Report at the Conference of Senior Cadres of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region
November 1942

I. On the Basic Summation of Past Work

To develop the economy and ensure supplies is the general policy of our economic and financial work. But many comrades place heavy importance on finance and do not understand the importance of the economy; their minds circle all day long only on the simple question of fiscal revenue and expenditure, and circle as they may, they still cannot solve the problem. This is the result of an old, conservative viewpoint playing tricks in the minds of these comrades. They do not know that while the quality of fiscal policy certainly affects the economy, it is the economy that determines finance. There has never been a case of fiscal difficulties being solved without an economic foundation, nor a case of finances becoming abundant without economic development. Our fiscal problem is the problem of supplying the living expenses and operating expenses for several tens of thousands of troops and working personnel, which is also the problem of supplying the expenses for the War of Resistance. These expenses are all resolved through the taxes of the people and the production of the several tens of thousands of troops and working personnel themselves. If we do not develop the privately-run economy and the publicly-run economy, we will have no choice but to fold our hands and await death. Fiscal difficulties can only be overcome through solid and effective economic development. The conservative viewpoint of forgetting economic development, forgetting to open up sources of revenue, and attempting to solve fiscal difficulties by contracting essential fiscal expenditures cannot solve any problem.

In the past five years, we have gone through several stages. The greatest difficulty was in 1940 and 1941, when the two anti-communist frictions both occurred in this period. We were once reduced to having almost no clothes to wear, no oil to eat, no paper, no vegetables, the soldiers had no shoes or socks, and the working personnel had no quilts in winter. The Guomindang treated us by cutting off funds and imposing an economic blockade, attempting to trap us to death; our difficulties were truly immense. But we overcame the difficulties. This was not only because the people of the border region gave us grain to eat, but especially because we resolved to do it ourselves and established our own publicly-run economy. The government established many self-sufficient industries. The army carried out a large-scale production movement, developing agriculture, industry, and commerce with the goal of self-sufficiency. The personnel of tens of thousands of organs and schools also developed the same kind of self-sufficient economy. We used these methods to overcome the difficulties. Has not the principle that only by developing the economy can we ensure supplies been proven by clear and unambiguous historical facts?

At present, although we still have many difficulties, the foundation of our publicly-run economy has already been laid. With another year in 1943, our foundation will be even more stable.

The line of development is the correct line, but development is not reckless, unfounded development. Some comrades, disregarding the specific conditions of this time and this place, clamor for development, for example, demanding the construction of heavy industry, proposing grand salt industry plans, grand military industry plans, etc., all of which are unrealistic and cannot be adopted. The Party's line is a correct line of development; on the one hand, it opposes the old, conservative viewpoint, and on the other hand, it opposes empty, unrealistic grand plans. This is the Party's struggle on two fronts in financial and economic work.

In developing the publicly-run economy, we must not forget the importance of the help the people give us. The people have given us grain to eat: 90,000 dan in 1940, 200,000 dan in 1941, and 160,000 dan in 1942, ensuring the food supply for the army and working personnel. Up to 1941, the grain production in our publicly-run agriculture was still very weak; in terms of grain, we still relied on the common people. Although we must increase the army's grain production in the future, for the time being we can still only rely mainly on the common people. The border region is vast in area but sparse in population, with only 1.4 million people; supplying so much grain is not easy. The common people transport public salt for us and pay a public salt substitute fee; in 1941 they also bought five million yuan in public bonds, which is also not a small burden. For the needs of the War of Resistance and national construction, the people should bear the burden, and the people are well aware of this necessity. When the public authorities are in extreme difficulty, it is also necessary for the people to bear a little more, and this also receives the people's understanding. But while we take from the people on the one hand, on the other hand we must enable the people's economy to grow and be supplemented. This means adopting appropriate measures to help the people's agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, salt industry, and commerce to develop, so that the people lose something but at the same time gain something, in order to sustain the long-term War of Resistance.

