An Analysis of the Situation as Regards the
Japanese Attack, and of the Political Tendency
of Chiang Kaishek

(February 7, 1941)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

1. The scale of the enemy army's attack this time is very extensive and the
fighting is fierce, apparently of an even larger magnitude than the Battle of Yichang.
This has been brought on entirely by the anti-Communist schemes of Chiang
[Kaishek], He [Yingqin], and Bai [Chongxi].
2. Tang [Enbo]'s group army¹ suffered considerable losses, three of his armies
have turned back toward western Henan, and Nanyang fell on the 4th. Li Xianzhou
is still on the western bank of the Huai River, where the battle is also fierce. A
section of the enemy forces attacked and occupied Xiangcheng by way of Shangcai,
threatening Li from the back; another section attacked and occupied Taihe by way
of Haozhou, impinging upon Li's front. It is estimated that Li, too, will withdraw
westward if defeated. The main force of the Guangxi army, now concentrated in the
Dabie mountains, has been cut off from the rear, thus becoming a force in the
enemy's rear. This is a heavy blow to the Guangxi faction, and it is estimated that
Mo Dehong's troops are also likely to retreat westward in the future. Fan Hanjie's
troops have been transferred south from the Zhongtiao mountains. These troops
will be forced to cross the river if Luoyang is in danger. The earlier plan that Pang
Bingxun's troops move to southern Hebei to cut us off from Hebei and Shandong
has to be abandoned, of course. Of Hu [Zongnan]'s troops, Li Tiejun's army² was
transferred eastward in great haste by night, and the Eighth Division is retreating
from Zhengning to Binzhou,³ probably in preparation for moving eastward. The
forces surrounding the border areas have been weakened. As for the development
of the war situation in Henan, it is possible that another unit will be transferred. In
sum, the "Communist suppression" plan has been smashed fundamentally.
3. Chiang Kaishek did know that the enemy would attack some time within the
months of January, February, and March. The reason he instigated the Southern
Anhui Incident, issued the order of January 17, and deployed a large army to
attack the New Fourth Army north of the Huai River, in eastern Anhui and in
central Hubei, was solely that he wanted to stop the enemy offensive by fighting
the Communists. I'm fighting the Communists, [he thinks,] and when the clash
between the Guomindang and the Communists is greatly exacerbated, Japan will
probably just watch the tigers fight from atop the mountain, I should think. If we
drag this on for a few months, then Hitler will order Japan to go farther south, and
China will be at peace. What he doesn't know is that the Japanese think quite
differently. First, time does not allow a wait. The Guomindang-Communist conflict is all very well and good indeed, but you're tricking me to buy some time. I'd
rather take advantage of the conflict between the two parties and use it as a chance
to attack, undermine your strength, and solve the China problem easily that way.
Tōjō said in his speech on the 30th, "The Chiang régime is locked in an internal
conflict and thus unable to carry on a war of resistance, but Japan will in no way
rely upon the fact that the Guomindang and the Communists are squabbling but,
rather, upon our own strength to solve the China issue." So the attack in Henan is
to Chiang like a huge bucket of cold water that washed away all his illusions.
Second, the Japanese would not like us to go to North China. Tōjō declared openly,
"North China is Japan's base area, and if Chiang Kaishek drives the Communist
forces from Central China to North China, that would undermine Japanese interests." This is something we failed to realize in the past.
4. When doing external propaganda, please emphatically point out the "words
straight from our hearts" passage in our telegram of the 9th [of November 1940]
(altogether 102 characters, from "Right now is a time when both Chinese traitors
and puppet troops are acting outrageously and rumors are rife" to "wanted very
much to share [these words] with you two gentlemen"),5 so that the Guomindang
and the middle-of-the roaders might realize that what we predicted is, unfortunately, right on the mark in terms of the present dangerous situation that has come
about between the Guomindang and the Communists and between China and Japan. They have insisted upon becoming "pressed to the limits so that mutual agitation arises, [leading to] mutual defeat and damage to both sides," which has in turn
led to "[our being] the snipe and clam to the enemy's fisherman, the result being in
violation of our intent, and by that time too late to regret."6

4. Tōjō Hideki (1884-1948) was at this time the Japanese minister of war. In 1948 he
was hanged as a war criminal.
5. See above, the telegram dated November 9, 1940, to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi,
paragraph 2.
6. The parable of the snipe and the clam is used both in the telegram of November 9,
1940, cited in the previous note, and in Mao's telegram of the same date to Zhou Enlai,
likewise translated above.
5. Military fighting against the Communists has actually come to an end (although attacks are still going on in eastern Anhui and the Guanzhong border areas), but please pay attention to how Chiang Kaishek and various others handle
relations between the Guomindang and the Communists. According to my observations, they will have no choice but to seek a compromise. The enemy attacks are
so fierce, the January 17 order is so unpopular, all his plans have failed, and the
[People's] Political Council is about to be convened, so he must necessarily find a
way to compromise or things will be even more to his disadvantage. Is this sort of
estimation appropriate? What is your opinion?

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 633-36, where it is reproduced from a manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Refers to the Guomindang Army's Thirty-first Group Army, under the command of
Tang Enbo.

2. The Seventy-sixth Army, commanded by Li Tiejun, which was under the Guomindang
Army's Thirty-fourth Group Army, whose commander-in-chief was Hu Zongnan.

3. An old xian name, now Binxian in Shaanxi.