Marginal Notes on Reading the Fourth Chinese Edition of *A Course on Dialectical Materialism* by Sirokov, Aizenberg, et al., Translated by Li Da and Lei Zhongjian
(March–September 1941)

**A Course on Dialectical Materialism**

**Chapter One: Materialism and Idealism**

**I. The Essence and Origins of Materialism and Idealism**

... The same idealist stance toward social phenomena can also be observed in Trotsky’s case, whether during the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty or in the discussions concerning labor unions.[1] At those times, he likewise did not proceed from an analysis of objective reality but from a pre-prepared formula, from a will acting in haste. ... The same can be said of the Trotskyist opposition: in 1923, they proposed the immediate industrialization of the country at the expense of the peasantry—that is, not only the rich peasants but also the middle peasants—as the task of the proletariat. In such instances, Trotsky likewise disregarded objective conditions, skipped over revolutionary stages, thought with the mind of an idealist, and never considered whether the prerequisites for industrial recovery existed or whether the masses were prepared; instead, he was governed solely by his own will and desires. [p. 74]

**II. Mechanistic Materialism**

... They do not understand that the fact that the material world is reflected in consciousness is not something naturally given to humanity; rather, it is something humanity acquires through struggle, through human practice, through the entire history of society’s struggle against nature, and through class struggle. Human agency, which develops consciousness through the historical process of social practice, was something the French materialists failed to grasp. [p. 86]

... Because of the metaphysical character of their philosophy, the French materialists ultimately became captives of the very idealism they fought against when it came to their views on society. For the proposition that the consciousness of the rulers can change the social system—“opinion rules the world”—is an idealist one. The fact that mechanistic materialism is incomplete, and that it inevitably falls into idealism when explaining social processes, has already been proven by the experience of the French materialists themselves. [p. 88]

**III. Modern Mechanistic Materialism**

... Mechanistic materialism equates (compares) all phenomena of the reality of the Russian Revolution with the stages already passed through by bourgeois revolutions. In the case of a bourgeois revolution, capitalist economy, at a certain moment, had already grown within the womb of the feudal system; therefore, for the bourgeoisie, the moment of seizing political power was, in a certain sense, the moment the revolution was completed. But in the case of a proletarian revolution, socialist relations only begin to grow after power has been won; thus, the seizure of power marks the beginning of a transitional period, through which socialism, in the course of its struggle with other socio-economic forms, becomes entrenched. [pp. 89–90]

... To explain a certain phenomenon from the standpoint of dialectical materialism does not mean reducing that phenomenon to mechanical motion, but rather exposing the specific regularities within that phenomenon—that is, bringing to light the internal contradictions inherent in and governing the development of that specific phenomenon. Whether physical phenomena, chemical phenomena, social phenomena, or any other phenomena, all possess their own regularities, all have special forms of motion. ... What determines the regularities of motion within a given phenomenon is not the form of mechanical motion, but the particular form of motion peculiar to that given phenomenon. The reason mechanists attempt to reduce everything to mechanics is that they regard mechanics as dialectics. [pp. 91–92]

... Consciousness is a new attribute of matter that emerges at a certain stage of material development, under certain conditions; prior to this, consciousness did not exist. ... [p. 97]

However, as Engels long ago pointed out, natural science without philosophy is blind; natural science cannot advance without philosophy. [p. 98]

**IV. Subjective Idealism**

... If objective reality is not given, then you and Mach will inevitably fall into subjectivism and agnosticism. If objective reality is given, then a philosophical concept for this objective reality is necessary—and this concept was already formulated in ancient times. This concept is *matter*. Matter is the philosophical category denoting that objective reality which is given to humanity through sensation, which exists independently of our sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and imaged by our sensations. ... [p. 109]

... Bogdanov’s reactionary idealist philosophy caused him to make many mistakes in understanding the tactics of class struggle; these mistakes ultimately led to his expulsion from the Party. During the period of reaction, he and other social democrats organized a group that was called the "Otzovists" (Recallers)[1] for demanding the recall of the deputies from the Third State Duma;[2] they also acquired the name "Vperedists" (Forward Group)[3] from the title of the collected essays they published. Politically, they demanded that the same tactics used during the revolutionary period be applied in the period of reaction, believing that working within legal labor organizations was a betrayal of the revolution. ... Admittedly, objective conditions had changed, the revolution had failed, and the Party had been smashed; as for objective reality, Bogdanov considered it to be merely "organized experience." "Leftist" rhetoric, mechanical thinking, and idealism—these were the fundamental principles underlying the tactics of the Otzovists. [p. 118]