Some comrades, disregarding the needs of the War of Resistance, one-sidedly emphasize that the government should practice "benevolent governance"; this is an erroneous viewpoint. Because if the War of Resistance is not victorious, so-called "benevolent governance" will only be practiced on Japanese imperialism, and will have nothing to do with the people. Conversely, if the people's burden is temporarily increased, but the difficulties of the government and the army are overcome, the War of Resistance is sustained, and the enemy is defeated, the people will have good days to live; this is the great benevolent governance of a revolutionary government.

Another erroneous viewpoint is to disregard the people's difficulties and only consider the needs of the government and the army, draining the pond to get the fish, and making endless demands. This is the thinking of the Guomindang, which we must never inherit. We did at one time increase the burden on the people, but we immediately set about building a publicly-run economy. In 1941 and 1942, the portion resolved by the army, organs, and schools through their own efforts accounted for the majority of the total need. This is a miracle unprecedented in Chinese history, and this is our unconquerable material foundation. The more our self-sufficient economy develops, the more we can lighten the taxes we impose on the people.

In the first stage from 1937 to 1939, we took very little from the people; in this stage, the people's strength was greatly recuperated. From 1940 to 1942 was the second stage, and the people's burden was increased. After 1943, we can enter the third stage. If our publicly-run economy continues to develop in 1943 and 1944, and if our army obtains the opportunity for full or large-scale military farming in these two years, then after two years, the people's burden can be lightened again, and the people's strength can once again be recuperated. This trend is possible, and we should prepare to do so.

We must refute this or that kind of prejudice and put forward our Party's correct slogan, which is "Develop the economy, ensure supplies." In public-private relations, it is "Give consideration to both public and private interests," or "Give consideration to both the army and the people." We believe that only such a slogan is the correct slogan. Only by realistically developing the publicly-run and privately-run economies can we ensure the supply for our finances. Even in difficult times, we must still pay attention to the limits of taxation, so that although the burden is heavy, the people are not harmed. And as soon as we have the means, we must lighten the people's burden, in order to recuperate the people's strength.

The die-hards of the Guomindang feel that the construction of the border region is hopeless, that the difficulties of the border region are insurmountable, and they are waiting every day for the border region to "collapse." With such people, we have no need to argue; they will never see the day of our "collapse," we will only prosper. They do not know that under the leadership of the Communist Party and the border region government, the masses of the people will always support the Party and the government. The Party and the government will certainly have ways in the economic and financial fields to overcome any serious difficulties. Some of our current difficulties have already been overcome, and some are about to be overcome. We have experienced times many times more difficult than the present, and we overcame those difficulties as well. The difficulties in the various base areas in North China and Central China are now much greater than those in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region; there are serious wars there every day, they have held on for five and a half years, and they will certainly be able to continue to hold on until victory. There is no pessimism before us; we can overcome any difficulty.

After the Conference of Senior Cadres, we are going to implement the policy of "better troops and simpler administration." This time, the policy of better troops and simpler administration must be strict, thorough, and universal, not perfunctory, painless, or partial. In this implementation of better troops and simpler administration, we must achieve the five objectives of simplification, unification, efficiency, economy, and opposition to bureaucratism. These five items have a very great bearing on our economic and financial work. After simplification, consumptive expenditures will be reduced, and the income for economic construction will be increased. Unification will establish a regular working system for the Party, government, and army, which not only directly gives good influence to financial and economic work, but also can reduce the burden on the people. This kind of unified system must overcome the bad phenomena of disunity, lack of coordination, independence, and each going his own way, which affect the thorough implementation of policies and regulations and affect the people's economy. After this unified system is established, work efficiency can be increased. Economy is something all work organs must pay attention to, and economic and financial work organs must pay special attention. The result of practicing economy can save a large amount of unnecessary and wasteful expenditure, the amount of which can reach several tens of millions. The working personnel engaged in economic and financial business must also overcome the existing, and in some cases still very serious, bureaucratism, such as the phenomenon of corruption, putting on airs, useless formalism, routinism, etc. If we fully implement these five requirements in the systems of the Party, government, and army, then our implementation of better troops and simpler administration this time will have achieved its purpose, our difficulties will certainly be overcome, and the mouths of those who laugh that we will "collapse" can be sealed by us.

