Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, Party leadership in all anti-Japanese base areas has generally been unified, and relations among the Party, government, military, and mass organizations have remained fundamentally harmonious.
This unity has sustained several years of arduous struggle and supported the nationwide war effort.
However, remnants of subjectivism and factionalism, coupled with insufficient clarity and proper resolution of certain political viewpoints and organizational issues, have given rise to certain disharmonies in the relationships among Party, government, military, and mass organizations—in essence, among Party cadres across these systems—in some regions.
Examples include: a lack of sufficient spirit of unity; uneven pace of action; tendencies toward acting independently; inadequate respect within the military for local Party and government authorities; blurring of distinctions between Party and government functions; independent-mindedness among Party members holding positions in government bodies; Party members monopolizing leadership of mass organizations; sectionalism; narrow-minded partisanship; and so forth.
Such disharmonies impede both the consolidation and development of the anti-Japanese base areas and our Party’s further Bolshevization.
The construction of the base areas and the implementation of democratic institutions demand centralized, unified leadership in each area.
Moreover, the intensification of the Japanese invaders’ “sweeping” operations, the strengthening of blockade lines and fortified posts, the increasing difficulty of communication between higher and lower levels, and the growing regional and guerrilla nature of the war all call for greater flexibility in the hierarchical subordination of various systems.
It is imperative that each region—each military district or sub-district—enjoy greater operational independence while maintaining unified leadership over all aspects of its activities, and that all organizations within a given area coordinate even more closely, leaving no openings for the enemy to exploit.
To this end, the Central Committee hereby makes the following decisions:  (1) The Party is the vanguard of the proletariat and the highest form of proletarian organization.
It must lead all other organizations, including the military, the government, and mass organizations.
Unified, centralized leadership of the base areas should be embodied in the existence of a single Party committee in each area responsible for directing all work—the Central Bureau, a Regional Bureau, a District Party Committee, or a County Party Committee.
Accordingly, the Central Representative Organs (Central Bureaus and Regional Bureaus) and Party committees at all levels (District Committees and County Committees) are designated as the supreme leading organs of their respective areas, charged with unifying the direction of Party, government, military, and mass-organization work.
The practice of establishing joint Party–Government–Military Committees, which was necessary and correct during the early stages of base-area establishment, is hereby abolished.
The character and composition of Party committees at all levels must be transformed.
They should no longer serve merely as committees for directing local Party affairs but rather as unified leadership bodies for all Party, government, military, and mass-organization activities within their respective areas—not as mere joint conferences.
Consequently, their membership must include leading Party, government, and military cadres (the standing committees of these Party committees should likewise comprise representatives from all three sectors), rather than consisting entirely or predominantly of Party functionaries.
The work of these committees should encompass all fronts, involving discussion and inspection of Party, government, military, and mass-organization activities, rather than being confined solely to local Party matters.  (2) Resolutions, decisions, or directives issued by the Central Representative Organs and District/County Party Committees must be implemented without condition by subordinate Party committees, by equivalent government, Party, military, and military-political committees, by military political departments, and by Party groups and individual Party members in mass organizations.
The existing systems and hierarchical relationships within the government, military, and mass-organization structures remain intact.
Decisions, orders, and decrees of higher authorities; commands and instructions from higher military leadership; and resolutions of higher-level mass organizations—all important documents of this kind must first be submitted for approval by the Party leaders within the relevant organs and then forwarded to the corresponding Party committee for endorsement, or at least for prior consultation and agreement with the committee leadership, before being promulgated.
However, not every such document requires formal approval.
Not only must lower-level government, military, and mass-organization bodies implement these directives without fail, but subordinate Party committees must also do so, without invoking the absence of instructions from higher Party authorities as an excuse for defiance or delay.
Should a subordinate Party committee disagree with a decision made by a higher-level government, military, or mass-organization body, it may report its dissent to the higher Party committee.
When disputes arise within a Party committee itself regarding how to implement specific directives from higher organizations, they shall be resolved according to the principle of majority rule.