**V. Kant and the Neo-Kantian Revision of Marxism**

... Our forms of cognition exist prior to experience, or, as Kant put it, are a priori; our knowledge depends on their activity, their operation. In this way, our knowledge can be said to be a combination of sensations and the cognitive forms that structure those sensations. ... [pp. 122–123]

[Next paragraph in original text continues on p. 128]

... Instead of linking the two, they treat them not as two items, but as one single thing. They do not connect epistemology with dialectics but study them independently; therefore, they resolve the question of the relationship between subject and object, thought and existence, in a metaphysical spirit. On this question, some of them fall into the theory of correspondence, while others even arrive at conclusions containing elements of agnosticism. [p. 128]

**Chapter Four: Essence and Phenomenon, Form and Content**

**I. Essence and Phenomenon**

... The shortcoming of these theories lies in separating the political superstructure from the rest of the system of social relations, especially from the system of economic relations. But it goes beyond this. Another shortcoming of these theories is that they treat political and legal relations, which are only one aspect of the entire society, as identical with the whole system of social relations, identical with society itself. The confusion of society with the state long hindered the development of social science. Because social science treated the two as identical, it failed for a long time to discover the contradiction between them. [p. 352]

As described above, scientific cognition, in its development, advances from external connections to internal connections. It constantly penetrates deeper into the depths of the process of interaction and extracts from it the essential contradictions and essential relations. This isolation of essential relations, this analysis of internal relations, simultaneously determines the source of the self-motion of the concrete process and discovers the laws governing that process.

The starting point of scientific cognition, properly speaking, lies in seeking out from the countless interactions of phenomena the relatively stable foundation that we call the essence, the essential contradictions.

However, when our cognition takes as its task the discovery of the internal basis within external relations, it encounters several contradictions. In the process of cognizing reality, the essence does not, in its immediate form, appear on the surface of phenomena. For example, in capitalist society, value manifests itself in exchange relations through use-value; the production relations of commodity producers manifest themselves in the relations among commodities. Wages, on the phenomenal surface, do not appear as the price of labor power but as the price of labor; classes do not appear as owners of the means of production but as possessors of sources of income. Therefore, merely cognizing individual phenomena observed in isolation cannot lead to the discovery of the driving spring of the development of nature and society behind the flow of the transformation of existence. On the other hand, when attempting to discover the basis, if phenomena are neglected, the essence is transformed into mere abstractions that cannot reflect the movement of the laws of objective reality.

... Empiricism reduces all of reality to phenomena, reducing the process of cognition to the perception of phenomena. Consequently, Hume and Berkeley observe phenomena by separating them from their connection with essence, reducing phenomena merely to the illusions of reality. They identify reality with the sum total of subjective perceptions, thereby stripping the illusions themselves of objective existence. ...

Rationalism, by separating the essence from the phenomena, transforms the essence into something unchanging and immobile. The essence is interpreted as the simplest of relations, as the simplest, immutable foundation. Thus, the entire physical world neither arises nor perishes; it is reduced to a world of colorless, featureless molecules that only change position. In jurisprudence, proceeding from the principles of rationalism, science seeks behind the existing, changeable laws for the so-called "unchanging natural law" supposedly inherent in human nature. In economics, Adam Smith sought an unchanging measure of value applicable to all instances of buying and selling; David Ricardo sought the unchanging laws of capitalism. In all sciences, rationalism separates the essence from phenomena, turning the essence into an immutable foundation, and as a result, cannot discover the contradictions within the concrete process of its object of study. The permanence of law, state, religion, and capitalism, along with the permanence of atoms, are all derived from abstract, unchanging essences. [pp. 354–356]

... The metaphysician, by separating essence and phenomenon and setting them in opposition to each other, inevitably can only cognize one aspect of reality. The metaphysician either disregards the diversity of reality, offering contentless laws applicable to all ages and all nations, or alternatively, clings rigidly to phenomena, fails to expose their essence, and venerates these phenomena as the developmental laws of the process as a whole. Both tendencies, when analyzing modern capitalism, reveal their errors: that is, they fail to understand the transformation of capitalism's essence, fail to grasp the transition of capitalism to its next stage, ignore the connection between the old and new stages of capitalism, and one-sidedly emphasize the new phenomena while divorcing them from their connection to the driving basis of the entire process. ... [pp. 357–358]

