Directive on Our Army’s Military Policy After the Southern Anhui Incident[1]

(February 17, 1941)

Peng and Zuo; Liu and Deng; He and Guan; Nie and Peng; Lü and Cheng; Zhu Rui; Chen and Luo; Chen and Hu:

(1) At present the central point of departure for the Party’s policy is to exploit the contradictions between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. There are still serious contradictions between Japan and Chiang, hence we must exploit them; therefore we have adopted the policy of a military defensive and a political offensive. The longer this policy lasts the more advantageous it will be, and the shorter it lasts the less advantageous.

(2) All armed forces under the leadership of our Party, including the New Fourth Army, should at present basically fight only defensive battles against the anti-communist troops, not offensive battles, and should not attempt to launch anti-Chiang guerrilla warfare in the great rear area; all such methods are harmful at present.

(3) The Eighth Route Army should especially exploit Chiang’s policy of differential treatment (the New Fourth Army issue does not implicate the Eighth Route Army). Apart from the middle and lower levels being able to voice support for the New Fourth Army, the general headquarters should adopt an attitude of silence (such an attitude on the one hand shows that leeway is being left, and on the other hand is a show of strength), and militarily adopt a defensive posture.

(4) The New Fourth Army has already lost its legal status and originally could have made a big uproar, but in order not to narrow the contradictions between Japan and Chiang—on the contrary, they should be widened—it should also not go to the great rear area. For the time being, it should still be confined as a principle to operating in enemy-occupied areas and their vicinity. After the enemy withdraws from Henan, Peng Xuefeng’s operations across the New Yellow River should be temporarily abandoned. The task of developing the main force toward Henan should at present be changed to preparation, not implementation.

(5) The same applies to the preparation of the Eighth Route Army’s mobile units: at present it is also preparation, not implementation. The sooner the preparation is completed the better, so as to guard against contingencies; the later the implementation is carried out the better, so as to coordinate with the most favorable conditions internationally and domestically. Therefore, in stepping up the preparation of mobile units, we must curb any impatience that may arise among the troops, and must make the senior personnel in the units understand that, on the one hand, we must prepare to deal with possible sudden incidents (total rupture), and on the other hand, we must avoid in our own actions triggering a premature rupture. It must be understood that the later the rupture occurs the more advantageous it will be, and the earlier it occurs the more harmful.

(6) Therefore, at present only the policy of a military defensive and a political offensive meets the above requirements. A strategic military offensive is correct only when the necessary conditions are ripe. The so-called necessary conditions are: first, when Chiang Kai-shek declares total rupture and capitulates (he will not declare total rupture unless he capitulates); second, when the most favorable international moment arrives. Only when these conditions are present will we have the initiative; otherwise we will fall into a passive position politically and militarily. We must take this initiative into our own hands.

(7) Please deploy military affairs in accordance with the above policy. This policy has been decided by the Central Committee.

Mao, Zhu, Wang, Ye

17th

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[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang, and Ye Jianying to Peng Dehuai, Zuo Quan, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, He Long, Guan Xiangying, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Zhen, Lü Zhengcao, Cheng Zihua, Zhu Rui, Chen Guang, Luo Ronghuan, Chen Yi, and Liu Shaoqi.