Central Revolutionary Military Commission

Directive on Military Development in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas

(November 7, 1941)

I. General Issues

(1) The brutal “mopping-up” operations carried out by the enemy invaders against our anti-Japanese base areas, along with the depletion of our military, material, and financial resources and the loss of territory, have brought the struggle between the enemy and ourselves in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines into a new and more intense stage.

(2) In this new stage, our policy must be one of protracted struggle to wear down the enemy, dispersed guerrilla warfare, employing every form of struggle (from the most intense armed struggle to the most peaceful revolutionary dual-dealing methods) to maneuver against the enemy, conserving and preserving our own strength (both armed strength and popular strength) while awaiting favorable opportunities. We must therefore oppose right-leaning views characterized by pessimism and despair, fear of difficulties, passivity toward guerrilla warfare, and capitulation to the enemy; at the same time, we must oppose “left”-leaning views characterized by empty talk of mobile warfare (before our weaponry changes, the possibility of mobile warfare will increasingly diminish or even become impossible), empty talk of decisive battles, impetuous and reckless action, and a lack of the tenacity needed for patient, protracted struggle.

(3) In this new stage, the military development of our base areas must be suited to the new objective environment. The military structure of every base area must consist of three components: (a) the main forces, (b) the local forces, and (c) the people’s armed forces (i.e., self-defense corps and militia that do not leave production). During the period of establishing the base areas, it was correct to concentrate primary attention on expanding and consolidating the main forces; however, the recent changes in the situation between the enemy and ourselves mean that the central focus of military development at present must be placed on expanding and consolidating the local forces and the people’s armed forces, and it is precisely here that our weaknesses lie. Our outlook still remains stuck in the previous stage (the War of Resistance Against Japan differs from past domestic wars in that there is no possibility of concentrating maximum forces to wage battles of annihilation against the enemy). Due to limitations in manpower and material resources and the absolute reduction in the possibility of mobile warfare, the main forces should adopt an appropriate policy of elite troops, with the focus of their work being to enhance their political, military, and technical quality, and to streamline and strengthen their organization. It was wrong for Xiang Ying to advocate a policy of elite troops in the previous stage, but if we still fail to propose a policy of elite troops for the main forces in the present stage, we will also be committing an error.

(4) Regardless of whether major changes occur in the future, the numerical ratio between the main forces and the local forces (excluding the people’s armed forces) in mountainous base areas should generally be based on a principle of two to one, and in plain base areas on a principle of one to one. In certain extremely difficult areas (such as eastern Hebei, Daqingshan, and southern Jiangsu), the distinction between main forces and local forces should be eliminated, and all armed forces should be localized. As for the people’s armed forces (the self-defense forces that do not leave production), they should encompass the vast majority of the population, and the number of their backbone elements (i.e., the militia, model self-defense corps, and Youth Anti-Japanese Vanguards or youth self-defense corps) should exceed the total number of the local forces and main forces combined. The total number of persons in each base area who have left production (including Party, government, military, civilian, and student personnel) should still only account for approximately three percent of the total population in the areas under our control. Naturally, these ratios are approximate and must be made concrete according to the specific conditions of each locality. To persist in the struggle against the enemy, all organizations—Party, government, military, civilian, and student—in our base areas must work in unison to carry out the military development described above.

II. Issues Concerning Local Forces and Military Districts

(1) Although there is a distinction between the main forces and the local forces, there is no unbridgeable gulf between them. Generally speaking, the distinction between the main forces and the local forces lies in the fact that the former are crack, regular units that undertake relatively larger combat tasks, while the latter are highly guerrilla-oriented local units that undertake dispersed guerrilla tasks. The former are units under unified command, not limited to specific areas. The latter are units under dispersed command, limited to specific areas.

(2) During the stage of creating and expanding the base areas, it was necessary to concentrate all efforts on expanding the main forces, with the main forces concurrently commanding the military district’s local forces and with their organizational structure also belonging to the main forces; but now that the situation has changed, the relationship between the main forces and the local forces must also change. The local forces should have independent organizational structures and command organs, namely military districts and military sub-districts. However, the responsibility of the main forces to assist the local armed forces not only remains unchanged but should be heavier than before. When the main forces streamline (not expand but streamline) and strengthen their own organization, they should, in accordance with the ratios mentioned in the preceding “General Issues” section, transfer a corresponding portion of units to the organizational structure of the local forces (though the unit designations do not necessarily have to be changed). The main forces should provide the local forces with many cadres, rifles, ammunition, and so on. During combat, the main forces should define the general combat tasks of the local forces, and in this sense, the local forces are under the command of the main forces. The main forces should assist the local forces in training their troops. However, the organizational structures of the main forces and the local forces are mutually independent, and the main forces must absolutely not swallow up the local forces. As for the main forces, when they suffer losses and need replenishment according to the ratios, they must be supplemented by appropriately mobilized drafts from the self-defense corps, militia, and local forces, with the principle of maintaining the proper ratios between them.

