will objectively serve Chiang’s interests.