……As we advance into the period of transformation, the most dangerous form of opportunism is the left deviation that denies every possibility of socialist construction in Russia. Only by breaking this deviation can the Party ensure the successful socialist construction of the Soviet Union. Conversely, during the transformation period itself and the stage of entering socialism—that is, the completion of the foundation of the socialist economy—the most dangerous manifestation of opportunism is the right deviation that denies the Party's means and methods of transforming the possibility of socialist construction into reality. In this era, the left deviation is no longer the main danger. For at the moment when the foundation of the socialist economy is nearing completion, any talk of doubting the possibility of socialist construction is utterly laughable. … [p. 361]

"Essence appears, and appearance is essential." — Ilyich wrote this when annotating Hegel's doctrine of quality. In all phenomena, there is no identical abstract essence. Essence manifests differently according to the different forms of its appearance. Thus, appearance inherently reveals essence through itself. Essence is not fully expressed in any single phenomenon. Hence, appearance is richer and more complete than the essence it manifests. [p. 362]

… In the analysis of phenomena, exposing the essence, revealing the foundation of the process's advance—that is, the contradiction of essence—requires not only indicating the manifestation of this essence within phenomena but also pointing it out within false appearances. [p. 364]

II. The Development of Essence, and a Critique of Empiricism and Schematism

… He said: "… The essence of opportunism is the idea of class compromise. The war pushed this idea to the extreme. Not only that, but it combined many exceptional elements and motives with the usual ones, causing the vulgar masses, split by peculiar threats and coercion, to collaborate with the bourgeoisie" [1]. Thus, in its foundation, the new tendency is rooted in opportunism; it is merely a single variant of opportunism. In many phenomena, Ilyich pointed out to us the development of essence, which [2] is the opposite of the abstract essence spoken of by those metaphysicians. … [p. 366]

If individual phenomena are elevated to a universal law of development,

[1] See Lenin, *The Bankruptcy of the Second International*. (*Selected Works of Lenin*, Vol. 2, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, pp. 648-649)

[2] Mao changed "this" to "that."

[3] The March Consultative Council refers to the Second First Session of the National Consultative Council held in Chongqing from March 1 to 10, 1941. In early January of that year, after the Kuomintang die-hards instigated the Southern Anhui Incident, they faced condemnation from progressive public opinion at home and abroad. To escape political isolation, the Kuomintang convened this meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Chinese Communist Party proposed twelve terms for settling the aftermath of the Southern Anhui Incident. Due to the Kuomintang's refusal to accept them, the CCP delegates, including Mao Zedong and six others, refused to attend.

Zhang Guotao

then objective reality is distorted. The economizers, who elevate spontaneously occurring economic strikes to a general law of development of class struggle, fail to understand the essence of class struggle. … [p. 372]

… Plekhanov did not study what essential contradictions lay at the root of the new facts he enumerated; he turned this correct proposition into a tool of sophistry. In this way, under certain circumstances, Plekhanov failed to link the matter of defending the motherland to the proletarian revolution and the revolutionary process. Acting as a schematist on the one hand, Plekhanov at the same time exposed himself as a narrow empiricist. He departed from analyzing the essential contradictions of the entire era of imperialism and instead observed various facts of the imperialist war.

Marx and Engels also criticized the empirical mode of thought that arises from the narrow practicalism of bourgeois entrepreneurs. … Practicalism has also become a characteristic feature of various fundamental tendencies in bourgeois science. The so-called vulgar empiricism, which denies the essence of the processes hidden behind phenomena and retreats into the narrow empirical world, has had class significance and still does. … [pp. 375-376]

… Laws in bourgeois science are presented as immutable essences; science itself is transformed into a description of abstract schemas of processes. It is well known that Marx ridiculed those supra-historic laws that claim to be universally valid, transcending time and space. In the first period of his revolutionary activity, Ilyich had already mocked the futility and lifelessness of the sociology of populism [1]. Ilyich opposed Bogdanov and the Machists, attacking their schematism and their chaotic formulation of laws, and pointed out how easily they fabricated "universal laws" devoid of all concrete content. [p. 377]