Below, we will discuss the various tasks of economy and finance, concretely summarize the experience of past work, and propose the work policy that should be implemented in 1943.

II. On Developing Agriculture

Since "Develop the economy, ensure supplies" is the general policy for the economy and finance of the border region, then how it was done in the economic aspect in the past, what achievements there were, what shortcomings there were, and what policy should be adopted in the future, are the first and foremost important questions.

The economy of the border region is divided into two major aspects: privately-run and publicly-run. The privately-run economy is all private agriculture, industry, and commerce. The publicly-run economy is the agriculture, industry, and commerce operated by the government, the army, and organs and schools. The roles and relationship of these two aspects are: the privately-run economy is to solve the livelihood of the 1.4 million people of the border region, and at the same time to aid the government and the army in the form of taxes, to support the sacred cause of the War of Resistance and national construction. The publicly-run economy is to solve the main part of the living expenses and operating expenses of the tens of thousands of Party, government, and military personnel, so as to reduce what is taken from the people, recuperate the people's strength, and facilitate taking from them in future urgent needs. The principle applicable here is "Give consideration to both public and private interests," or "Give consideration to both the army and the people." If our Party and government do not pay attention to mobilizing the people and helping the people develop agriculture, industry, and commerce, then the people's livelihood cannot be improved, and the needs of the War of Resistance cannot be supplied, and the result will be hardship for both the army and the people. If the morale of the army and the people cannot be consolidated, then nothing can be spoken of. Therefore, it is our very important task for the Party and government to pay great attention to the construction of the people's economy. But relying solely on the people to pay taxes still cannot solve the needs of the War of Resistance and national construction; especially under the conditions of the border region's vast area and sparse population, a great contradiction has long existed between the people's taxes and the government's expenditures. Therefore, we must also pay great attention to operating the publicly-run economy; this is a very great task that our government, our army, and all our organs and schools have shouldered. In recent years, we have had great achievements in this aspect, and in 1943 we must create even greater achievements, in order to directly solve the needs of the War of Resistance and national construction. The more the publicly-run economy develops, the more the people's burden can be reduced; this is another method of cultivating the people's strength. And the tool for uniting and accommodating these two aspects of the privately-run and publicly-run economies is finance.

The privately-run economy has agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, cooperative undertakings, the salt industry, and commerce. Here we will first speak of agriculture.

The agriculture of the border region declined during the period of the Agrarian Revolution. At that time, Yan'an, Ansai, Bao'an, Ganquan, Huachi, and the three eastern counties all had much wasteland. In a place called Yijia Chuan, about a hundred li long, on the border of Huachi and Bao'an counties, there lived only twenty or thirty households. Bao'an's Wuya Si and Zhangjia Cha had been uninhabited since the Tongzhi reign. Ganquan's Fucun Chuan, and a large part of Yan'an's Jinpen Wan and Mashi Chuan, had all become wasteland. Cotton planting in the border region had completely stopped. The destruction of livestock was even greater: only four to five hundred thousand sheep were left, and only over a hundred thousand cattle and donkeys. Spinning and weaving, and the transport industry, were similarly destroyed, especially spinning and weaving, which had almost completely stopped. The export of salt only reached 70,000 pack-loads in 1938. From this it can be seen that the agriculture of the border region was in a period of decline at that time. Only after the Central Red Army arrived in the border region, the civil war stopped, and bandits were cleared out, enabling the peasants to live and work in peace and contentment; the "Left" economic policies were corrected; the tax policy of recuperating the people's strength was proposed; and the influence of the Party and government's call to develop agriculture, which greatly raised the peasants' enthusiasm for production, did agriculture rapidly recover and develop.

