March 18, 1941

[This inner-party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.]


1. The second anti-Communist onslaught,[1] which
was touched off by the telegram of Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi (dated
October 19 last year), reached its climax in the Southern Anhwei Incident
and Chiang Kai-shek's Order of January 17; the rearguard actions are his
anti-Communist speech of March 6 and the anti-Communist resolution of the
People's Political Council.[2] From now on there
may be some temporary easing of the situation. With the world's two major
imperialist blocs on the eve of a decisive struggle, that section of China's
big bourgeoisie which is pro-British and pro-American and which is still
opposed to the Japanese aggressors finds it necessary to seek a slight temporary
relaxation in the present strained relations between the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party. Besides, the Kuomintang cannot keep these relations strained
to the pitch of the past five months, because of the situation within the
Kuomintang (there are contradictions between its central and local authorities,
between the C.C. Clique and the Political Science Group, between the C.C.
Clique and the Fu Hsing Society [3] and between
the die-hards and the intermediate sections, and also contradictions within
the C.C. Clique and the Fu Hsing Society themselves), because of the domestic
situation (the broad masses of the people are opposed to the Kuomintang's
tyranny and sympathize with the Communist Party) and because of our Party's
own policy (of continuing the protest campaign). At the moment, therefore,
Chiang Kai-shek needs a slight temporary easing of the tension.

2. The recent struggle points to a decline in the standing of the Kuomintang
and a rise in that of the Communist Party, and this is the key factor in
certain changes that have occurred in the relative strength of the two parties.
All this has compelled Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider his own position and
attitude. In stressing national defence and preaching that party politics
are out of date, he is posing as a "national leader" who is above domestic
contradictions and feigning impartiality to class and party, his aim being
to preserve the rule of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie and the
Kuomintang. But this attempt of his will certainly prove futile, if it is
only a subterfuge and means no real change in policy.

3. At the beginning of the recent anti-Communist onslaught, the policy of
conciliation and concession which our Party adopted out of consideration
for the general interest (as indicated in the telegram of November 9 last
year) won the sympathy of the people, and we again won the support of the
whole people when, after the Southern Anhwei Incident, we turned to a vigorous
counter-offensive (as indicated by our two sets of twelve
demands,[4] our refusal to attend the People's
Political Council, and the country-wide protest campaign). This policy of
ours, the policy of waging struggle on just grounds, to our advantage, and
with restraint, was entirely necessary for repulsing the latest anti-Communist
onslaught, and it has already proved fruitful. Until there is a reasonable
settlement of the major points at issue between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party, we must not show any slackening in our campaign of stern protest against
the Southern Anhwei Incident, which was engineered by the pro-Japanese and
anti-Communist cliques in the Kuomintang, and against their political and
military oppression in all its forms, and must intensify our propaganda for
the first twelve demands.

4. The Kuomintang will never relax its policy of oppression of our Party
and other progressives or its anti-Communist propaganda in the areas under
its rule; therefore our Party must heighten its vigilance. The Kuomintang
will continue its attacks on the areas north of the Huai River, in eastern
Anhwei and in central Hupeh, and our armed forces must not hesitate to repulse
them. All base areas must strictly carry out the Central Committee's directive
of December 25 last year, [5] intensify inner-Party
education on tactics and rectify ultra-Left views, so that we can unfalteringly
maintain the anti-Japanese democratic base areas. Throughout the country,
including, of course, all the base areas, we must reject the erroneous estimate
that a final split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party has either
already occurred or is about to occur, together with the many incorrect views
arising therefrom.

NOTES


1. For a fuller account of the second anti-Communist onslaught,
see "A Comment on the Sessions of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee
and of the People's Political Council", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,
Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. III, pp. 137-51.

2. On March 6, 1941, Chiang Kai-shek delivered an
anti-Communist speech at a meeting of the People's Political Council. Harping
on his old theme that the "direction of all military and political affairs"
must be "unified", he declared that the organs of anti-Japanese democratic
political power in the enemy's rear should be abolished and that the people's
armed forces led by the Chinese Communist Party must be "concentrated in
specified areas" according to his "orders and plans". On the same day, the
People's Political Council, which was dominated by the Kuomintang reactionaries,
passed a resolution whitewashing Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist and
anti-popular activities and violently attacking the Communist members of
the People's Political Council for their refusal to attend the council's
session in protest against the Southern Anhwei Incident.

3. For the Political Science Group, see "Problems of War
and Strategy", Note 14 p. 234 of this volume. For the C.C. Clique and the
Fu Hsing Society, see "The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After
the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan", Note 10, p. 74 of this volume.

4. The first set of "twelve demands", proposed by the Communist
members of the People's Political Council at its session of February 15,
1941, were similar to those listed in the "Order and Statement on the Southern
Anhwei Incident". The second set were put to Chiang Kai-shek on March 2,
1941 by the Communist members of the People's Political Council as a condition
for their attendance of the council's sessions and were as follows:

  (1) Immediately stop the anti-Communist military attacks all over the country.

  (2) Immediately stop the nation-wide political persecution of the Chinese
  Communist Party and of all other democratic parties and groups, recognize
  their legal status, and release all their members arrested in Sian, Chungking
  Kweiyang and other places.

  (3) Lift the ban on the bookshops which have been closed down in various
  places, and rescind the order for impounding anti-Japanese books and newspapers
  in post offices.

  (4) Immediately stop all restrictions on the New China Daily.

  (5) Recognize the legal status of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

  (6) Recognize the organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in the
  enemy's rear.

  (7) Maintain the status quo in the division of garrison areas in
  central northern and northwestern China.

  (8) Let the Communist-led armed forces form another group army in addition
  to the Eighteenth Group Army, making a total of six army corps.

  (9) Release all the cadres arrested during the Southern Anhwei Incident and
  provide funds for the relief of the victims' families.

  (10) Release all officers and men taken prisoner during the Southern Anhwei
  Incident and return all their arms.

  (11) Form a joint committee of all the parties and groups, with one
  representative from each, and appoint the Kuomintang and the Communist Party
  representatives to be its chairman and vice-chairman respectively.

  (12) Include Communist representatives in the presidium of the People's Political
  Council.


5. The directive of December 25 is included as the article
"On Policy", pp. 441-49 of this volume.


Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.