• This latest enemy offensive is of immense scale and ferocity, seemingly even larger than the Yichang Campaign; it is entirely due to Chiang Kai-shek. The 11th Army Group has suffered heavy losses: three corps have already been withdrawn to western Henan, and Nanyang fell on the 4th. Li Xianzhou remains on the west bank of the Huai River, where fighting is equally intense. One enemy column has advanced from Shangcai to capture Xiangcheng, striking at Li’s rear, while another has moved from Bozhou to seize Taihe, pressing forward against his front. It is likely that Li’s forces, once defeated, will also be compelled to withdraw westward. The main body of the Guangxi Army, concentrated in the Dabie Mountains, now finds itself cut off from its rear areas and effectively transformed into a guerrilla force operating behind enemy lines—this constitutes a severe blow to the Guangxi clique. It is conceivable that Mo Dehong’s unit may likewise be forced to retreat westward in due course. Fan Hanjie’s army has already been redeployed south from Zhongtiao Mountain; should Luoyang come under imminent threat, his forces too will have no choice but to cross the Yellow River. Accordingly, the original plan to dispatch Pang Bingxun into southern Hebei to sever our communications between Hebei and Shandong must of necessity be abandoned. Hu Zongnan’s Li Tiejun Division has been hurriedly transferred east overnight, and the 8th Division has been withdrawn from Zhengning to Binzhou, presumably in preparation for further eastward movement. As a result, the encirclement forces around the border region have been weakened, and depending on how the situation in Henan unfolds, there may yet be occasion to redeploy additional units. In short, the anti-Communist campaign has been utterly shattered.

Three. Chiang Kai-shek had long been aware that the Japanese intended to launch an offensive within January, February, or March. His initiation of the Southern Anhui Incident, his issuance of the “January 17th” directive No. 7, and his deployment of large forces to attack the New Fourth Army in northern Jiangsu, eastern Anhui, and central Hubei—all were aimed at halting the enemy advance by turning the focus to internal conflict. Once we are locked in a full-scale civil war, he reasoned, Japan will simply sit back and watch the two sides tear each other apart. If he can merely hold out for a few more months, Hitler will surely compel Japan to pivot southward, thereby bringing peace to the China theater. However, the Japanese viewed the matter quite differently: first, they could not afford to wait. While a prolonged civil war might serve their purposes, Chiang’s ostensible commitment to anti-Communism was nothing more than a ruse to buy time. Rather than allowing him to stall, they decided to exploit the conflict themselves, launching a preemptive strike to weaken him and thus resolve the Chinese problem with far greater ease. In his speech on the 30th, Tojo declared: “The internecine strife within Chiang Kai-shek’s regime certainly precludes any sustained resistance; however, Japan will not rely on this Sino–Japanese dispute to settle the China question. Instead, we shall depend upon our own strength to bring about a decisive outcome.” Consequently, the Henan offensive came as a devastating cold shower for Chiang, shattering all his illusions. Second, the Japanese were adamant that we should not extend our operations into North China. Tojo stated publicly: “North China is Japan’s strategic base. Chiang Kai-shek seeks to drive the Communist forces from Central China into North China, thereby undermining Japan’s interests.” This crucial point had hitherto escaped our proper assessment.

Four. When conducting external propaganda, please emphasize the passage in the Jia telegram that expresses my heartfelt sentiments—from “At present, when traitorous and puppet elements are running rampant and rumors are rife”—to “I earnestly hope to speak frankly before both gentlemen”—a total of 101 characters. By highlighting these words, we can prompt the Kuomintang and the centrist factions to reflect upon the grave dangers now confronting both the Sino–Japanese and the Sino–Communist fronts. Regrettably, our predictions have proven all too accurate: if pressure is applied too relentlessly, mutual antagonism will escalate into a mutually destructive confrontation, resulting in a classic “snipe and clam” scenario where we ourselves become the pawns, while the enemy reaps the benefits—a tragic outcome for which there will be no remedy once it has occurred.

Five. Although the military phase of the anti-Communist campaign has in fact come to an end (even though attacks continue in eastern Anhui and the Guanzhong border region), attention should now be focused on how Chiang Kai-shek and his associates intend to manage Sino–Communist relations. From my observations, they have no choice but to seek some form of compromise. With the enemy pressing so fiercely, with the “January 17th” directive having so thoroughly alienated public opinion, and with his entire campaign now in ruins, coupled with the impending convening of the Advisory Council, failure to reach a settlement would only place him at an even greater disadvantage. Is this assessment appropriate? What is your view?