Since the CPC Central Committee put forward the policy of streamlining the army and government, a considerable amount of time has passed. If we were to examine how well this policy has been implemented across the various anti-Japanese base areas, we would find that some regions have been earnestly carrying it out and have already reaped significant benefits. The facts demonstrate that the Central Committee’s policy is well suited to the actual conditions in each base area and is indeed achievable. At the same time, however, we also observe that certain regions or work departments have adopted a perfunctory, even reluctant, approach to its implementation, thereby failing to carry it through. Indeed, a small minority have remained completely unchanged, regardless of the Central Committee’s decisions, persisting in “doing things their own way” and regarding their own region or department as an “exception.”  We believe that the root cause of this failure to implement the policy of streamlining and the tendency to regard oneself as an exception lies in a problem of understanding—specifically, an insufficient grasp of the true significance of the policy as articulated by the CPC Central Committee. Therefore, in order to ensure its thorough implementation, it is necessary to reiterate and clarify its profound importance.

Why did the CPC Central Committee propose the policy of streamlining? First, after five years of resistance behind enemy lines, our anti-Japanese base areas now exist in a complex, interlocking pattern with the enemy-occupied zones. The Japanese forces, relying on railways, highways, and fortified strongholds, encircle us, while we, in turn, use the vast countryside to encircle them, creating a stalemate characterized by mutual envelopment and a protracted, seesaw-like struggle. The vigorous early-stage guerrilla offensive deep into enemy territory is now a thing of the past. The challenge ahead lies in preserving our strength, overcoming difficulties, and enduring the final, grueling phase. Victory will belong to whoever can withstand this severe crisis. Under the enemy’s current brutal sweep-and-grab operations, the gradual shrinkage of the base areas and the depletion of human and material resources are inevitable. Consequently, we must tighten our belts and adapt to these changing circumstances if we are to hold out. This necessary austerity is not only aimed at maintaining our strength and weathering the present crisis but also at preparing for a future counteroffensive. The current retrenchment is, in essence, a step toward greater development down the road.

Second, warfare behind enemy lines is incessant, the frontlines are fluid, and both troops and organs are highly mobile. Not only are large administrative apparatuses impractical under such conditions; even within the military, an excess of non-combat personnel would render operations cumbersome and unacceptable in a wartime environment. Thus, streamlining is essential to meet the demands of war. It must be understood that the organization of our organs and units is prescribed to fulfill specific tasks, not for the sake of having organs or units per se. While expansion typically emphasizes quantity—“putting up the framework” to facilitate work—one should prioritize quality during retrenchment: lean and efficient rather than bloated and redundant. If circumstances change yet we stubbornly cling to old practices without making any adjustments, we are nothing more than dogmatists.

Third, as the base areas shrink under relentless warfare and resource constraints intensify, particularly in economically backward rural regions where people’s wealth is limited, the number of individuals detached from production in each base area must be kept within a reasonable proportion. Exceeding this limit would lead to the contradiction of “too many fish in too small a pond.” The enemy’s “three-alls” policy directed against our core base areas aims precisely to destroy our “conditions for survival,” representing a strategy of “draining the pond to catch all the fish.” Streamlining is, therefore, a direct response to this vicious enemy tactic.

Based on this understanding of these three key aspects, the CPC Central Committee long ago decided that the total number of personnel detached from production in any base area should not exceed three percent of the local population. Following the introduction of the streamlining policy, it further specified that the main force should cease expanding, shifting the focus of future military construction to strengthening local militias and developing militia units that remain integrated with production. This has been a consistent policy, tailored to the needs of the rear-front theater, and all base areas must implement it thoroughly.

