Relations Between the Guomindang and the
Communist Party at Present, and
Our Tactics
(February 14, 1941)
Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:
We have taken note of all your telegrams.
1. Our estimates are in agreement. Opposition to the Communists will not change,
but the tide may ebb and the "Communist-suppression" campaign may come to a
standstill (this can only be called a possibility).
2. As long as the current high tide does ebb and the "Communist-suppression"
does come to a standstill, it would be difficult [for them] to instigate another high
tide or to carry out another "Communist-suppression" (unless there were a surrender). Thus now is a crucial turning point in the situation.
3. The enemy will necessarily attack Chiang [Kaishek]. The estimate of a certain gentleman¹ is correct, and making use of the contradictions between Japan
and Chiang remains at the core of our policy.
4. But to make concessions to Chiang would be dangerous (as you have said).
Now is the time to force Chiang to make concessions to us, not a time for us to
make concessions to him. Things will be easier once we have tided over this present
period.
5. Chiang has never been so besieged as he is now with reproach both from
within and without, and we have never before won over such a broad section of the
masses as we have today (both at home and abroad).
6. Chiang will not launch a counterattack on the enemy; his primary idea is still
to preserve his actual strength. But the likelihood that Japan will attack Chiang is
great, so Chiang will be forced to meet the challenge and thus will be unable to
preserve his strength after all.
7. At present there is a stalemate between the Guomindang and the Communists,² but it will not last long. The time when the enemy launches a large-scale
attack will be the day when the deadlock is broken (but if the enemy does not
attack the stalemate will continue).
8. Only at that time, if Chiang expresses to us an easing up of tensions, can we
respond with a similar attitude. But now is not that time. To let the stalemate exist
for now is favorable; the more deadlocked we are, the more it is to our advantage
and to Chiang's disadvantage.
9. The present deadlock exists only politically (deadlocked in terms of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists). Militarily, as far as we
are concerned, there is no stalemate because we have not attacked him.
10. If Chiang again orders Tang [Enbo]'s group³ to attack Huaibei, he will be
creating the deadlock himself, and eventually, when the enemy army strikes again,
he will suffer even greater losses. If Chiang does not attack Huaibei again, then he
could undo his own military deadlock right now and be left with only the political
deadlock. If Chiang is smart, this is what he should do.
11. Our political offensive (the twelve demands) has prevailed over Chiang's
political offensive (the telegrams of the 19th and the 8th, the Southern Anhui Incident, the order of the 17th, the deadline for moving north, the disciplinary order,
the attack in Central China, and so on). Our offensive has achieved results, and
more is yet to be gained.
12. Our purpose is not to get Chiang to acknowledge our twelve demands or
some of the twelve demands, as he will never do so (of course we should not say
this to the masses inside and outside the Party and should still demand that Chiang
acknowledge them), but to defeat their offensive with an offensive.
13. The situation has changed. Before January 17, he was on the offensive and
we were on the defensive. Things turned inside out after the 17th, and he has
landed in a defensive position, wherein lies our greatest victory.
14. Only a military offensive would prevent Chiang from resisting Japan and
would be a very wrong policy. A political offensive, on the contrary, would only
push Chiang to fight Japan and would not prevent him from doing so. Therefore, it
is absolutely correct to talk about a military defensive and a political offensive, the
two being both opposite and complementary.
15. In terms of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists,
a military defensive and a political offensive will also only bring the two parties
together rather than split them apart. If a powerful attacking force is beaten into a
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 329-31, where it is reproduced
from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
1. "A certain gentleman" refers to Tsuikov (1900-1982), who served at the time as
military attaché to the Soviet embassy in China and principal military adviser to the National Government.
2. Here the version of this text in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 23-25, adds the
parenthetical remark "(as Chen Bulei has said)." Chen Bulei (1890-1948) was, at this time,
Chiang Kaishek's confidential assistant.
3. This refers to the Guomindang Army's Thirty-first Group Army, whose commanderin-chief was Tang Enbo.


defensive position to the point that it can no longer attack, there would be the
possibility for the Guomindang and the Communists to come to a temporary easing of tensions.
16. Relations between the Guomindang and the Communists, which suffered a
breach ripped by Chiang Kaishek's own hand, can be mended only by our hands.
Our hands means the political offensive, which is the twelve demands. There is no
other effective way aside from this.
17. Please explain the above points to a certain gentleman, and ask his opinion.
18. As soon as [a report on] the enemy's and our troop strengths and deployments in North China and Central China is ready, you will be informed.

Mao Zedong

Abridged Text of a Telegram from Mao Zedong
and Six Other Councilors to the
Secretariat of the Political Council

(February 15, 1941)

To the Secretariat of the People's Political Council, for your perusal:

Regarding the government's handling of the New Fourth Army, our Party's Central Committee has lodged a strong protest and put forward twelve demands as a
way of dealing with the aftermath, which are, (1) to stop provocation; (2) to rescind the order of January 17; (3) to punish He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, and Shangguan
Yunxiang, the three chief culprits in the Southern Anhui Incident; (4) to release Ye
Ting and let him continue to act as army commander; (5) to return all men and
rifles to the New Fourth Army; (6) to compensate all New Fourth Army officers
and men who were casualties of the Southern Anhui Incident; (7) to withdraw the
Communist-suppression troops from Central China; (8) to dismantle the blockade
lines in the Northwest; (9) to release all patriotic political prisoners throughout the
country; (10) to abolish the one-party dictatorship and practice democratic government; (11) to carry out the Three People's Principles and follow the will of the
Director General; (12) to arrest the leaders of all pro-Japanese factions and have
them tried under the national law. The government is requested to accept these
points. Until the government has deliberated and made a decision, Zedong and the
rest of us would find it difficult to attend. You are hereby notified and respectfully
requested to give the matter your attention!

Mao Zedong
Wu Yuzhang
Chen Shaoyu
Dong Biwu
Qin Bangxian
Deng Yingchao
Lin Zuhan

Printed in abridged form

Our source for this telegram is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 27, where it is reproduced
from *Wannan shibian*. A virtually identical text, dated February 18, appears in *Mao Zedong
ji*, Vol. 7, pp. 279-80, where it is taken from *Xin Zhonghua bao*, March 13, 1941.