To the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the principal leading comrades of the Party: The Pacific War will be a protracted one. The Japanese invaders will become increasingly mired in the South Pacific. At present, they are withdrawing troops from North and Central China to advance southward, and it is likely that further detachments will be transferred in the future as well.

Chongqing’s policy is to employ only guerrilla forces against the enemy, avoiding any engagement by main forces that would result in a stalemate. Once the enemy begins to withdraw, our forces should also fall back. We too ought to adopt this policy.

In 1941, our base areas suffered severe damage. Taking advantage of the fact that, in 1942, the enemy will be preoccupied with the Pacific theater and will adopt a strategic defensive posture toward China, we should concentrate our efforts on restoring our strength.

We must resolutely implement the Central Committee’s directive of December 13 [1], streamlining the armed forces and government apparatus, developing the economy, intensifying mass mobilization, expanding work in enemy-occupied areas, intensifying political offensives against the enemy and their collaborators, and systematically training cadres.

On the military front, our task is to crush any “sweeping” operations the enemy may launch—every such operation must be decisively defeated—and to recapture the territories from which the enemy has withdrawn. As for strongholds deep within our territory, we should strive to isolate them so that they are forced to evacuate voluntarily. In a few absolutely essential locations, we may resort to direct assaults to retake them; however, we must not undertake large-scale offensives, as this could merely pin down the enemy and provoke retaliatory “sweeping” campaigns, which would be not only futile but also highly detrimental.

We must vigilantly guard against any adventurism that might arise among the troops or in local organs.

Both the international situation and domestic developments are compelling the Kuomintang to make some kind of political shift; nevertheless, the process will remain slow.

Our Party and our army should refrain from provoking the Kuomintang in our propaganda. We should calmly observe developments, offer little criticism, exercise utmost patience, and avoid impatience.

In sum, next year’s central task is to accumulate strength, restore our vitality, and consolidate our internal cohesion—among the Party, the government, the military, and the people.

Against the enemy and their collaborators, we should prioritize political offensives, supplementing them with guerrilla warfare.

As for the Kuomintang, our primary focus should be on fostering communication and unity, while guarding against its anti-communist tendencies.

If the enemy does not attack the Soviet Union, we shall adhere to this policy and await the exhaustion of the Japanese forces. Should the enemy attack the Soviet Union, or should the Soviet Union strike first, we will then have ample resources to coordinate our operations with the Red Army.

It is earnestly hoped that all comrades will study and put these instructions into practice.

Printed on December 28 by the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, based on Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

Note [1]: Judging from the content of the directive described in the text, it appears to be the CPC Central Committee’s Instruction of December 17, 1941, Concerning Work in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas Behind Enemy Lines Following the Outbreak of the Pacific War.