Despite the clear significance of the streamlining policy and the Central Committee’s steadfast advocacy of it, not all comrades in the various base areas have yet fully grasped these points. As a result, implementation has been incomplete, and among a small number of comrades there still persist certain incorrect views and one-sided interpretations that hinder the effective execution of the policy. These misconceptions need to be addressed. For example, some argue: “Although my unit or organ may currently exhibit a ‘top-heavy’ structure—with a bloated upper echelon and a weak lower tier—you should look to the future! It is destined to grow, and we ought to concentrate on solving today’s problems first. If we fail to address current difficulties and overcome this bottleneck, there can be no talk of the future. To simply gaze skyward, fantasizing about what might come, while turning a blind eye to the concrete realities before us, is a form of ‘farsightedness’ that cannot resolve any real issue.” Others claim: “My situation is not as dire as you suppose; I can manage as is. Let’s keep things as they are and worry about it when conditions really worsen—why rush?” Such views are equally misguided. Over the past two years, the evolving situation behind enemy lines has made it abundantly clear that dire conditions are bound to arrive, and in some areas they have already done so. Today, developments behind enemy lines are no longer matters of abstract speculation; they are stark, living facts. If we do not remain vigilant to these changes and proactively adopt appropriate measures, we shall be caught off guard when the moment arrives. It is precisely the Bolshevik art of leadership to act decisively and minimize losses to the revolutionary forces. Passive resignation and a shortsighted political outlook are equally wrong.

Still others contend: “In the anti-Japanese struggle, we should follow Han Xin’s principle—‘the more troops, the better.’ How can a ‘lean’ army possibly subdue the enemy? Of course, there is a limit to how many troops one can field; numbers cannot be increased indefinitely. The crucial question is whether we can sustain them—whether our material and financial resources are sufficient. If we ignore this most basic requirement for survival and blindly pursue numerical expansion, we risk ending up with either too few troops to defend the base area or, conversely, an overabundance that rapidly depletes our resources, leaving us unable to mount an effective defense. Therefore, we should champion the ‘lean-army’ approach rather than the ‘massed-troops’ doctrine; the latter must be opposed.”

Yet another line of reasoning goes like this: “Work in the base areas is multifaceted and demanding. Large organs and a plentiful cadre are indispensable to getting things done. Aren’t we constantly feeling short of cadres everywhere? How can we possibly talk about ‘streamlining’ now?” It is true that in certain regions or departments there remains a genuine shortage of qualified cadres, which calls for reinforcement. On the other hand, are not many organs proliferating, systems becoming increasingly convoluted, and a pervasive problem of overstaffing and idle hands prevalent? Therefore, the central task of streamlining lies in reorganizing and adjusting staffing levels, consolidating organs, and reducing redundancy to enhance operational efficiency and accelerate problem-solving. Accordingly, we should advocate for “streamlined administration” rather than “bureaucratic proliferation”; the latter must be firmly opposed.

All of these perspectives suffer from the familiar malady of one-sidedness. Each can be presented logically and persuasively when taken in isolation, without considering the broader picture. However, upon careful and comprehensive examination, it becomes evident that none of them holds water. Only the policy of streamlining—the product of a holistic assessment that takes both present conditions and future prospects into account—is truly viable. As Marxists-Leninists, we must always begin with reality when addressing any problem. A partial, one-sided view inevitably leads to subjective errors. Hence, the successful implementation of the streamlining policy first requires a clear, thorough understanding of its significance. Only with such understanding can we undertake its execution seriously, proactively, and with enthusiasm—and only then can we truly execute it well.

Streamlining constitutes the central link in the current work of all base areas. The realization of this task must be integrated into every aspect of our operations. Whether it involves political work, military affairs, or fiscal and economic matters, all activities should be reconsidered in light of this policy and carried out accordingly. At the same time, the implementation of streamlining must be closely linked to concrete efforts such as conserving and nurturing the people’s strength, promoting production, achieving self-reliance, and practicing strict economy to combat waste. The rear-front theater presents a harsh, ever-changing combat environment, often marked by sudden shifts. If leading organs and cadres fail to anticipate emerging trends, make timely, decisive decisions, and proactively adjust our policies, then when adverse conditions suddenly arise, we shall be caught unprepared and may even suffer unexpected losses.

Finally, it bears repeating: the policy of streamlining is the correct approach for overcoming present difficulties and securing greater future development. It addresses both immediate needs and long-term goals; it is a positive, proactive policy, not a passive one. Defeating Japanese imperialism is a settled matter, and our path to future development is likewise predetermined. By streamlining and honing our ranks during this arduous journey from the present to the counteroffensive, we can better ensure both victory and sustained progress.