An Analysis of the Attitudes of the Various
Political Forces in Britain, the United States,
and China After the Japanese-Soviet Treaty
(April 20, 1941)¹
Zhou [Enlai]:

1. We are in receipt of your telegram of the 19th, and the analysis therein is
quite correct.² Under attack by Germany, Britain's relations with the Soviet Union
will soon take a turn for the better, and the United States will basically follow in
Britain's footsteps; they certainly cannot give offense to the Soviet Union. Under
the influence of Britain and the United States, the wavering elements in the pro-Britain and pro-United States faction, the diehard faction, the middle-of-the-road
faction, and the progressive faction in China will all try to curry favor with the
Soviet Union. Only the very obstinate elements in the diehard faction are in danger of being drawn toward capitulation by the pro-Japanese faction. This is very
much worthy of attention, but right now it is not yet likely to happen.

2. The overall orientation of Britain and the United States is to deal first with
Germany and then with Japan, and they definitely do not dare adopt a tough attitude toward Japan. It is even possible that they may concede the Dutch East Indies
to Japan or even halt assistance to China. This sort of possibility exists as long as
Germany occupies Suez and further intensifies the bombing of London and attacks in the Atlantic, posing a real threat to Britain's survival, and as long as Japan
agrees not to make war on Britain. When this situation emerges, great confusion,
realignment, and wavering will occur among the wavering elements of what you
referred to as the pro-British and pro-American faction, the diehard faction, the
middle-of-the-road faction, and the progressive faction. They will become the
objects of vociferous competition between the pro-Japanese faction and the Communist faction. The time for this to occur may be between this fall and this winter.
Our orientation is to strive to have Chiang and the main body of the Guomindang
move in the direction of being pro-Soviet, accommodating the Communists, and
reform, on the condition that their régime be maintained and our status be recognized. At that time, Britain and the Soviet Union and the United States and the
Soviet Union may have entered into mutual nonaggression pacts (such an agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union may very well be signed before long).

3. [We are] prepared to issue a document on political intelligence within a
day's time and shall incorporate your point explaining narrow nationalism.

4. Chen Ruiting's regiment³ has decided to rebel within a day or so. They will
still be under the rubric of the 92d Army (to be called the independent brigade of
the Ninety-second Army) and will move to Zhang Aiping's⁴ zone for training.
Please be prepared to deal with possible inquiries from the Guomindang, answering to the effect that this is the Ninety-second Army's own business; that we counterattack anyone who attacks us and are friendly toward anyone who adopts a
friendly attitude toward us; and that it is right for us to assist Chen's regiment,
since it is friendly to us, but it is still the Ninety-second Army, not the Eighth
Route Army.

5. Please ask the Guomindang whether it still plans to provide pay for the Eighth
Route Army. If so, fine; otherwise, we will raise funds from the whole country and
the whole world (including the Soviet Union), launch a general fund-raising campaign (we are truly prepared to do so), and act like beggars begging for food,
because the Guomindang has pushed us into a corner, and we are about to starve to
death.

Mao Zedong

3. The 425th Regiment of the 142nd Division of the Guomindang Army's Ninety-second
Army. Chen Ruiting (1906- ) was a native of Shandong. Following this action, he
became in 1942 the chief of staff of the New Fourth Army.
4. Zhang Aiping at that time commanded the Third Detachment of the Eighth Route
Army's Fifth Column.


--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 332-33, where it is reproduced
from Mao's handwritten manuscript.
1. The time of dispatch of this telegram is indicated by a conventional Chinese character
signifying between 9 and 11 P.M.
2. Zhou Enlai had sent a telegram to Mao and the Central Committee Secretariat on
April 19, in which he analyzed the attitudes of various factions in Chongqing toward the
Japanese-Soviet pact. For extracts see Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, p. 333, n. 2.