Policies in the Struggle Against "Nibbling"
on the Plains of Hebei

(June 9, 1941)

To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], and
Luo [Ruiqing]:

1. The purpose of the enemy's "nibbling" policy in southern Hebei is to reduce
our area of operations and expand its own occupied area. If we do not smash it,
then it will be very difficult for us to gain a foothold on the plains.
2. The main link in smashing this sort of policy lies in having a correct policy.
The point of departure should be politics primarily, rather than military attack
alone or mainly military attack.
3. Generally speaking, the starting point for the work of our Party and our army
in this kind of triangular area should be to conceal ourselves well, to conserve our
strength, and to always be considering the popular masses. The popular masses
must be protected so that they are not harmed (which means protecting our own
survival). As for certain actions to deal with the enemy taken by the popular masses
when they had no choice under duress, not only is it wrong to oppose them severely (this is not Rightist backsliding), but based on the specific situation they
should rather be made into planned methods for dealing with the enemy, or even
tactics. Our Party and our army should help the popular masses come up with
these methods to deal with the enemy. Only in this way will the masses not be
divorced from us, and the enemy's vicious plot to break up the unity between our
army and the people be smashed.
4. A purely military struggle and a policy of sharp opposition on the surface
would lead to brutal suppression by the enemy. The result would be, in fact, to
create terror among the masses, which would accomplish precisely the purposes
of the enemy bandits' conspiracy.
5. Within these regions we should more often adopt a two-faced policy, strengthening our work with the puppet organizations and puppet armies, making more
friends, and refraining from a lot of noisy boasting (in other words, conceal ourselves). Here associations and political power of the masses can be organized only under cover, not the way it is done in the base areas. In sum, the more we are able
to protect ourselves, unite the people, and isolate the Japanese bandits, the more
likely we are to be able to hold out for longer. All methods are harmful that seek
only the momentary gratification of fighting with all one's might and pay no attention to twists and turns.
6. A fundamental condition for holding out on the plains is to improve and
strengthen the local armed forces, which are led by local cadres and tied by flesh
and blood to the local people. In this sort of triangular area, their role is particularly weighty and significant. Without this kind of local armed forces, it would be
difficult to rely solely on dispersing the main forces to engage in guerrilla warfare.
7. The spirit embodied in your telegram of the 10th 1 should be modified. At the
same time, we hope that you will strictly examine the policies in this regard within
the plains region. We feel that the occurrence of constant defections that has arisen
recently among certain troops on the plains has something to do with this, and you
must pay very serious attention to it.
Mao [Zedong]
Zhu [De]
Wang [Jiaxiang]
Ye [Jianying]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 648-49, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. Here the character hui (gray), commonly used in telegrams to signify the tenth day of
the month, appears. We assume that it has this meaning, but there is no way of determining
whether Mao was referring to a telegram of May 10th or to one sent earlier in 1941.