Even if the heads of government, military, or mass organizations disagree with the majority opinion, they must still carry out the decision of the corresponding Party committee, though they may submit their own views to the appropriate higher authority.  (3) The Central Bureaus and Regional Bureaus serve as the Central Representative Organs and are appointed by the Central Committee.
District and County Party Committees are elected by unified congresses of Party organizations from both the military and local ranks, subject to approval by higher authorities.
These committees should include representatives from local Party organizations, Party cadres serving in the military, and leaders of Party groups within the government.
Whether main-force units participate in county-level Party committees will be determined on a case-by-case basis by local authorities.
County committees in which no main-force units are represented consist solely of leaders from local Party organizations, local military units, and government Party groups.
Secretaries of Party committees at all levels should be selected from comrades capable of mastering work across all fronts—Party, military, and governmental.
Thus, a committee secretary must not only be well-versed in Party affairs but also in military strategy and administrative work.
Candidates for district Party committee secretaries are proposed by the Central Bureaus and Regional Bureaus and approved by the Central Committee.
Candidates for county Party committee secretaries are nominated by the district committees and approved by the Regional Bureaus and Central Bureaus.
To unify leadership of Party affairs within both the local Party and the military, the secretaries of Regional Bureaus, District Committees, and County Committees shall concurrently serve as political commissars of the corresponding military districts or sub-districts, while a deputy secretary will be assigned to manage purely Party-related tasks.
If a political commissar of a military district or sub-district is also chosen as secretary of a Regional Bureau, District Committee, or County Committee, a separate deputy political commissar may be appointed to oversee exclusively military matters.
Regional Bureaus, District Committees, and County Committees should attend to all aspects of their work; beyond their role as political commissars, they should refrain from assuming additional specific responsibilities.
Should exceptional circumstances arise requiring that a Party committee secretary not concurrently serve as a political commissar, or vice versa, such arrangements must be approved by the higher Party committee or the Central Committee.
The military political committees and political departments shall become departments within the corresponding Party committees (Central Bureaus, Regional Bureaus, District Committees, and County Committees), enjoying equal rights and obligations alongside other departments such as the Organization Department and the Propaganda Department.
They will not be subordinate to any other department or committee, yet, unlike other committees and departments, they will continue to maintain direct superior-subordinate leadership and affiliation relationships.
Military policies—including principles governing troop expansion and army building, guidelines for political work, and so forth—and major strategic directives concerning military operations—for example, strategic campaign plans and post-operation summaries related to counter-sweeps—must be deliberated by the Party committee.
However, specific military actions shall be decided by the commander and political commissar—that is, the Party committee secretary—whose final authority over military operations derives from the Regulations on Political Work.
Unrestrained democratic debate would only lead to failure in military endeavors.
The appointment and removal of key military personnel shall continue to be carried out by military organs in accordance with established rules.  (4) The main force constitutes the armed wing under Party leadership and serves as a powerful pillar for base-area construction and the continuation of the struggle.
Its primary mission is to consolidate and defend the base areas in which it is stationed.
While possessing a national character, the main force also retains a distinct local identity.
In the past, inconsistencies in base-area leadership often stemmed from a lack of unified understanding among certain main-force commanders regarding the establishment and defense of a particular base area.
As a result, certain policies they implemented—for instance, issues related to local armed forces in the context of military construction, troop-raising initiatives, or unified financial and economic management—focused narrowly on the main force while neglecting the need for coordinated efforts across the entire base area, thereby provoking disputes with local Party and government authorities.
Simultaneously, in some regions, Party leadership bodies failed to fully appreciate the overriding priority of supporting the war effort, falling short in their responsibilities to ensure adequate replenishment of personnel, provision of food and supplies, and effective measures to combat desertion and maintain discipline.
These shortcomings contributed to disharmony in relations between the military and local Party and government organs.