On the other hand, it is well known how Ilyich criticized many of Bukharin's theoretical works. Regarding Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*, Ilyich pointed out that in his work, Bukharin had introduced a Spencerian-style bourgeois sociology "in general," which juxtaposed narrow empiricism (the collection of unnecessary details) with schematism (pasting labels onto individual phenomena). Bukharin conflated the state capitalism of the Soviet Union with that of bourgeois countries. …

Under the most difficult and complex conditions, the Party takes overcoming difficulties as its main task and does not lose itself in bewilderment before new facts. The Party discovers the connection between these difficulties and the totality of various facts, thereby uncovering their tendencies of development and setting other developmental tendencies against them. In short, the Party can discover the laws of phenomena and thus detect new motives in the development of essence, indicating its progression through contradictory stages. With his innate genius, Ilyich was able, behind the "shameless" Brest peace treaty, to trace the developmental tendencies of the proletarian revolution and its inevitable victory; behind compromises with the middle peasants, to trace their collectivization—agricultural collectivization—; and behind Russia's poverty and technological backwardness, to trace the real possibility of the Soviet Union transforming into an advanced country. … The Party judged their errors as follows: panicking at the emergence of new, unseen facts; failing to discover the foundation, essence, and developmental laws of these phenomena; unprincipled clinging to arbitrary phenomena; conceding to class enemies, even at the expense of damaging positions on other, more important fronts of class struggle, and striving hastily to escape difficult circumstances as early as possible.

Subjectivist

The arguments of both the Chinese-ists and the followers of Zhang Guotao are mechanistic.

Take note

The two deviations mentioned above both reveal a failure to understand the dialectics of essence and appearance. Unable to perceive the development of essence within phenomena, they shift to the standpoint of either the abstract identity of the substance or the abstract distinction of phenomena. At the root of these two variants of the metaphysical understanding of regularity lies the same mechanistic methodology. The mechanists, including Bukharin and, in this context, Trotsky, cannot comprehend the particularities of the various processes of the Soviet proletarian revolution. In their view, the essence of processes invariably appears as something unchanging. [pp. 378-381]

… The development of the essential contradictions of certain processes simultaneously enables scientific cognition to discover the movement of these processes within many contradictory phenomena, progressing from a less profound essence to a deeper essence, "for example, the infinite transition from essence of the first order to essence of the second order" [1] (Ilyich). [p. 384]

[1] See Lenin, *Conspectus of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. (*Philosophical Notebooks*, People's Publishing House, 1974 edition, p. 278)

III. Form and Content

Classification must follow the objective and inherent order.

Engels, speaking of the principles of scientific classification, emphasized the validity of forms in our understanding of reality. "The classification of sciences is that each science analyzes individual forms of motion or a series of interconnected and mutually transitory forms of motion; it classifies and arranges these forms of motion according to their inherent order. Herein lies the significance of classification" [1] (*Dialectics of Nature*). … Social motion manifests itself in various forms — in the process of production, in distribution, exchange, the movement of capital, the movement of social classes, the movement of various political parties, scientific movements, literary movements, religious movements. All these are concrete forms of the movement of society viewed as a whole. Naturally, each form of motion has a particular type of connection to its content, i.e., each has its particular form. … [pp. 390-391]

IV. The Development of Form and Content in Processes

… Ilyich said: "Right-wing dogmatism, standing only on the recognition of old forms and paying no attention to new content, thus ended in complete bankruptcy." Applying this to the right wing in Russia, we can say: they paid no attention to the growth of new content during the period of transformation under the New Economic Policy — that is, they ignored the growth of new content that guarantees the victory of socialist elements over capitalist elements and gives rise to its own new forms of development. … In sum, they overlooked that the New Economic Policy is a form that guarantees socialism's victory over capitalism.

Ilyich also said: "Left-wing dogmatism, anchored in the unconditional denial of certain old forms, fails to understand that new content realizes itself through all forms. They do not know that the task of us communists in learning is to master all forms; they do not know how to learn to swiftly supplement one form with another, to replace one form with another, and to adapt our tactics to every shift called forth by elements other than our class and our efforts" [2]. … Under the New Economic Policy, they saw only the capitalist form. But they did not understand how the new content develops through these forms, could not utilize old forms to develop new content, and leaped over many developmental stages where old forms could have been utilized. [pp. 412-413]

[1] See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*. (*Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 20, People's Publishing House, 1971 edition, p. 593)

[1] The "Three-Thirds System" is a united front political policy implemented by the Chinese Communist Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan, beginning in 1940. According to this policy, personnel in the anti-Japanese democratic government were roughly distributed as follows: Communist Party members accounted for roughly one-third, left-leaning progressives for roughly one-third, and middle elements and others for roughly one-third — hence the name "Three-Thirds System."