Below is a statistic of land reclamation, cotton planting, and livestock development in the last four years:

| Year | Reclaimed Land (mu) | Cotton Planted (mu) | Cattle & Donkeys | Sheep | Total Livestock |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1939 | 1,000,000 | 3,750 | 150,000 | 600,000 | 750,000 |
| 1940 | 700,000 | 30,000 | 200,000 | 1,200,000 | 1,400,000 |
| 1941 | 300,000 | 94,000 | 210,000 | 1,100,000 | 1,310,000 |
| 1942 | 350,000 | 150,000 | 220,000 | 1,300,000 | 1,520,000 |
| Total | 2,350,000 | 277,750 | | | |

This statistic indicates: the cultivated land in the border region has expanded year by year, the acreage of cotton planting has increased year by year, and livestock has developed year by year, and the actual numbers are even greater than those in the statistical table. Therefore, many places that were formerly wasteland have now become cultivated land. For example, Yijia Chuan now has over a hundred households, and all the wasteland in the valley has become cultivated land. Wuya Si and Zhangjia Cha are also now fully inhabited. In Yan'an County, eleven districts used to have wasteland; now only Jinpen and Liulin two districts, half of the central district, and one township in Yaodian district have wasteland. In 1939, Yan'an had only about 300,000 mu of cultivated land; in 1942, it had 699,536 mu. Counties like Ansai, Anding, Yanchuan, and Yanchang used to have much wasteland, but now have very little. Before 1940, the border region still bought grain from Luochuan and Hedong. Now, not only does it not need to buy grain from outside, but it also has a surplus of grain to export to the Yulin area. A portion of the population has moved in from outside, livestock has also increased, and there is no feeling of grain shortage. From all these facts, it is beyond doubt that the border region has become self-sufficient in grain.

Cotton planting has not only recovered to its peak period before the revolution, but has also developed. For example: in Yanchuan's Yongping, Yongsheng, Yuju and other districts, cotton was not planted before, but now it is. Yan'an did not plant cotton before, but now it does. Because planting cotton is more profitable than planting grain, the average harvest of one mu of cotton can be worth more than 700 yuan, whereas if grain is planted it is only worth over 100 yuan, a ratio of seven to one. In 1939, the area of cotton planting was only over 3,700 mu, but by 1942 it was over 94,000 mu, and the output has reached 1.4 million jin; this is a great achievement. But the total need of the border region is 3 million jin, so this is the task for the future.

The development of livestock has also been very fast. For example: in 1937, Yan'an had only over 8,000 sheep, now it has over 60,000. In 1937, Huachi had only about 70,000 sheep, now it has over 120,000. In Zhangjiahe, Sanxiang, Dongyang District, Yanchuan, before the Agrarian Revolution there were only five flocks of sheep (there are no pastures there, each flock can only have thirty to fifty head), now there are thirteen flocks. The development of cattle and donkeys has increased by almost one-third compared to the civil war period. Therefore, in 1940 and 1941, 500,000 pack-loads of salt could be exported. If there had not been an increase in cattle and donkeys, it would have been very difficult to transport this salt.

But the development of agriculture is uneven. The more universally developed and more successful areas are the directly subordinate counties and Longdong, especially Yan'an, Ansai, Ganquan, Huachi, Quzi, and the three eastern counties. Because there is much land, few people, and the climate is not bad. The counties that use salt transport as a subsidiary occupation are also mostly these. At the same time, public consumption is also greatest in this area. The area that has not developed is the garrison area, because there the population is large, the land is scarce, and it is impossible to expand cultivated land. The achievements there, to some extent, are the gradual restoration of the household spinning and weaving industry; and there has been some migration to the Yan'an area, which has somewhat adjusted the distribution of population and land.

On the other hand, the speed of development is also different. Before 1940, development was faster, especially in 1939 and 1940 there was great development. For example: land reclamation in these two years was 1.7 million mu. In 1940, sheep increased by nearly 600,000, and cattle and donkeys increased by over 50,000. But in 1941 and 1942, land reclamation was only over 600,000 mu, just over one-third of the previous two years. The number of sheep in 1941 was even less than in 1940, and cattle and donkeys only increased by over 10,000 head (in reality, they decreased). But in these two years, cotton and textiles developed further.

The above is a general overview of the development of agriculture in the border region. Below, we will talk about how agriculture in the border region developed.

