The Policy of Military Defensive and
Political Offensive in Dealing with Chiang

(February 17, 1941)

Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], He [Long], Guan
[Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen], Peng [Zhen], Lü [Zhengcao], Cheng [Zihua], Zhu
Rui, Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], Chen [Yi], and Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi]:

(1) The central starting point of the Party's policy at present is to make use of the
contradictions between Japan and Chiang. There are still serious contradictions
between Japan and Chiang, so it is necessary to make use of them. Therefore, we
have adopted a policy of a military defensive and a political offensive. The longer
the duration of this policy, the more favorable it is to us; the shorter, the more
unfavorable. (2) All armed forces under the leadership of our Party, including the
New Fourth Army, should by and large wage defensive warfare only and abstain
from offensive warfare against the anti-Communist armies. They should not attempt to launch guerrilla warfare against Chiang in the far rear. (3) The Eighth
Route Army in particular should take advantage of Chiang's policy of differentiation (that of not involving the Eighth Route Army in the New Fourth Army question). The middle and lower levels may voice their support for the New Fourth
Army, but apart from that the headquarters should keep quiet (this attitude represents, on the one hand, a gesture of restraint and, on the other, a protest), and
militarily take a defensive posture. (4) Now that the New Fourth Army is without
legal status, it could make a big scene. So as not to reduce the contradictions between Japan and Chiang but, rather, to expand them, however, they should not go
to the far rear but, rather, take as their principle, for the time being, restricting their
operations to enemy-occupied areas and their adjacent areas. When the Henan
enemy has retreated, Peng Xuefeng should temporarily give up his effort to cross
the new Yellow River, and the task of the main forces to develop toward Henan
should be changed for now to preparation and not be carried out. (5) The same
applies to preparations for the Eighth Route Army reserves, for now it is also a
matter of preparation and not carrying out. The faster, the better as far as preparation is concerned, just in case; the slower, the better in terms of implementation, in

Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, no. 3, 1985, p. 7 (pp. 170-71 of the annual
volume).
order to meet the most favorable international and domestic conditions. Therefore, in stepping up preparations for the reserve forces, it is necessary to guard
against impetuosity that may arise in the ranks. It is necessary to have people at
higher levels in the armed forces understand that we must, on the one hand, be
prepared to deal with a possible sudden event (such as an overall split), and, on the
other, in our own actions we must avoid causing too early a split. It must be understood that the later the breakup, the more favorable it is, the sooner the breakup,
the more harmful. (6) Therefore, at present only a policy of military defensive and
political offensive fits in with the above requirements. Strategic military offensive
is correct only when the necessary conditions are ripe. What is meant by necessary
conditions is, first, that Chiang declares a complete split and surrenders (he will
not declare an overall split unless he surrenders); second is the arrival of a most
favorable moment internationally. Only when these conditions are met will we
have the initiative; otherwise we will land in a politically and militarily passive
position. We must take hold of this kind of initiative. (7) Please make military
arrangements according to the orientation outlined above. These guidelines were
decided upon by the Central Committee.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang] Ye [Jianying]