1. Our offensive (the Twelve-Point Proposal and our refusal to attend) forced Chiang Kai-shek to give a direct reply, thereby bringing the issue into the open nationwide (using all Kuomintang newspapers to publish our Twelve-Point Proposal while simultaneously exposing Chiang Kai-shek’s true colors. Chiang originally wanted to narrow the issue, but now it has expanded—from a military issue to a political issue and a party issue). All this is the result of our offensive.

2. Chiang’s speech on the 6th and the resolution of the Political Consultative Conference still reflect a two-faced policy of striking and pulling. The joint telegram from our seven political council members also represents a two-faced policy of striking and pulling. This seesaw struggle will continue—what is called "dragging on"—and may drag on for another year.

3. Chiang’s speech on the 6th seems to have a similar intent to Cheng Qian’s statement published in Xi’an newspapers last April, in which he proclaimed my "Ten Major Crimes"—a kind of Ah Q-ism. He scolds us to save face, but then uses it as a pretext to withdraw his troops. The election of Biwu as a permanent member of the Political Consultative Conference and the recent release of detainees in Xi’an appear to be manifestations of this troop withdrawal.

4. However, we should continue our offensive until our provisional measures are substantially recognized (mainly regarding troop expansion, defense zones, the *Xinhua Daily*, and fewer arrests on the roads).

5. Regarding Chiang’s speech on the 6th and the resolution of the Political Consultative Conference, I propose not issuing a defensive rebuttal but ignoring them. Instead, we should take advantage of the Kuomintang’s Eighth Plenary Session to send a telegram from the Central Committee, reaffirming the necessity of the Twelve-Point Proposal, and launch a frontal attack. What do you think?

6. Among the minor parties, the Chinese Socialist Party and the Youth Party have temporarily become tools of Chiang Kai-shek. However, factions such as those led by Huang Yanpei and Zhang Biaofang, who truly represent the national bourgeoisie and enlightened gentry, remain centrist.

7. Hu Zongnan’s offensive against the Guanzhong region has ceased, and we have instead expanded our territory by one district. The border areas are now calm. In eastern Anhui, the Guangxi troops have been battered by the Japanese and are in disarray. Li Xiannian is making gains in eastern Hubei. Mo Shujie’s 84th Army is too preoccupied to act. Chen Daqing in central Hubei and Li Xianzhou in northern Huai are also powerless. On all fronts, there is a trend toward stalemate. In another two months, as the European war intensifies and the South Seas become critical, it seems Chiang Kai-shek will have no choice but to compromise with us. This big scoundrel is, in reality, a bully who only picks on the weak and fears the strong.