(3) The numerical strength of the local forces shall be developed according to the aforementioned ratios, but it is still necessary to issue special directives regarding general minimum numbers. It is hereby stipulated that a district should have a district guerrilla unit of approximately 50 men and rifles; a county should have a county guerrilla battalion of approximately 200 men and rifles; a sub-district should have an independent regiment or battalion of approximately 2,000 men and rifles. The district guerrilla unit shall be under the command of the district Party and government organs; the county guerrilla battalion shall be under the command of the county Party and government organs; a command headquarters shall be established for the sub-district, which shall not be concurrently assumed by the main forces, and the secretary of the local Party committee shall concurrently serve as the political commissar of the sub-district; the military district shall be concurrently assumed by the main forces, or a separate command shall be established, but regardless of whether the main forces concurrently assume the military district level, the organizational structures of the main forces and the local forces shall remain mutually independent. In areas with frequent combat, the district armed forces should hold fast to their own district, the county armed forces to their own county, and the sub-district armed forces to their own sub-district. We must oppose flightism (temporary movement due to truly unfavorable circumstances is not included in this category) and arbitrary transfers. In the interior areas of the base areas, district and county guerrilla units should simultaneously be under the command of the sub-district and go to the guerrilla zones to operate, in order to temper themselves and prepare for the future. In central mountainous areas where the enemy rarely came in the past, we must anticipate that they will certainly come in the future and rapidly establish district and county armed forces without further delay, though the quantity of their personnel and arms may be less than in plain areas and border areas.

(4) The local forces must be genuinely localized; their main components, and especially their main cadres, should be local. Therefore, training local cadres and having the local Party send outstanding local cadres to the local forces is a task of the first importance. The methods of struggle, political work, uniforms, and so on of the local forces should all suit local conditions (i.e., respect local characteristics and guerrilla nature). Hence, the approach of mechanically transferring the entire set of practices of the main forces into the local forces while paying empty lip service to regularization is inappropriate; command methods that restrict the independent activities of the local forces or assign them combat tasks beyond their capacity are also inappropriate.

III. Issues Concerning Self-Defense Corps and Militia

(1) To strengthen the self-defense armed forces of the broad masses in every base area and adapt to the new war situation, we must establish self-defense corps and militia with even greater earnestness. This is an extremely important issue in the military development of the base areas behind enemy lines at present. However, to date, the various base areas (with the exception of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area) have not yet achieved the desired results in this work. Henceforth, we must intensify our efforts to accomplish this task; otherwise, the various base areas will inevitably suffer immense harm.

(2) The self-defense corps and the militia (including the model self-defense corps and the Youth Anti-Japanese Vanguards) are both armed self-defense organizations of the broad masses for defending their homes and the anti-Japanese base areas, without leaving production, but the scope and tasks of the two differ from each other. Within the base areas, all persons between the ages of 16 and 55, regardless of class, sex, race, religion, or belief, should be registered and organized into members of the general self-defense corps or women’s self-defense corps (of course, attention must be paid to political mobilization; reliance on coercion alone is impermissible). The basic tasks of such self-defense corps are to wage mass guerrilla warfare, maintain public order within the base areas, and perform war service duties (such as transport, stretcher-bearing, message delivery, information blockade, and the strengthening of defenses and clearing of fields).

(3) The militia is the backbone of the self-defense corps; it is the higher-level organization within the lower-level people’s armed forces, formed on a completely voluntary basis from two mass organizations: the model self-defense corps and the Youth Anti-Japanese Vanguard Corps. All able-bodied men willing to take up arms to kill the enemy may join on the principle of voluntariness. Their tasks are to reconnoiter enemy situations, engage in independent combat, coordinate with the main forces in operations, harass the enemy, blockade and besiege enemy strongholds, sabotage enemy communications, strike against small enemy units and the activities of armed traitors, and, when the enemy attacks, lead the self-defense corps in covering the transfer of the masses.

(4) The self-defense corps is a mass organization of the entire population and should be organized into units based on the residential areas of its members, divided into squadrons, platoons, and squads, with no requirement for uniform numbers. The organization of the militia, however, should strive, to the extent possible, for relatively uniform numbers in each unit to facilitate combat and training.

(5) The self-defense corps and militia should be under the unified leadership of people’s armed forces committees at every level (from the border area down to the county). Such committees are democratic, centralized organizations produced by people’s armed forces representative congresses at each level; the method of appointment must not be adopted. Within the scope of the border area, under the unified leadership of the people’s armed forces committee, the militia should have its own independent organizational system, with separate headquarters established at the county, district, and village levels. Its internal life should fully adhere to democratic principles, and responsible personnel at all levels should be elected, never appointed.

(6) The entire lower-level people’s armed forces should have their own independent organizational systems and democratic systems for internal life; military and political organs must not interfere with or supplant them. However, in carrying out their various basic tasks, they should be directed by the government through the headquarters at the corresponding level. In peacetime, under the overall intent, the militia should accept government direction and carry out independent activities; when coordinating with the main forces in combat, they should accept the command of the regular army or guerrilla units. The people’s armed forces committees at various levels must also not interfere with the independence of the various people’s armed organizations; their authority lies only in unified command, weapons distribution, unified funding, and unified education.