Before internal peace was established, agriculture was in decline; afterwards, it developed. How was this development achieved? In addition to the arrival of the Central Red Army, the clearing of bandits, the realization of peace, and the ability of peasants to live and work in peace and contentment, there are also the following reasons:

First is the correction of the "Left" errors in economic policy and the implementation of a policy of recuperation. Because although the peasants had been allocated land, due to the "Left" economic policy, they were afraid to develop production. On the other hand, because agriculture had been damaged before and after the revolution, its foundation was very weak, which hindered development. The Central Committee implemented a policy of correcting "Left" errors, which broke the peasants' tendency to fear developing production; peasants were willing to increase their farm tools, and rich peasants dared to hire partners and long-term laborers. The policy of recuperation restored vitality and facilitated the peasants' reproduction; at the same time, high grain prices and large profits from subsidiary occupations also stimulated the peasants' enthusiasm for production, causing agriculture to develop rapidly and laying the foundation for the collection of 200,000 dan of public grain and 16 million jin of public hay in 1941.

Second is the call to develop production. For example: the cadre production mobilization conference convened by the Central Committee in 1939, the first border region Party congress, the first consultative council, and the first agricultural exhibition all had calls to develop production, and these calls played a huge role in promoting it. Because they first motivated the cadres, and through the cadres they reached the masses, mobilizing men, women, old, and young, as well as "erliuzi" to participate in production, increasing the labor force, and finally breaking the peasants' fear of developing production. Therefore, the amount of land reclaimed in 1939 reached over one million mu; the year in which livestock was truly bought from outside was also the most in that year.

Third is the immigration policy. In the last four years, cultivated land has expanded by 2.35 million mu; an important reason is that areas with a lot of land have absorbed a large number of immigrants, increasing the population. For example: in 1937, Yan'an had a population of only 34,000, now it has a population of about 70,000 (including Yan'an city). Therefore, the county's cultivated land has increased from about 300,000 mu to about 700,000 mu. In 1936, Ansai had a population of only about 20,000, now it has a population of over 40,000. Ganquan originally had only over 8,000 people, now it has over 14,000. In 1939, Yanchang had a population of only 25,000, now it has over 32,000. Yanchuan has the least wasteland, but from 1938 to the present, its population has also increased by over 10,000. In 1938, Huachi had only 35,000 people, now it has over 40,000. The populations of other counties such as Bao'an, Anding, Jingbian, Longdong, and Guanzhong have all increased. Most of these new populations are from Hengshan, Yulin, Shenmu, and Fugu, followed by the garrison area; they all came voluntarily, not organized by the government. The reason they came voluntarily is because there is land and preferential treatment; the counties also organized old households to help with grain, tools, and cave dwellings; at the same time, rich peasants accepted partners, which also facilitated immigration. The increase in immigrants not only expanded the area of cultivated land, but also developed livestock and prospered commerce. So immigration is one of the conditions for developing agriculture.

Fourth is the reward policy. Immigrants are exempt from public grain for three years and have other obligatory burdens reduced. For cotton farmers whose profit from planting cotton is less than that from planting grain, the government compensates them. For livestock bought from outside the border region, a certain amount of public grain is reduced in the first year. Also, the rewards for labor heroes at the two agricultural exhibitions have had a great effect. For example: Yan'an's Wu Manyou and Mao Kehu, and Ganquan's Du Fafu, were all rewarded at the first agricultural exhibition; they have now all become very good rich peasants, each paying over five dan of public grain (one dan in the border region is 300 jin), and have promoted other peasant households in the countryside to develop production. All of these have promoted the development of agriculture, especially the development of grain and cotton.

Fifth is reducing the waste of labor and adjusting the labor force. During the civil war, being busy with war, there was no time for production, and the land was left barren. After peace was realized, there were still regular training and sentry duties for the self-defense corps, as well as various meetings, so each able-bodied man lost at least three workdays a month. Later, this loss of work was reduced. At the same time, before 1941, the public grain collected was small, and the obligatory transport of public grain was not much, so the loss of work was less. In recent years, "zhagong" (temporary work for others in groups with a foreman) and "biangong" (of a mutual aid nature among the masses, also group work) have developed in the countryside, adjusting the labor force. Also, "erliuzi" have been mobilized to participate in production, and more women have participated in production. All of these have helped the development of agriculture in the border region.

