under cover, not the way it is done in the base areas. In sum, the more we are able
to protect ourselves, unite the people, and isolate the Japanese bandits, the more
likely we are to be able to hold out for longer. All methods are harmful that seek
only the momentary gratification of fighting with all one's might and pay no attention to twists and turns.
6. A fundamental condition for holding out on the plains is to improve and
strengthen the local armed forces, which are led by local cadres and tied by flesh
and blood to the local people. In this sort of triangular area, their role is particularly weighty and significant. Without this kind of local armed forces, it would be
difficult to rely solely on dispersing the main forces to engage in guerrilla warfare.

7. The spirit embodied in your telegram of the 10th¹ should be modified. At the
same time, we hope that you will strictly examine the policies in this regard within
the plains region. We feel that the occurrence of constant defections that has arisen
recently among certain troops on the plains has something to do with this, and you
must pay very serious attention to it.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang) Ye [Jianying]

1. Here the character *hui* (gray), commonly used in telegrams to signify the tenth day of
the month, appears. We assume that it has this meaning, but there is no way of determining
whether Mao was referring to a telegram of May 10th or to one sent earlier in 1941.

Cooperate with Friendly Armies in the Battle;
Resolutely Smash the Enemy's Attack

(June 9, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have drafted a telegram to Wei [Lihuang].¹ If you are in agreement,
please send it on to Yuan Xiaoxuan.²

2. To Section Chief Yuan, for transmittal to Commanding Officer Wei for his
perusal: The current overall situation cannot be sustained unless both the
Guomindang and the Communist Party, your honorable troops and our troops,
cooperate closely with each other. After taking southern Shanxi, it is possible that
the enemy will advance on Zheng[zhou], Luo [yang], and Xi'an. Under the leadership of the Supreme Command³ and of you, our Elder Brother, the Eighth Route
Army is resolved to cooperate with friendly armies in the campaign, resolutely
smash the enemy's attack, and fight to defend Zheng[zhou], Luo[yang], and Xi'an.
Only there are two kinds of cooperation, direct and indirect. Direct cooperation
produces its effect more rapidly; indirect cooperation produces its effect more
slowly. Our humble army is responsible for attacking and destroying the [Bei]Ping-
[Wu]Han, [Bei]Ping-[Tian]Jin, [Tian] Jin-Pu[kou], Bei[ping]-Shenyang, [Bei]Ping-Baotou, and Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railroad lines, the northern sector of the
Bai[gui]-Jin[cheng] line, and the northern and central sectors of the Tong-Pu[kou]
line, so as to pin down the enemy from the far rear as well as the near rear. This is
indirect cooperation. If the Eighth Route Army were to send strong forces to the
Zhongtiao mountains and the triangular area in Fennan, and take responsibility for
attacking and destroying the southern sector of the Tong-Pu line, the southern
sector of the Bai-Jin line, and the Dao[kouzhen]-Qing[huazhen] line, as well as
taking control of the north bank of the Yellow River, to strike at the enemy from
the flank and pin him down, so as to assist the efforts of your honorable army's
main forces to surround the enemy from the south and west bank of the Yellow

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 645-47, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript.