Going forward, in order to achieve unified leadership of the base areas, it is essential not only to establish Party committees as the sole central leadership bodies in each locality but also to rectify certain ideological and policy errors among local main-force commanders and Party leaders.
All central policies pertaining to the base areas must be rigorously implemented, along with the relevant directives issued by the Military Commission concerning military construction.
Henceforth, main-force units must comply with resolutions and decisions of Party committees at all levels as well as with laws and regulations enacted by governments at all levels.
Main-force units are likewise obligated to honor decisions made by subordinate Party committees and local governments—such as those at the county, district, or township level—if they differ from their own views.
Any disagreements should be reported to the higher Party committee and higher government authorities.
Furthermore, regular communication and mutual assistance between the military and local Party and government organs are indispensable.
Main-force units bear the responsibility of protecting Party, government, and mass-organization institutions; whenever these institutions suffer undue damage due to negligence or indifference on the part of the military, the commanding officers concerned shall be held accountable.
In the event of any disputes, efforts should first be made to resolve them locally through collaboration, with a detailed record of the dispute and its resolution submitted to higher authorities.
Relying solely on appeals to higher levels without engaging in face-to-face discussions to find common ground should be avoided.  (5) The governmental system—comprising legislative councils and executive bodies—is the organ of state power, and its laws and decrees carry compulsory force.
The relationship between the Party committee and the governmental system must be clearly defined.
Practices such as the Party’s assumption of governmental functions, the blurring of boundaries between Party and government, and the failure of government officials to abide by Party decisions or violations of Party discipline must all be corrected.
In implementing the “three-three” system, the Party’s leadership over the governmental system should be principled, policy-oriented, and focused on overarching strategic guidance, rather than constituting micromanagement or substituting for government functions.
Subordinate Party committees have no authority to alter or disregard decisions and laws issued by higher legislative and executive bodies.
Party organs and individual Party members should set an exemplary standard in enforcing these laws.
The Party should undertake political work to enhance the prestige of legislative and executive bodies.
When Party cadres and members violate laws and decrees passed by these bodies, the Party organization must impose severe disciplinary sanctions.
The Party’s leadership over legislative and executive affairs can only be exercised through its own Party members and Party groups; Party committees and other Party organs lack the authority to issue direct orders to legislative and executive bodies.
Party groups must obey the decisions of their corresponding Party committees; however, their working methods must be reformed, shifting from coercive tactics aimed at compelling non-Party individuals to comply to approaches based on persuasion and political education.
Should a Party group fail to secure the support of a majority in the legislative or executive body, resulting in the rejection of its proposals, the principle of majority rule must prevail, and the democratic centralist principle must not be violated.
Nevertheless, if Party group members, owing to differences of opinion with their corresponding Party committee, refuse to resolutely implement the committee’s decisions, such behavior constitutes a violation of Party discipline and warrants censure and punishment.
The Party must dispatch capable cadres to serve in legislative and executive bodies; the practice of neglecting governmental work and concentrating cadres solely within Party organs must be abandoned.
In implementing the “three-three” system, the number of Party members within the governmental system will decrease, but the quality of their contributions must be significantly enhanced.
Party members and cadres serving in legislative and executive bodies must adhere to the resolutions, decisions, and disciplinary rules of their Party committees and Party groups and may not exploit their positions to act arbitrarily.
It is particularly important to note that the successful implementation of the Party’s leadership over the “three-three” system hinges upon the consistency of words and deeds among government officials and their absolute obedience to Party decisions.
Therefore, strict enforcement of Party discipline among government officials and other Party members holds profound significance.
When Party committees consider transferring government officials, they must proceed with caution and ensure that the affected individuals formally resign from their government posts in accordance with established procedures.
Relations between the government and the military must be improved.
The military should receive education emphasizing respect for and support of the government, while the government should guarantee adequate provisions and transportation for the armed forces.
Military leaders should be appointed to serve as members of legislative councils and senators.
The military should set an example in respecting and enforcing government laws, and any illegal actions committed by military personnel must be strictly punished.