Sixth is the agricultural loan policy. Before, there were no agricultural loans, but there was the help of the policy of recuperation. Now, public grain has been increased, especially since 80% of peasant households have to pay public grain; a portion (roughly one-third) of peasant households lacking draft animals, farm tools, and food grain must have the help of loans. And it is especially necessary to give agricultural loans in order to develop certain necessary agriculture (such as cotton planting), rural subsidiary occupations (such as spinning and weaving), and certain areas that must be developed more. Although the agricultural loans in 1942 only amounted to over four million, of which draft animal loans were only over 1.5 million, with the help of these loans, over 2,600 draft animals were bought, nearly 5,000 farm tools were bought, and cotton planting was developed; it cannot be said that this was not a great help. But because financial resources are limited, loans can only be made according to the government's financial capacity, and not yet according to the needs of the peasant households; but having a little is better than having none, and it has some adjusting effect.

The above are the several main reasons for the development of agriculture. Below, we will talk about several main lessons from our work.

First, we must suit measures to local conditions and time. The regions and times of agriculture are different, and the methods of development are also different. For example, the garrison area has no wasteland (except for a small amount in Qingjian), so cultivated land cannot be expanded; sheep are limited by pasture, so development is limited; salt transport lacks pack animals; and the policy of rent reduction has not been thoroughly implemented. Therefore, grain production there has not increased, and subsidiary occupations other than spinning and weaving have not developed. But the method of deep plowing (improved practice) by weeding more, fertilizing more, and plowing more, although it has long been practiced there, should still be further studied based on the current situation, in order to increase production as much as possible. But if this method is used in areas with much land, few people, and crude practices, it will have little effect. Because these methods all require an increase in labor. In the view of peasants in the latter type of area, deep plowing is not as good as planting more land, and applying more fertilizer is not as good as reclaiming more wasteland; especially in areas with little rainfall, planting more land is better. So the slogan of improving farming methods is generally of little effect in the latter type of area at present. In these areas, the most important way to truly increase output at present is still by reclaiming wasteland. If from 1937 to 1942, a period of six years, the increased cultivated land was about 3 million mu, then the harvest in 1942 was at least 500,000 dan of coarse grain more than in 1936, equivalent to 250,000 dan of fine grain (one dan is 300 jin). If the grain output of the border region in 1942 is estimated at 1.5 million dan of fine grain, then the grain increase due to the increase in cultivated land in the past six years accounts for one-sixth of the total. Part of this increased cultivated land belongs to the reclamation by immigrants, and part belongs to the expanded cultivated land of old households. From this it can be seen that in guiding agriculture, we must adopt different methods according to different regions; one type of region should focus on deep plowing, and another type of region should focus on expanding the area of cultivated land. There should also be a distinction in time: when there is wasteland to be reclaimed, the main thing is to encourage reclamation; when the wasteland is all reclaimed, we must turn to encouraging deep plowing. Not only should there be a distinction between large regions, but even within a county, a district, and sometimes even within a township, there should be this distinction. For example, within a township, if some villages have a lot of wasteland, reclamation should be encouraged; if some villages have little or no wasteland, deep plowing should be encouraged. In terms of time, when there is still wasteland, the township should encourage reclamation; when the wasteland is finished, the township should encourage deep plowing. But in our work in the past few years, although on the one hand there have been achievements, on the other hand, much of the work has indeed been empty and generalized. Many of our comrades still do not know how to meticulously study the objective situation and, based on different places and different times, put forward definite requirements and solve the conditions for increasing production. In the past, slogans such as deep plowing, reclaiming wasteland, building water conservancy, and increasing production by 400,000 or 200,000 dan were generally put forward, but in reality they contained a lot of subjectivism, and many peasants had no interest in or were not influenced by these slogans. From this, the conclusion is drawn: in future work, we must seek truth from facts, conduct in-depth investigation and research, and solve problems according to specific times, places, and conditions.