[2] See Lenin, *"Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder*. (*Selected Works of Lenin*, Vol. 4, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 257)

Chapter V: Possibility and Reality, Contingency and Necessity

I. The Interaction of Phenomena, Cause and Effect

Starting from interconnection, through our practical activity we recognize the world surrounding us. Our cognition contains various generally interconnected elements. First, our cognition grasps the interrelations and interactions of phenomena. Engels said: "Interaction —— this is the first thing we observe" [1]. For example, within a certain enterprise, we discover interactions among its various elements —— between the technological installations and the labor organization, between the working masses and the technical staff, between the trade union organization and the management department, between the management department and the committee. We also acknowledge interactions between the enterprise and its external environment. The enterprise's life depends on the supply of funds and raw materials, etc.; the enterprise itself, in turn, supplies its products to the public. In the city where we reside, we can observe all kinds of interactions among various social groups and various professions. Furthermore, we observe interactions between the city and the surrounding countryside. In sum, among all phenomena within the scope of our contact, we acknowledge interactions. [p. 424]

The front and the rear; superiors and subordinates.

[1] See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*. (*Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 20, People's Publishing House, 1971 edition, p. 574)

Reading Notes on *A Course in Dialectical Materialism* (Fourth Chinese Edition)

Early Period of the War of Resistance

Science opposes the so-called teleological perspective and explains all processes in nature and society through the principle of causality. Darwin demonstrated that the structures of animals and plants merely appear to be purposive; he showed that the species of animals and plants existing today are the result of millions of years of elimination of those unfit for survival. Science has further clarified that the purposiveness of human behavior can also be explained through causality. That is, human purposes arise as a result of their social activities. For example, the goal set by the proletariat to overthrow class society is evoked by the necessity of resolving the fundamental contradiction of capitalism—exploitation. [pp. 429–430]

II. Ground and Condition

As stated earlier, Marx, Engels, Ilyich, and Hegel differ in that they did not discover the ground within "concepts," but within the essential contradictions of objects. For instance, according to Marx, the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production, which emerges in class struggle, manifests as the ground for the development of all forms of society's movement as a whole. The movement of this ground, this foundation, determines morality, law, science, art, and the superstructure above them. … [pp. 434–435]

The source of development is the ground. However, in dialectics, the ground is combined with conditions. Therefore, when observing development, one must not

disregard conditions, especially not the significance of essential conditions. Yet, people often forget this. For example, Trotsky, who in 1905 put forward the slogan "Abolish the Tsar, establish a workers' government," disregarded the essential conditions within which the Russian labor movement was developing. Trotsky disregarded the role and significance of tens of millions of Russian peasants. Similarly, in 1926, Trotsky, in alliance with Zinoviev [1], advocated the theory of super-industrialization—a theory aimed at developing industry and raising the prices of industrial exports by increasing taxes on peasants—once again disregarding the role and significance of the peasants in the socialist construction of the Soviet Union. The disregard for essential conditions is also a characteristic of Menshevik-tinted idealism. Deborin and other idealists with Menshevik tendencies only spoke of the inner ground of development; but they, entirely like Trotsky, very mistakenly understood this ground, that is, the essential contradiction. We already saw this when examining the law of the unity of opposites. … [pp. 437–438]

… We know that the ground creates new conditions in reality. However, the ground not only creates new conditions but also overcomes old conditions. The Russian peasantry was not an essential condition for Russia's social transformation. Yet, the development of capitalist relations first facilitated the leadership of the proletariat in the Russian labor movement; later, it facilitated the realization of the proletarian

[1] The original text reads "季维诺夫"; Mao Zedong changed it to "季诺维夫."

revolution based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The peasantry in the Soviet Union was once an essential condition that determined the impossibility of a direct transition to socialism. However, through the "New Economic Policy," the peasants were drawn into socialist construction; thus, in 1930, the Soviet Union entered the era of socialism. [pp. 439–440]

III. Possibility and Actuality

In mid-19th century Germany, the continuous transformation of the bourgeois revolution into the proletarian revolution did not materialize. Yet, Marx's analysis played a very important role in history. Ilyich grasped this analysis and completed the great theory of the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution. … [pp. 447–448]

