At Present the Command Center in
Central China Should Focus on
Three Basic Strategic Areas (February 1, 1941)

To Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi], and for the information of [Peng]
Dehuai: At present the command center in Central China should focus on three basic strategic areas. The first basic strategic area is the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Border Re-
gion. The method is to have Peng Xuefeng,1 Zhang Yunyi,2 and Li Xiannian3 push
westward gradually from their respective locations, with the objective of reaching
western Hubei, western Henan, and southern Shaanxi and establishing guerrilla
base areas there within one year, making use of the contradictions between Japan
and Chiang [Kaishek] and also taking advantage of the present attacks by the Japa-nese bandits in the direction of northern and western Henan (the Japanese bandits
have started an offensive campaign from Woyang in the east and Xinyang in the
south, besieging Tang [Enbo], Li [Xianzhou], He [Zhuguo], and the troops of the
Guangxi faction; Tang, Li, and He are likely to suffer huge losses). First of all you
should order Peng Xuefeng to prepare several detachments of crack troops, and
when the main forces of Tang, Li, and He are dealing with the enemy toward the
west and are weakly defended in Huaixi, have them cross the Huai River and expand
toward the area between the Huai River and the Beiping-Hankou [railroad] line. If
this plan were to succeed, it would be a tremendous strategic victory and would clear
the way to the south for our troops in North China. The designation as the New
Fourth Army should be restored to the troops under Peng Xuefeng; if the North
China troops move south in the future they will also use the New Fourth Army
designation. The New Fourth Army has now been proclaimed by Chiang Kaishek a
mutinous army, so it is not bound by any laws (some founding members of the Guomindang are fearful that bandits will be found everywhere in the provinces of
Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Henan). If this plan succeeds, Huang Kecheng4 should
prepare to expand into Henan. Second, you should order Zhang Yunyi and Deng
Zihui to expand into western Anhui. They should be made to understand that, to
repel the attack from the Guangxi armies, the main thing is to adopt the orientation
of developing on exterior lines, and that the Tongcheng base area is an ideal strategic base. As for the enemy attack this time, Mo Shujie5 has ordered his troops in
Shangcheng to meet the challenge, and if the enemy army turns to the main forces
of the Guangxi army concentrated in the Dabie mountains after fighting Tang, Li,
and He, then Zhang and Deng can shift their main target area for development
toward western Anhui. Your telegram of reply last October said that the area between Chaohu and Wagehu is no more than 100 _li_ and passage is very difficult. But
now we have base areas in Wuwei and Tongcheng, and even though they cover no
more than one or two _xian_, they are of greater strategic significance than large
expanses of base areas in the enemy rear and deserve particular attention. Third,
the directions for development for Li Xiannian are the three areas of western Hubei,
western Henan, and eastern Hubei. Eastern Hubei can be assigned right away
to the existing detachments of Xishui, Huanggang, and Ludong, and their political
leadership capabilities strengthened. Development in western Hubei and western
Henan will be pushed forward along with the advancement of the Japanese bandits. In all three areas mentioned above that are under Peng, Zhang, and Li, good
use can be made of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang, to realize our
strategic development. The second strategic center in Central China is the base
area in South China, which is made up of four parts: southern Jiangsu, southern
Anhui, eastern Zhejiang, and the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area. Southern
Jiangsu is the center of our concentrated forces in South China, and much effort
should be used in its management. We do not know much about the area, so we
hope you will send us a detailed report. In the future this area should prepare to
move into the Tianmu mountains. As for southern Anhui, people should be sent
across the river to guide the remnant forces in their fight against Japan in the area
around Wuhu and to build up a detachment of 2,000 to 3,000 men and rifles in a
year’s time. They should make contact with the local Party organizations and prepare eventually to develop into the Huangshan and northeastern Jiangxi. Not everyone should cross the river; those who have already crossed the river may stay
for a period of recuperation, after which it may be considered to send them back to
the Wuhu area. The situation has changed drastically since January 17, and Xiang
Ying’s erroneous policy in the past of moving southward would be correct if used
from now on. Even by Guomindang reports, the losses in southern Anhui amount

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Notes

Our source for this text is _Mao Zedong junshi wenji_, Vol. 2, pp. 621–24, where it is printed
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.
1. Peng Xuefeng was at the time commander of the Eighth Route Army’s Fourth Column.
2. Zhang Yunyi was at the time deputy army commander and Second Division commander of the New Fourth Army.
3. Li Xiannian was serving at the time as commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army’s
Hubei-Henan Advance Column.

4. Huang Kecheng was at the time commander and political commissar of the Eighth
Route Army’s Fifth Column.
5. Mo Shujie was at the time army commander of the Guomindang Army’s Eighty-fourth Army.