Second, in a large part of the region, the peasants still suffer from heavy rent and high interest, and the policy of reducing rent and interest has not been thoroughly implemented. The peasants on the one hand have to bear the burden of rent and interest to the landlords, and on the other hand have to bear the burden of public grain and public funds to the government; what they get for themselves is too little, they cannot raise their enthusiasm for production, and it is impossible to increase the amount of production. From this, the conclusion is drawn: we must conscientiously implement the laws and regulations on reducing rent and interest.

Third, the increase in public grain and the new collection of public hay, sheep tax, and the impact of transporting public salt have lowered the peasants' enthusiasm for production. For example: in 1941 and 1942, the public grain, public hay, and public salt that the peasants contributed were very large, and the cultivated land expanded by the peasants in these two years was only over 600,000 mu, only six-tenths of that in 1939. Livestock did not actually increase in 1941, and sheep even decreased (of course, plagues were a factor). Immigration also decreased; in 1942, there were only 4,843 immigrant households, and 3,517 old households moved, the main reason being fear of the burden. Another reason: in the method of collecting public grain, it is progressive based on the actual harvest rather than on the amount of land; this method is reasonable in terms of average burden, but it is a hindrance to promoting agricultural investment. Because for the same land, if the harvest is large, more must be contributed, and if the harvest is small, less can be contributed, or even none; this will lower the peasants' enthusiasm for investing in the land. If collection is based on the amount of land, this point can be corrected, and the enthusiasm of middle and rich peasants will be higher, and it will not harm the poor peasants. From this, the conclusion is drawn: public grain and public hay must have limits, and at the same time, the standard of taxation must be improved in order to promote agricultural production.

Fourth, policies should be implemented thoroughly. For example: for immigrants and cotton planting, it was stipulated that they would be exempt from public grain for three years, but in reality, public grain was "welcomed" from immigrants, and half of the public grain was also collected from cotton fields; for livestock bought from outside, it was originally stipulated that a certain amount of public grain would be reduced in the first year, but this was not implemented; also, the regulations for rewarding production were not fully implemented. All of these not only affect the prestige of the government, but also will lower the enthusiasm of the peasants. From this, the conclusion is drawn: in the future, all laws and regulations promulgated by the government must be resolutely implemented.

Fifth, adjusting the labor force and many other methods of helping the peasants, such as labor exchange and labor pooling — these are of great significance for increasing agricultural output, but aside from a few places like Yan'an County, we have not yet organized and promoted them. Many cadres in various counties are indeed actively working on behalf of the people, devising ideas and creating many good methods for mobilizing the masses to develop production, producing many exemplary cases. But many other comrades are not like this. They lack a practical and energetic spirit, they lack creativity. They feel there is nothing to do in agricultural work, or do not know where to begin, so they merely raise empty slogans like 'spring plowing' and 'autumn harvest,' adopt a passive attitude, let the peasants go it alone, and the government merely registers results after the fact. But in reality, there is much to be done, and many good methods can be devised. For example: during the spring plowing of 1941 in Yan'an County, some peasants were very demoralized, and phenomena emerged such as moving away, dividing households, or selling draft animals in preparation for reducing production. In the eyes of comrades lacking an active spirit and creativity, these phenomena were hopeless — one could only let nature take its course. But the comrades of Yan'an County were not like that. They had no passive attitude, no bureaucratism. They were able to seize the key points of the problem, adopt positive measures, and overcome the difficulties. At that time, the Party and government did a great deal of work in propaganda, in grain allocation, and in the allocation of cave dwellings and farm tools. In the end, not only did production not shrink, but more than 80,000 mu of cultivated land was added. This example proves that our local Party and local government have much work that can and should be done in agriculture, and that as long as it is done in a focused and proper manner, it will immediately produce results. The conclusion drawn from this is: cadres must have a positive spirit for overcoming difficulties, must stay in touch with the masses, must create vivid methods based on the needs of the masses, and must solve the people's problems. They must never adopt a passive attitude or bureaucratism.