To Zhou Enlai on the Question of Definitely
Not Attending the Political Council

(March 2, 1941)

1. I trust that the instructions of March 1 have reached you.1
2. Last night at the meeting of the Secretariat your telegrams were discussed.2
After long and careful consideration, we have concluded that Chiang is exerting
every possible pressure to force us into submission, and that, if we were to attend,
our reasonable and favorable political offensive position of the past would collapse altogether, our whole position would be lost, he could brush aside and ignore
all our conditions, and we would be left without any recourse whatsoever. There-fore we certainly cannot attend unconditionally, but they will never accept the
terms guaranteed in the open order, so we must resolve not to attend.
3. If we fail to attend, there is nothing he can do about it:
a. Everyone in the whole country knows that he was wrong in the Southern
Anhui Incident, so for us to protest by not attending would hardly be doing
something wrong.
b. We have set forth conditions for a compromise (a temporary measure) which
they did not accept, so they are in the wrong.
c. If because of this he should instigate even greater splitting action (by supporting the government’s order of January 17, issuing orders for suppression, arresting our representatives, and so on), he would be even more in the
wrong and this would be even more detrimental to their side.
d. The international situation has reached a point that is unfavorable to the other
side (the war between Britain and Germany and the conflict between Britain
and Japan).
e. The situation within the country is that the other side has absolutely no way
of dealing with us, and we are not cowed in the least.
4. As long as we can hold out during the present difficulty, there is the possibility of a change for the better. If the conditions arising from the aftermath are
resolved within six months, we are still prepared to attend the second Political
Council in September.
5. The present political struggle is more acute than ever before. Many smaller
parties and groups have already gone over to Chiang Kaishek’s side and may
create within the Political Council an atmosphere that is unfavorable to us. But
this is a passing thing and will change in a short time. For this reason, what the
smaller parties and groups have to say is not to be heeded or believed. What they
say is meant to deceive us.

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 35–36, where it is reproduced
from Wannan shibian.

1. According to Nianpu, Mao drafted a telegram on March 1 for the Central Committee
Secretariat to Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, and Deng Yingchao, on refusal to attend the Political
Council in Chongqing if negotiations with the Guomindang failed. Presumably these are
the instructions referred to here.

2. The available Chinese text has two characters missing here, but these are supplied in
Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 278–79, where the content of Zhou Enlai’s two “urgent” telegrams of
March 1 is also summarized. The essential point of Zhou’s message was that a clear decision on attendance or nonattendance was indispensable.