rudimentary material on social conditions
Circular to Zhou Enlai Regarding Our
Estimate of International Relations and
Guomindang and the
Communist Party
(March 17, 1941)

1. Chiang is eager to save the situation, apparently because of current international relations.
2. The objective of Matsuoka’s1 trip to the West is to conclude two treaties,
between Japan and Germany and between Japan and the Soviet Union, respectively. If the two treaties are signed, the great war will break out soon. Britain and
the United States want to prevent Japan and the Soviet Union from concluding a
treaty, and have ordered Chiang to effect a reconciliation with the Chinese Com-munist Party. It appears that Chiang, also fearful of a rapprochement between
Japan and the Soviet Union, is turning to us for assistance. Japan, on the other
hand, taking advantage of deteriorating relations between the Guomindang and
the Communist Party, is seeking help from the Soviet Union to subdue Chiang.
3. If Japan and the Soviet Union sign an economic treaty only, and not a political one, Chiang might possibly accept all our conditions as a temporary solution.
But if Japan and the Soviet Union conclude a political treaty, it is then possible
that both the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists and that
between China and the Soviet Union will deteriorate for a time.
4. (Omitted.)

Our source for this dispatch is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 45, where it is reproduced
from a documentary collection published in China in 1982.
1. The reference is to Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946), who was at this time the foreign
minister of Japan. He was strongly pro-Axis, and did indeed conclude the two treaties
mentioned by Mao—and a great war did indeed break out. He was arrested after the war as
a “Class A” war criminal, but died before a verdict could be reached.
The Situation After the Repulse of the
Second Anti-Communist Onslaught

(March 18, 1941)

1. The second anti-Communist onslaught, which was touched off by the telegram of the 19th of He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi] (dated October 19 last year),
reached its climax in the Southern Anhui Incident and Chiang Kaishek’s order of
January 17; the rearguard actions in this onslaught are Chiang Kaishek’s anti-Com-munist speech of March 6 and the anti-Communist resolution of the [People’s]
Political Council. From now on, there may be some temporary easing of the situation. With the world’s two major imperialist blocs on the eve of a decisive struggle,
that section of China’s big bourgeoisie which is pro-British and pro-American and
which is still opposed to the Japanese aggressors finds it necessary to seek a slight
temporary relaxation in the present strained relations between the Guomindang
and the Communist Party. Besides, the Guomindang cannot keep these relations
strained to the pitch of the past five months because of the situation within the
Guomindang (there are contradictions between its central and local authorities,
between the CC Clique and the Political Study Clique, between the CC Clique and
the Fu Xing Society, and between the diehards and the intermediate sections, and
also contradictions within the CC Clique and the Fu Xing Society themselves),¹
because of the domestic situation (the broad masses of the people are opposed to
the Guomindang’s tyranny and sympathize with the Communist Party), and because of our Party’s own policy (of continuous protest movement). At the moment, therefore, Chiang Kaishek needs a slight temporary easing of the tension.

2. The recent struggle points to a decline in the standing of the Guomindang
and a rise in that of the Communist Party, and this is the key factor in certain
changes that have occurred in the relative strength of the two parties. All this has
compelled Chiang Kaishek to reconsider his own position and attitude. In stressing national defense and preaching that party politics are out of date, he is posing
as a “national leader” who is above domestic contradictions and feigning impartiality to class and party, his aim being to preserve the rule of the big landlord
class, the big bourgeoisie, and the Guomindang. But this attempt of his will certainly prove futile if it is only a subterfuge and means no real change in policy.

3. At the beginning of the recent anti-Communist onslaught, the policy of conciliation and concession which our Party adopted out of consideration for the general interest (as indicated in the telegram of November 9 last year) won the sympathy
of the people, and we again won the support of the whole people when, after the
Southern Anhui Incident, we turned to a vigorous counteroffensive (as indicated
by our two sets of twelve demands, our refusal to attend the Political Council, and
the nationwide protest campaign). This policy of ours, the policy of waging struggle
on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, was entirely necessary for
repulsing the latest anti-Communist onslaught, and it has already proved fruitful.
Until there is a reasonable settlement of the major points at issue between the
Guomindang and the Communist Party, we must not show any slackening in our
campaign of stern protest against the Southern Anhui Incident, which was engineered by the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist cliques in the Guomindang, and
against their political and military oppression in all its forms, and must intensify
our propaganda for the first twelve demands.

4. The Guomindang will never relax its policy of oppression of our Party and
other progressives or its anti-Communist propaganda in the areas under its rule;
therefore our Party must heighten its vigilance. The Guomindang will continue its
attacks on the areas north of the Huai River, in eastern Anhui, and in central Hubei,
and our armed forces must not hesitate to repel them. All base areas must strictly
carry out the Central Committee’s directive of December 25 last year, intensify
inner-Party education on tactics, and rectify ultraleft views, so that we can
unfalteringly maintain the anti-Japanese democratic base areas. Throughout the
country, including, of course, all the base areas, we must reject the erroneous
estimate that a final split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party has
either already occurred or is about to occur, together with the many incorrect views
arising therefrom.

Our source for this document is the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 2, pp.
778–80.

1. The CC Clique was a secret organization created in 1927 by the Chen brothers, Chen
Guofu and Chen Lifu, who played during the ensuing years a dominant role in the
Guomindang. The Political Study Clique was a small group of prominent men, two of
whom were Chiang Kaishek’s sworn brothers. The Fu Xing Society was composed largely
of middle-ranking military officers. Members of all three of these organizations were intensely loyal to Chiang Kaishek.