… Stalin said: "Russia presents two contradictory groups. One group of contradictions consists of the internal contradictions existing between the proletariat and the peasantry. The other group consists of the contradictions between Russia, as a socialist country, and all other countries, as capitalist countries. The contradictions of the first group can be completely overcome by the conditions of one country; the contradictions of the second group, in their resolution, however, depend on the necessity of the efforts of the proletariat of two or three other countries—those who conflate the contradictions of these two groups are people who have committed the greatest error against Ilyichism. Such people are either confused or

unfathomable opportunists" [1]. [pp. 451–452]

Not only socialism, but any historical phenomenon comes about as a result of the active activity of humanity. Marx said: Humans themselves make their own history [2]. Possibility is transformed into actuality through activity. This is not only true of facts concerning human historical development, but also of natural development. Matter possesses activity and self-movement. This self-movement determines all transformations of possibility into actuality inherent in matter. Matter, through its activity and under certain conditions, transforms possibility into actuality. [p. 455]

… Engels said: "In the nature of matter itself is contained the fact that matter develops into thinking beings. Therefore, when the appropriate conditions exist, this development always proceeds necessarily" [3]. This is the only correct answer to the question of the emergence of consciousness. Naturally, this answer is only an initial methodological response. The science that concretely solves this problem is a special science. However, special science can solve this problem only when it proceeds from correct methodological stipulations, that is, from the stipulations provided by materialist dialectics.

[1] See Stalin's "The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)," Part IV, "Concerning the Destiny of Socialism in the Soviet Union." (Stalin, Works, Vol. 7, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, pp. 90–98) [Translator's note: Reference details adapted from the original Chinese footnote citing a Chinese edition.]

[2] See Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. (Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 398)

[3] See Engels, Dialectics of Nature. (Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987, pp. 550–551)

Ovary, ovum, embryo—are they possibility?

Note

Theory cannot be developed in the study

Above, we have clarified the question of the transformation of real possibility into actuality. Yet, in reality, there are also new real possibilities that arise. These new, real possibilities are not, as the mechanists claim, contained within matter from the very beginning. New possibilities are created by the concrete development of matter at a certain stage and under certain conditions. For example, inorganic matter creates the real possibility of life only at a certain stage of its development and only under certain conditions. The entry into the era of socialism creates many new real possibilities, namely, a new, unprecedented speed of industrial development, a new, unprecedented expansion of mass cultural development, new possibilities for the development of science and technology, and so on.

… The profound and valuable thoughts of Marx, Engels, and Ilyich on the issues of possibility and actuality were disregarded by the Deborin school. These thoughts of Marx, Engels, and Ilyich were developed and concretized in the resolutions of the Party congresses and in the works of Comrade Stalin. The historical unfolding of the categories of possibility and actuality indicates with great precision: Who developed materialist dialectics in the past stages of our philosophical development? Was it the bankrupt philosophical leadership? Or the Party leadership? This history also indicates: How did materialist dialectics develop? And how can it develop? Did it develop in the quiet, isolated study of philosophical research, cut off from life? Or did it develop in the experience of revolutionary struggle and socialist construction? [pp. 456–458]

IV. Contingency and Necessity

… Ilyich said: "To know an object truly, one must grasp and study all its aspects, all connections and 'mediations.' We will never achieve this completely, but the demand for comprehensiveness warns us against error and rigidity" [1]. [p. 470]

Chapter VI Materialist Dialectics and Formal Logic

II. The Fundamental Laws of Formal Logic

… When Ilyich criticized those Russian Machists who stubbornly held to identical views, he brilliantly explained: Where conceptualist physicists and metaphysicians assert that matter disappears, there actually exists a brilliant confirmation of dialectical materialism; the atom exists for each chemical element as a specific, real, fixed structure, while on the one hand

concurrently being "divisible," in its electrical structure it is
on the other hand a complex entity. [pp. 490–491]

[1] See Lenin, "Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin." (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 94)

This section is good

III. Critique of Plekhanov's

Formal Logic

What the opponents of dialectical materialism often put forward when opposing the law of the unity of opposites, regarded as the fundamental law of being and thought, is the law of contradiction of formal logic. Bernstein, the founder of international revisionism, and Mikhailovsky, one of the reactionary popular leaders of the 1880s and 1890s, treated dialectics, especially the law of the unity of opposites, as rigid, unscientific "Hegelianism," basing all their criticism on the standpoint of the law of contradiction of formal logic. [p. 494]

