the worst is precisely a condition for creating favorable possibilities and turning
them into reality. On this occasion, we were fully prepared against a split by the
Guomindang, and so the Guomindang dared not lightly bring about a split.
7. There are even more comrades who fail to understand the unity of the national struggle and the class struggle, and who fail to understand united front policy
and class policy, and consequently the unity of united front education and class
education. They hold that after the Southern Anhui Incident special emphasis should
be placed on what they call class education, as distinct from united front education. Even now they do not understand that for the whole period of the anti-Japanese
war our Party has a single integral policy-the national united front policy (a dual
policy) which integrates the two aspects, unity and struggle toward all those in
the upper and middle strata who are still resisting Japan, whether they belong to
the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie or the intermediate classes. This dual
policy should be applied even to the puppet troops, the Chinese traitors, and the
pro-Japanese elements, except for those who are absolutely unrepentant, whom
we must resolutely crush. The education that our Party conducts among its own
members and the people in general likewise embraces both these aspects, that is, it
teaches the proletariat and the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie how to unite, in different ways, with the different strata of the bourgeoisie and
the landlord class for resistance to Japan, and at the same time how to conduct
struggles against them in varying degrees according to the varying degrees in which
they compromise, vacillate, and are anti-Communist. United front policy is class
policy, and the two are inseparable; whoever is unclear on this will be unclear on
many other issues.
8. Other comrades do not understand that the social character of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas in North China
and Central China is already new-democratic. The main criterion in judging whether
an area is new-democratic in character is whether representatives of the broad
masses of the people participate in the political power there and whether this political power is led by the Communist Party. Therefore, united front political power
under Communist leadership is the chief mark of a new-democratic society. Some
people think that New Democracy can be considered as accomplished only if there
is a land revolution like that of the ten-year civil war, but this is wrong. At present
the political system in the base areas is a political system of the united front of all
the people who are for resistance and democracy, the economy is one from which
the elements of semicolonialism and semifeudalism have been basically eliminated, and the culture is an anti-imperialist and antifeudal culture of the broad
masses of the people. Therefore, whether viewed politically, economically, or
culturally, both the anti-Japanese base areas that have only enforced the reduction
of rent and interest and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, which has
gone through a thorough land revolution, are new-democratic in character. When
the example of the anti-Japanese base areas is extended throughout the country,
then the whole of China will become a new-democratic republic.

The Current Situation and
Our Overall Orientation

(May 9, 1941)

To Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]; Chen [Yi], Liu [Shaoqi], and Lai [Chuanzhu];¹
He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying]; [Nie] Rongzhen; Xiao Ke;² Lü [Zhengcao] and
Cheng [Zihua]; Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]; [Song] Renqiong; Zhu [Rui],
Chen [Guang], and Luo [Ronghuan]; Li [Yü]³ and Luo [Shunchu]; Su [Yu]4 and
Liu [Yan]; [Huang] Kecheng; Zhang [Yunyi] and Deng [Zihui]; [Peng] Xuefeng,
[Li] Xiannian, and [Tan] Zhenlin:

1. The enemy is gathering forces in an attempt to attack Henan, Shaanxi, and
Yunnan, fight through the Beiping-Hankou railroad, and cut off the two communication lines in the Southwest and the Northwest. As for Henan and Shaanxi, it is
said that more than four divisions and regiments of troops have been mobilized,
and, in recent days, the traffic has been very busy along both the Ping-Han and the
Tong-Pu [Datong-Tongguan] lines. It is quite possible that battles will break out
within a few days.

2. It is our estimate that, through the process of this campaign, the anticommunist sentiment of the Guomindang will be greatly reduced, and there is hope that
the situation will take a turn for the better. The Soviet aid to China has not changed,
and recently more than a hundred planes and two hundred cannon have arrived.
There is also the possibility that relations between China and the Soviet Union will
improve. Both Tang Enbo and Hu Zongnan are ready to fight the enemy. The

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 349-51, where it is reproduced
from Mao's handwritten manuscript.
1. Regarding Lai Chuanzhu, see the note to the text of March 16, 1939.
2. Xiao Ke (1908-), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927
and took part in the Nanchang Uprising. At this time, he was commander of the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Forward Army.
3. Regarding Li Yü, see the note to the text of December 6, 1939 (p. 267).
4. Regarding Su Yu, see the note to the text of July 12, 1940. At this time, he had become
commander of the New Fourth Army's First Division and commander of the Central Jiangsu
Military Area Command.
5. Liu Yan (1905-1946), a native of Taoyuan in Hunan, served at the time as political
commissar of both the New Fourth Army's First Division and the Central Jiangsu Military
Area Command.


Guomindang has asked us to cooperate in the campaign, again with the sole purpose of goading us into action, claiming that if the Chinese Communist Party does
not compromise with Japan, it should launch an offensive in northern China and
stop the enemy's advance.
3. Our overall orientation is definitely not to be moved by its goading tactics.
We must continue to hold to our army's present posture, to strengthen all base
areas, and to develop patiently our work in the three arenas of dealing with the
enemy, the puppet troops, and the traitors (this is extremely important). According
to what the local conditions permit, certain of the enemy's and the puppets' strongholds that cut deeply into our region are to be taken over. In the areas close to
Henan and Shaanxi, there should be a considerable number of troops coordinating
with the friendly armies in fighting, and united front work should be promoted
vigorously in the meantime. But do not take this opportunity to actually expand
into the Guomindang areas, so that the forces under Chiang [Kaishek] and the
Guangxi clique will fight the enemy with their minds at ease. For the time being,
attacks on the troops of Han [Deqin], Shen [Honglie], Yu [Xuezhong], and Gao
[Shuxun] should be stopped. When war breaks out, the call to "unite all people in
the country against the attack of Japanese imperialism" should be emphasized.
4. The Central Committee has already sent a telegram to Comrade [Zhou] Enlai
to tell the Guomindang that our response to their request for our army to coordinate in the fighting is that this is a matter of course, and presents no problem. At
the same time, items such as the following are to be raised: (a) an immediate resolution to the problem of the New Fourth Army; (b) immediate provision of pay and
ammunition; (c) a halt in opposition to the Communist Party; (d) sending Zhou
[Enlai] back to Yan'an by plane for the meeting, and so on.
5. It is hoped that our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army will make all
deployments in a cool-headed manner in accordance with the orientation laid out
above.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang] Ye [Jianying]