(April 5, 1941)
To Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and for transmittal to Peng
[Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], Chen [Yi], and Liu [Shaoqi]: 1. We are in receipt of the telegram of the 25th from Zhu, Chen, and Luo.
Given the situation that sharp contradictions still remain between Japan and Chiang
[Kaishek], there is no possibility that the anti-Communist armies will launch a
large-scale attack on us. This point provides our Party with favorable conditions in
which to strengthen and expand our base areas in Shandong and Central China.
2. But the triangular struggle between the enemy, the diehards, and us in
Shandong and Central China is a protracted one, and none of the three parties will
be able to resolve the problem quickly.
3. Although Chiang Kaishek has sent Hou Jingru’s Twenty-first Division1 under Li Xianzou (and not He Zhuguo) north of the Longhai railway line to coordinate with Yu [Xuezhong] in Shandong and Han [Deqin] in Jiangsu,2 and this unit
continues to try and find a way to advance (it is still south of the Wo River right
now), because it is faced with too many difficulties, namely, obstruction by both
Peng [Xuefeng]’s forces3 and the Japanese bandits, it would be very hard to achieve
its goal. Pang Bingxun’s4 intention to enter Hebei and Han [Deqin]’s and Huo
[Shouyi]’s5 to enter Shandong are the same as this (Pang, and Han and Huo, are
still where they were originally).

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang] Ye [Jianying]

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 47, where it is reproduced from
a documentary collection published in China in 1982.
Opinion Regarding the Strategic Arrangements
in Shandong and Central China

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 637–38, where it is printed
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.
4. Therefore, in making strategic deployments you must be in accord with the
basic situation described above, make long-term plans, and not be swayed by the
information of the moment.
5. Peng Xuefeng’s task is to prevent the anti-Communist troops from marching
northward. You should order the troops in southwestern Shandong to make efforts
to weaken Feng Zigu’s6 and the other anti-Communist forces and to reconsolidate
and expand our own forces and construct base areas that are more stable. As for
moving the rest of the troops westward and southward, it is necessary to be very
careful so as to avoid having too many things to attend to at once.
6. The Central Committee has approved the suggestion of the Central China
Bureau that leadership of the Party and the army north of the Longhai railway line
should revert to the Northern Bureau and the General Headquarters of the Eighth
Route Army, and that south of the Longhai railway line should be under the Central China Bureau and the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army. The bureau in
Central China is still called the Central China Bureau.

--- Notes

1. Hou Jingru was at this time commander of the Twenty-first Division of the Guomindang
Ninety-second Army.

2. Yu and Han were, respectively, commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief
of the Guomindang Army’s Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone. Han served concurrently as chairman of the Jiangsu provincial government.

3. Peng was commander and concurrently political commissar of the New Fourth Army’s
Fourth Division.

4. Pang was at the time chairman of the Guomindang’s Hebei provincial government
and served concurrently as well as deputy commander-in-chief of the Guomindang Army’s
Hebei-Chahar War Zone and commander-in-chief of the Twenty-fourth Group Army.

5. Huo was division commander of the Fifty-seventh Army’s 112th Division, in the
Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone.

6. Feng was head of the xian government of Peixian, under the Guomindang’s Jiangsu
provincial government.