With the exception of expressing opinions on legislative and executive matters in their capacity as citizens, government officials, or legislators, no soldiers or military institutions shall interfere in the internal affairs of legislative or executive bodies.
However, military political organs should provide as much assistance as possible to government work.  (6) Mass organizations are voluntary associations formed by the people themselves, and the Party, government, and military should not directly interfere in their internal affairs.
The Party’s leadership over mass organizations is exercised through its own Party members and Party groups.
Nevertheless, practices such as the blurring of distinctions between Party and mass organizations, the monopolization of leadership by Party members, and the exclusion of non-Party elements must be rectified.
At least half of the members of mass-organization committees at all levels should be non-Party individuals.
The issues facing Party groups within mass organizations parallel those confronting Party groups within the government.
The government should respect the independence of mass organizations, provide them with necessary assistance, and require them to comply with government laws.
Mass organizations should legally register with the government to obtain official status.
Should a mass organization violate government laws, the government may impose penalties, up to and including dissolution.
Beyond that, it should refrain from interfering in the daily life and activities of mass organizations.
Mass organizations should mobilize the public to support the government and the military and contribute to the war effort.
However, they are not organs of state power and may not assume the administrative functions of the government or engage in arrests, interrogations, or sentencing of citizens.
The military and mass organizations should assist one another but should not interfere in each other’s affairs.  (7) In guerrilla zones, due to their unique characteristics, unified leadership must be ensured not only in terms of inter-organizational relationships but also, when necessary, through the integration of Party, government, military, and mass-organization organs into a single structure.
Party, government, and mass-organization bodies may merge with military command and political organs, allowing Party, government, and mass-organization cadres to hold specific positions within the military or guerrilla units—for example, as principal or deputy military commanders, political commissars, or staff members of political departments.
During periods of active combat, they will perform their duties in the military or guerrilla forces; in intervals between battles, they will resume their original roles in Party, government, or mass-organization work—for instance, as Party committee secretaries, county magistrates, or trade union chairpersons.  (8) Unified leadership of the Party manifests itself both in the interrelationships among Party, government, military, and mass organizations at the same level and in the hierarchical relationships between higher and lower levels.
Here, the strict adherence to the principle of subordination—subordination of the lower levels to the higher, and of the entire Party to the Central Committee—plays a decisive role in achieving unified Party leadership.
All base-area leadership organs must follow the Central Committee’s directives when implementing policies and institutional reforms.
When addressing new issues of nationwide, Party-wide, or military-wide significance, they must seek guidance from the Central Committee and refrain from adopting novel or unilateral stances that could undermine the unity of Party leadership.
Failure to resolutely implement, or overt acts of defiance against, resolutions, decisions, orders, or directives issued by higher Party, government, military, or Central authorities, particularly in cases involving fundamental principles or matters that, by their nature, should not be decided unilaterally, constitute manifestations of impure Party consciousness and acts of undermining unity.
It is once again necessary to remind all comrades engaged in Party, government, military, and mass-organization work in the base areas that Party members holding leading positions in Party committees, government, military, or mass organizations may not, without the Central Committee’s permission, issue declarations, deliver speeches, or broadcast messages of national or Party-wide significance.
Articles authored by leaders at all levels must be reviewed by appropriate personnel within their respective Party committees or Party groups.
Members of Regional Bureaus and above, as well as commanders at the division level and higher, whose writings carry national or Party-wide implications, should submit summaries or telegraphic reports of their content to the Central Committee in advance.
Localities should no longer engage in direct external broadcasting but instead channel their communications through the Yan’an Xinhua News Agency.
It is crucial to recognize that the unauthorized expression of political views by senior Party officials without the consent of their peers or superiors constitutes a grave violation of Party organizational principles and a highly detrimental act that undermines Party unity.  (9) To unify leadership of the base areas and improve relations among Party, government, military, and mass organizations, it is imperative to conduct ideological education and carry out a thorough rectification of the “three maladies”—subjectivism, sectarianism, and dogmatism—among cadres in all these systems.