(7) The primary weapons of the self-defense corps are broadswords and spears. The primary weapons of the militia are various types of old and new firearms (rifles, fowling pieces), hand grenades (every base area, and even every county, should establish hand grenade factories to manufacture hand grenades in large quantities, distributing two to four to each militia member), landmines, indigenous cannons, and Esi cannons, etc. At the same time, specialized training in techniques for sabotaging enemy railways, mines, trains, highways, and factories should be conducted among the militia to facilitate mass sabotage work. The main forces must, in a planned manner, allocate a batch of firearms to arm the militia, and must absolutely not be stingy. Hand grenades and landmines, these two primary types of weapons, must especially be manufactured in large quantities and widely distributed.

(8) The cadres of the self-defense corps and militia should be native-born and have flesh-and-blood ties with the masses. Each region should systematically transfer a large number of cadres from the localities and provide them with specialized training. The branch schools of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University or other military schools in each area should assume this responsibility.

(9) Finally, the Central Military Commission once again reiterates with emphasis that the central link in the development of the militia and self-defense corps lies in the establishment of a democratic centralist system. Any form of official appointment will hinder their development and impede the full expression of their initiative and activism. At the same time, it should be pointed out that when assigning tasks, it must be taken into account that the militia is the core component of the people’s armed forces and should be used in the struggle against the enemy, while general war service duties should be undertaken more by the self-defense corps.

IV. Issues Concerning the Weapons of the Army and Militia

(1) The replenishment of weapons for the war of resistance behind enemy lines is becoming increasingly difficult: the Kuomintang has not issued a single bullet for two years, and the possibility of future issuance is very small; operations against the Japanese invaders consume vast amounts of ammunition, while captures are relatively few (this is vastly different from the domestic wars); moreover, the enemy’s “mopping-up” operations are frequent, the rear areas are unstable, and the financial resources of the base areas are increasingly drying up, making armaments production more difficult by the day. This situation must attract our utmost attention.

(2) Under conditions where the industrial and technological levels of the enemy and ourselves are vastly disparate and the base areas are extremely unstable, our armaments production is naturally in a position of inferiority. Seeking parity in equipment between the enemy and ourselves in the mountains, building a large-scale military industry, and hoping for the production of new-style weapons are all fantasies that cannot be realized. Under present conditions, the basic policy for armaments production should be to repair firearms, remanufacture bullets, and especially to produce hand grenades, landmines, and so on in large quantities, distributing them widely to the army, militia, and residents, so as to struggle against the enemy everywhere, using quantity to overcome quality. If we neglect the large-scale production of such mass-oriented, relatively low-grade, and relatively backward weapons and concentrate our efforts on manufacturing advanced weapons such as rifles, machine guns, and artillery, we will certainly suffer great losses in the future.

(3) Under the policy of manufacturing hand grenades, landmines, and so on in large quantities, it is necessary to:

1. Not only should the main forces establish bomb factories to meet the needs of the main forces, but the local forces and militia command organs should also establish bomb factories in the sub-districts and counties to meet their own needs. These bomb factories should be small in scale, operated in a dispersed manner, and respectively subordinate to the command organs at various levels of the local forces and militia or to the various levels of government, but the arsenals of the main forces should provide various forms of technical assistance to the bomb factories of the local forces and militia.

2. Spare no expense in hiring workers and technicians skilled in manufacturing hand grenades, and establish training classes for bomb workers and technicians to cultivate such specialized personnel.

3. Collect iron, sulfur, and other raw materials for manufacturing bombs.

4. Strive for an ample production of bombs; in addition to supplying the main forces and local armed forces, special efforts must be made to ensure that every militia member has two hand grenades.

5. Popularize education in the use of hand grenades among the militia; the main forces and local forces should dispatch cadres at any time and place to train the militia and residents in this.

6. Manufacture more types of landmines specifically for use by the militia.

(4) In addition, the militia and residents should also adopt to the fullest extent all other backward weapons such as spears, indigenous cannons, indigenous guns, and so on, and devise ways to manufacture them.

(5) Besides bomb factories, the main forces should also strive to solve the problem of remanufacturing bullets, even if using black powder. The Yan’an Tri-Acid Factory can provide assistance with smokeless powder to nearby base areas.

(6) The Central Military Commission once again reiterates with emphasis the importance of mass-oriented, backward weapons—hand grenades, landmines, indigenous cannons, and so on. We have no airplanes, artillery, or tanks; furthermore, the quality of our rifles and machine guns is poor, and bullets are increasingly scarce. To hope to rely solely on our own strength to acquire extremely excellent rifles and machine guns and extremely abundant ammunition is, under present conditions, completely empty talk, let alone airplanes, artillery, and tanks. Therefore, we must resolve to rely on the masses, on the resolute anti-Japanese determination and activism of the militia and troops, on making everyone a soldier, on mass-oriented backward weapons, and on the quantity of these weapons, so that the enemy is everywhere exhausted by our hand grenades, landmines, indigenous guns, and indigenous cannons. At the same time, besides bombs, the main forces must actively seek ways to repair firearms and replenish their own ammunition. Only this is the sole path for persisting in the arduous and extraordinary struggle behind enemy lines today.