"Material motion lies at the root of all phenomena of nature. Motion is obviously contradictory. Regarding motion, one must make dialectical judgments according to the formula 'yes—no, no—yes,' as pointed out by Bernstein... But once a certain temporary combination of matter arises as the result of perpetual motion, and until it disappears as the result of the same perpetual motion, the question of its existence must be interpreted in an affirmative sense... When individual objects become the subject of inquiry, in our judgments about them, we must be guided by the 'fundamental law' of thought. In this domain, the formula 'yes—yes, no—no,' which Bernstein favors, dominates" [1].

[1] See Plekhanov, "Preface to the First Edition of Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy." (Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp. 82–83) [Translator's note: Reference details adapted.]

Plekhanov's critique is clearly inadequate. He compromises between formal logic and dialectical logic, without "sublating" the former into the latter. … [pp. 498–500]

VI. Abstraction as a Motive Force of Cognition

County annals, new tricks, book worship

If the essential contradictions of a low, undeveloped stage of social or natural development are transferred to a higher stage, that will only mitigate the contradictions, dissolve the new into the old, dissolve the present and future into the past. Such a method is effective only for reactionary social classes and groups and their ideologists. … [p. 521]

VII. The Theory of Concepts in Dialectical Materialism

A, B, C, D; I, II, III, IV

According to formal logic, an object is the sum total of its attributes. These attributes are external to the object; one attribute is independent of another attribute. To study an object is to decompose it into the various attributes belonging to it. To define an object is nothing other than to enumerate its fundamental attributes. … [p. 523]

In the logic of dialectical materialism, what determines the relationship between the universal and the particular?

What is the determining factor?

In the process of cognition, the particular determines the universal; in the process of practice, the universal determines the particular.

In the process of cognition, tactics determine strategy; in the process of practice, strategy determines tactics.

Ilyich once struggled against the idealist practice of deriving the laws of concrete social phenomena from the dead, formal abstraction of society. He said: "To start from questions like what is society, what is progress, is to start from the end to the beginning. When you have not yet specifically studied a particular social formation, cannot establish this concept, cannot study real facts, cannot objectively analyze any social relations, from where will you derive the concepts of society and progress in general?" [1]. Society exists as a definite socio-economic formation; it does not exist alongside such formations but within and through them. On the other hand, individual socio-economic formations

[1] See Lenin, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*. (V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 11)

The development of structures and the laws of their mutual transition are the special—speaking of each such structure—stages of the general laws of social development. Moreover, social regularity itself, which assumes a developed and differentiated form, unfolds at the highest stage of social development. The study of capitalist regularity is the key to a deeper understanding of the general laws of preceding socio-economic structures, and herein lies the reason.

The dialectical understanding of the general does not treat the object as a static essence but expresses the advancing contradictions of its essence, while also indicating the path to the particular. When mechanists attempt to prove that mechanical motion is the general form of motion, they construct a formal, abstract generality. Such an abstraction cannot represent concrete forms of material motion, for instance, life or all concrete forms of society.

Also, nature

The dialectical concept is concrete, because it theoretically reflects the object in the unity of contradictions on a given aspect, and thus in the unity of the general and the particular.

The Chinese subjectivists are the opposite

Ilyich said: "The particular does not exist apart from that connection which leads to the general. The general exists only in and through the particular. Every particular is in some way general. Every general is a part, aspect, or essence of the particular. Every general only approximately embraces all particular objects. Every particular enters incompletely into the general, and so forth." [1] [p.

The general of the Chinese subjectivists is divorced from the particular (divorced from reality)

Theory is linked with practice, the universal

[1] See Lenin, *On the Question of Dialectics*. (V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 713)

is linked with the particular. pp. 530-532]

The Chinese subjectivists engage in much eclecticism; they cannot identify the guiding (determining) aspect in a contradiction.

The Chinese subjectivists also exhibit a formalistic character

How strikingly similar to China

In defining the New Economic Policy, Stalin exposed the general essential contradictions and the guiding aspect manifested in all particular phenomena of the New Economic Policy across the various stages of the transition period.