1. Wei Lihuang was then chief commanding officer for the Guomindang Army's First
War Zone.

2. Yuan Xiaoxuan was then head of the Eighth Route Army's Luoyang administrative
office.

3. That is, Chiang Kaishek.


River, this would be direct cooperation. As regards this suggestion, those who fail
to grasp the true purpose behind the painstaking efforts on [Zhu] De's and our part
might think that we are motivated by the chance to expand our territory, but our
real desire is to protect Zheng[zhou], Luo[yang], and Xi'an. In the humble opinion of [Zhu] De and the rest of us, deployments such as in this regard must be
made or else it would be hard to effect quick results in pinning down the enemy.
The enemy has concentrated troops heavily in the Jiyuan-Yuncheng area, and coordinating operations only from afar would be like trying to put out a nearby fire
by fetching water from a distance, as the Battle of Zhongtiao clearly proves. We
cherish strong hope that relations between our two parties and two armies will
improve and certainly do not wish to add further impediments. For this reason,
with regard to the retreat of Elder Brother Hu Zongnan's troops to the defense line
along the river by way of Yichuan and Luochuan, we told our garrison forces in
the border region that they were not to take a single step beyond our original
defense area. In addition, with regard to Zhongtiao and the triangular areas, although we know clearly the advantages in terms of pinning down the enemy, we
did not allow our own troops to operate freely there. All this was meant to avoid
misunderstandings and to seek cooperation. The proposals we now make are also
purely a matter of offering suggestions. If you think they are acceptable, you may
order them carried out and, if not, you will simply ignore them. We wonder if we
may prevail upon you, Elder Brother, to give the matter consideration and submit
it for perusal and judgment to the Supreme Command, wherein rests the proper
decision. Still there are some things that must be elucidated. If the Supreme Command and our Elder Brother were to approve the above proposals, when our humble
troops have arrived in Zhongtiao and the triangular area we would need to request
your permission to mobilize the popular masses and organize anti-Japanese guerrilla units, for [Zhu] De and the rest of us believe that only such a policy would be
the most effective. Although the reasons for the failure this time in Zhongtiao are
many, the major one is actually that there were no mass organizations to block the
enemy's eyes and ears and to make ours more acute, rather than the charge that
our troops lacked training, our officers lacked courage, or that our command was
faulty. Should the above proposals fail to meet with approval, our humble troops
will continue to shoulder the task of coordinating in the far rear and will certainly
not back out of such responsibility. With all respect we offer our suggestions, and
humbly petition your decision and notification. Your younger brothers Zhu De
and Peng Dehuai, on the 9th.
3. It is our estimation that the above proposals are likely not to be approved, so
our troops will still have to make arrangements for coordination in the far rear and
the near rear according to the principle that, on the one hand, we have no choice
but to fight (that is, fighting is mandatory), but, on the other hand, we cannot fight
too fiercely (as in the Hundred Regiments Offensive).

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De]
!
Our Present Policy Is to Drag Chiang Into the
War of Resistance
(June 12, 1941)

Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], Li [Yu], and Luo [Shunchu]:

It has been reported as follows: On the 20th, the 686th Regiment of our 115th
Division,¹ as well as part of our troops advancing eastward started an attack on
Wang's regiment of Zhang's division in the area around Renhezhuang; on the 19th,
a certain Second Regiment of ours and the Yimeng Detachment, around two thousand men, attacked Meng's brigade of Chang's division in the area of Qingshahu
and Tangjialin; then, on the 24th, another unit of about three thousand men attacked the New Thirty-sixth Division at a certain village² in Chenzhuang; our forces
under Xu [Shiyou], Yu,³ and Peng [Jiaqing], about five thousand men, attacked
Zhao's division around Wuji near a certain mountain in Kaicheng, and so on.
Please check and reply to us as to whether such events have occurred. Our basic
policy at present is to drag Chiang into the War of Resistance. Our army should
adhere to the Party Central Committee's principle, "We shall not attack others
unless they attack us; if others attack us, we shall definitely defend ourselves." If
such attacks have actually taken place, we hope that they will be stopped immediately. Likewise inform Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], Chen [Yi], and Liu [Shaoqi].

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang] Ye [Jianying]

Our source for this text is *Wenxian he yanjiu*, 1985, No. 3, p. 7 (pp. 171-72 of the annual
volume).
1. Here and later in this telegram the letters "R" and "D" have been used instead of the
Chinese terms for "Regiment" and "Division."
2. *Moujiacun*, literally "a certain family village," that is, the family name identifying
this village is omitted.
3. The editors of *Wenxian he yanjiu* were unable to identify this person, and suspect a
misprint in the original text.