At cadre meetings, guided by decisions of the Central Committee and reports delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong, we must educate cadres to grasp the bigger picture and prioritize the overall situation.
We should encourage self-criticism and criticism, helping cadres understand the interconnectedness of the whole and its parts, of higher and lower levels, and of different localities, thus overcoming narrow, parochial perspectives.
Educational efforts must be intensified across all Party, government, military, and mass-organization entities to instill in every comrade an appreciation for the importance of unified leadership and for the revolutionary order and revolutionary laws prevailing in the base areas.
Special vigilance is required among military cadres: in situations where disharmony exists in the relationships among Party, government, military, and mass organizations, military personnel typically bear a greater share of responsibility.
Possessing firearms and prone to arbitrary decision-making, they may tend to disregard Party leadership, exhibit insubordination, act independently, and thereby harm the interests of the masses.
Therefore, military political cadres must exercise particular discipline over their subordinates and engage in rigorous self-examination.
They should rally their troops around Party leadership and government support, resolutely enforcing Party decisions and government laws.
At the same time, it is essential to correct certain misconceptions held by some Party members and cadres—that only work conducted within Party organs qualifies as “Party work.”
In fact, all Party members and cadres, regardless of whether they are engaged in political, military, mass mobilization, economic, technical, or cultural activities, are performing Party work.
Activities undertaken within Party organs represent merely one aspect of broader Party work—namely, Party administrative functions.
Obedience to Party leadership entails adherence to the Party’s line, policies, resolutions, decisions, directives, and disciplinary rules.
Some Party members merely pay lip service to this concept or misinterpret it, failing to study or earnestly implement the Party’s line, policies, resolutions, decisions, directives, and disciplinary requirements.
Such attitudes are wholly inappropriate.  (10) Strengthening the unified leadership of all anti-Japanese base areas is essential for the smooth prosecution of the war against the Japanese aggressors.
The principle of “everything subordinate to the war” stands as the highest tenet of unified leadership.
It is imperative to make clear throughout the Party that without a strong military and without victory in the war, the base areas cannot endure, and the entire edifice of Party, government, military, and mass-organization leadership will collapse.
Consequently, Party committees, governments, mass organizations, and the entire population share a collective obligation to bolster the military and enhance its combat effectiveness.
Matters such as replenishing military personnel, supplying food, clothing, and ammunition, providing transportation, allocating barracks, evacuating, caring for, and rehabilitating wounded and disabled soldiers, as well as extending preferential treatment to families of anti-Japanese veterans, all fall within the purview of Party committees, governments, and mass organizations, which have a duty to address these issues promptly.
Indifference to these responsibilities is utterly wrong and deeply harmful.
Within the military itself, it must be firmly understood that without the coordinated support of the Party, government, and mass organizations, a bare-bones military force cannot sustain the war effort for even a single day.
Therefore, educational efforts within the armed forces must be intensified to foster a sense of care for the base areas, prudent use of human and material resources, respect for Party leadership, strict observance of military discipline, and a commitment to providing essential assistance to Party, government, and mass organizations.
All measures pertaining to personnel and material replenishment, transportation, and preferential treatment for veterans must be carried out in strict accordance with government laws and regulations; reckless improvisation will only undermine the very foundations of the anti-Japanese military.  (11) Based on the principles set forth in this decision and taking into account local conditions, each base-area leadership organ shall formulate detailed supplementary regulations—codified as government decrees, military ordinances, Party-group rules, or mass-organization charters—to address the myriad practical challenges associated with unified leadership.
These regulations must subsequently be reported to the Central Committee.
Since the Central Committee first proposed the policy of streamlining the armed forces and improving their efficiency, many anti-Japanese base-area Parties have planned and implemented this work in accordance with its directives.
Leaders in the Jinji-Luyu Border Region, in particular, have taken vigorous steps in this regard, setting a model example of streamlined military operations.