The formalistic character of the Menshevik-tinged idealism is particularly prominently displayed in their conceptualist expositions. The Deborin school, while citing Ilyich's words on the concreteness of the dialectical concept, often acted "in entirely opposite ways" in their theoretical practice. On many occasions, they separated the concrete diversity of the particular regularities of individual forms of motion from the developmental process of the specific sciences of nature and society, and thereby deduced [1] from an empty, contentless abstract concept of matter in general by means of the logical method—this they set forth as their programmatic revelation. The Deborin school retreated toward rational idealism, Hegelianism, the self-development of concepts—not the reflection in concepts of the developing world. Signs of this retreat are also evident in the demand by several of their representatives that, in order to understand a specific social structure, one must proceed from abstract social regularities. [pp. 533-534]

Idealist dialectics (Hegel), idealist formalism (Deborin and the Chinese Deborinists), materialist

[1] Between the word "来" and the character "与" in the marginal comment "How strikingly similar to China," there was originally a diagonal line connecting them.

formalism (the French Enlightenment thinkers, Chen Duxiu), materialist dialectics—among these four, only the last is correct.

Precisely in this regard, in their formal constitution of general concepts and their opposition of the universal to the particular, the right-wing and left-wing opportunists align with their methodologies—the mechanists and the Menshevik-tinged idealists. … [p. 534]

The Deborin school exposed their own inability to understand the dialectical unity of the universal and the particular, or to apply it in practice. They treat the universal as an independent, self-developing essence and oppose it to the particular. They cannot discern, within the various fragments of the revolutionary movement, the particular, concrete forms of the fundamental contradiction of the whole movement.

The Chinese subjectivists are precisely like this. We must be able to discern.

Precisely so in China: the formalistic constitution of concepts and contempt for the concrete specificity of individual forms and stages of the movement. This is a characteristic of the counter-revolutionary Trotsky. Trotsky regarded his "theory of permanent revolution" as a theory universally applicable to all nations, utterly disregarding the specific stage of development each nation has reached and the particularities of its domestic and international conditions. … Inattentive to concrete specificities, he arbitrarily took subjectively constructed things to be specificities (abstract specificities, specificities without objective reality). Li Lisan and the subjectivists who came after him are exactly the same.

The anti-Leninist activity in China is astounding.

In the tactical and strategic lessons that Ilyich gave to foreign parties, he systematically stated: "The unity of international tactics in the communist labor movement does not require the elimination of diversity … What is necessary is that, in applying the fundamental principles of communism, these principles should be correctly modified and employed in accordance with national and national-state differences. When each country concretely pursues the solution of a unified international task and overcomes opportunism and left doctrinairism in the labor movement, it must investigate, study, explore, examine, and grasp its national particularities and international specificities. … Herein lies the main task of the present historical moment" [1]. [pp. 535-536]

Trotsky's "permanent revolution" is a formal abstraction. Precisely so in China

He scorned the revolutionary process by which the democratic revolution, under imperialist conditions, is transformed into a national and international proletarian revolution, and did not consider the concrete specificities of this transformation, the specific processes of revolution in each particular country, and the interrelations of their various aspects.

In Trotsky's case, dialectical materialism was replaced by an idealism of fabricated general formulas, which were brought in from outside in the concrete process of class struggle. [p. 537]

Things that are not themselves objective realities

[1] See Lenin, *"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*. (V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 246)

**VIII Judgment and Inference**

Such an understanding of human essence is incomprehensible to the narrow bourgeois mentality which opposes the "nature" of individual human beings to social relations. Marx's understanding of the essence of humankind reflected a new stage in the development of class struggle—the maturation of the organized proletariat. The proletariat, spurred [1] by the process of social development, discerned between itself and its enemies the bearers and defenders of definite social relations.

When prehistoric humans—perhaps a hundred thousand years ago—discovered the method of producing fire by friction, they already knew in practice that friction generates heat. But even before that era, they had long known how to warm themselves by rubbing cold parts of the body. However, from that time until the discovery that friction is in general a source of heat, who knows how many millennia passed. But in any case, the era arrived when the human mind developed to the point of making the judgment that friction is a source of heat … Later, after several more millennia, in 1842 … this particular problem (friction generating heat) was studied by linking it with other similar relations previously discovered.

Our recognition of questions concerning the nature of the Chinese revolution, questions of attributes, and military questions has developed through the development of practice.

From practice to theory

[1] "刺戟" means stimulus, i.e., stimulation.