() In principle, there is no difference between the Central Committee’s statement and the CMC’s statement; the former was issued on the 18th and primarily addressed the Southern Anhui Incident, while the latter, released on the 10th, set forth the entire question and sharply indicated that it was in direct opposition to the Chongqing Military Commission’s statement of the 17th. If it is deemed unobjectionable to publish them together in Chongqing, they may be published jointly; otherwise, only the CMC’s statement need be issued.

(i) From the onset of the rupture to a full-scale breakdown, there may still be a transitional period, the speed and duration of which will depend on various domestic and international factors. Our policy is not to hasten this process, but we must be prepared for it. Until Chiang Kai-shek formally announces a complete break, our office should retain a small contingent to maintain appearances. Therefore, a considerable amount of time remains possible, □□; the view that time should be prolonged is correct. In fact, our troops will not be able to go into action for at least half a year; for now, we are confined to defensive operations.

(iii) It would be highly undesirable if the Soviet Union were to supply Chongqing with additional arms again. Please instruct our military attaché to do everything possible to halt such shipments.

(iv) According to an Associated Press broadcast, Japanese forces have occupied Biyang, suggesting an impending attack on Nanyang. Tang Enbo has already withdrawn his units from Xincai to concentrate them at Shangcai, preparing to meet the enemy.

(v) News from Xi’an reports that Hu Zongnan has agreed to allow the Tongguan authorities to release more than ten individuals, including Li Xinghua, pending further developments.

(vi) The Border Region is currently intensifying its military and economic preparations.

(vii) Until the Kuomintang formally declares a complete rupture, we shall not sever all contact with them. However, with regard to relations between the two parties, we must adhere strictly to our eleven conditions and refrain from discussing any other issues, such as relocation northward, army expansion, or the status of the Border Region.

(viii) In his speech on the 27th, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a defensive posture, which clearly reflects widespread dissatisfaction. He is evidently acting out of fear and insecurity. Today, it has been decided that I shall deliver a counter-speech to respond to him.