However, there remain certain shortcomings: insufficient awareness, incomplete implementation of the policy, and a failure to fully grasp its connection to the Party’s current policies.
Some comrades have treated the streamlining initiative as an exceptionally important policy unto itself.
On this matter, I had intended to elaborate further in previous discussions but now wish to offer additional clarification.
All of the Party’s policies are geared toward defeating the Japanese aggressors.
Yet, after five years of war, we have entered a critical final phase in the quest for victory.
This phase is not only characterized by heightened urgency but also by extreme difficulties—what might be described as the “darkest hour before dawn.”
Such conditions are currently shared by all anti-fascist nations, including China as a whole, and are particularly pronounced in the base areas controlled by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.
Our goal is to secure two more years of decisive fighting against the Japanese enemy.
These two years will be marked by extraordinary hardship and complexity, differing markedly from the initial and middle stages of the war.
A revolutionary leader must anticipate these challenges in advance; otherwise, they risk wasting precious time and jeopardizing the success of the revolution.
The situation in all anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines has, to date, become increasingly difficult, though it has not yet reached its most severe stage.
The most formidable trials still lie ahead.
Many comrades tend to be misled by recent relative lulls in hostilities, assuming that future conditions will remain similarly manageable.
They lack the foresight to discern the hidden reefs that lie ahead and the ability to navigate skillfully around them.
What, then, constitutes the “final-stage reef” in the anti-Japanese struggle?
It is the extreme difficulty inherent in this critical phase.
The Central Committee has repeatedly drawn our attention to this challenge, urging us to steer clear of it.
While many comrades have come to understand this obstacle, others remain unaware that it must be overcome as a matter of utmost urgency.
Beyond this political difficulty—which has already arisen and may recur in the future—the Party has devoted considerable energy over the past five years to gradually mitigating another challenge: material scarcity.
This material difficulty will only intensify going forward.
At present, many comrades remain unduly complacent about it, necessitating a renewed effort to raise their awareness.
All comrades in the anti-Japanese base areas must recognize this impending material hardship.
For the time being, we must confront it head-on through the policy of streamlining the armed forces.
Why, then, does this policy constitute a crucial measure for overcoming material scarcity?
Clearly, the current situation—particularly the ongoing war—does not permit us to cling to outdated perspectives.
Our vast wartime apparatus has indeed adapted to and thrived under these circumstances, and such adaptation was both appropriate and necessary.
However, the times have changed.
In light of the shrinking scale of our operations, we can no longer sustain the same cumbersome organizational structure as before.
Continuing to maintain that contradictory arrangement would only exacerbate our difficulties.
The enemy’s strategy is predicated on provoking conflict within our ranks.
This tactic has proven effective.
By reducing the size of our forces, we diminish the potential for internal discord and create opportunities for more focused, efficient action.
Through careful planning and disciplined execution, we can keep our adversaries at bay and ultimately emerge victorious.
The policy of streamlining the armed forces is therefore an extremely important measure.
Engaging in fierce competition encourages us to tap into our latent creative energies and strive to maximize our limited resources.
When we shrink our large-scale apparatus, what happens?
Habitually, we tend to perceive contraction as a daunting, personally taxing endeavor—one that demands immense self-discipline and restraint.
Yet, when we approach it with a mindset of innovation and resourcefulness, we discover that even modest reductions can yield significant results.
By restraining our impulses and resisting the urge to expand, we can avoid being overwhelmed by the enemy and secure a lasting victory.
The policy of streamlining the armed forces represents precisely such a transformative opportunity.
The enemy seeks to bind our hands and feet, preventing us from moving freely.
If we succumb to the temptation of grandiosity, we risk becoming overly encumbered and unable to fight effectively.
Conversely, embracing a spirit of self-restraint and humility allows us to shed unnecessary burdens and focus on what truly matters.
This shift in perspective is essential for effecting meaningful change.