At Present the Command Center in
Central China Should Focus on
Three Basic Strategic Areas
(February 1, 1941)
To Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi], and for the information of [Peng]
Dehuai:

At present the command center in Central China should focus on three basic strategic areas. The first basic strategic area is the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Border Region. The method is to have Peng Xuefeng,¹ Zhang Yunyi,² and Li Xiannian³ push
westward gradually from their respective locations, with the objective of reaching
western Hubei, western Henan, and southern Shaanxi and establishing guerrilla
base areas there within one year, making use of the contradictions between Japan
and Chiang [Kaishek] and also taking advantage of the present attacks by the Japanese bandits in the direction of northern and western Henan (the Japanese bandits
have started an offensive campaign from Woyang in the east and Xinyang in the
south, besieging Tang [Enbo], Li [Xianzhou], He [Zhuguo], and the troops of the
Guangxi faction; Tang, Li, and He are likely to suffer huge losses). First of all you
should order Peng Xuefeng to prepare several detachments of crack troops, and
when the main forces of Tang, Li, and He are dealing with the enemy toward the
west and are weakly defended in Huaixi, have them cross the Huai River and expand
toward the area between the Huai River and the Beiping-Hankou [railroad] line. If
this plan were to succeed, it would be a tremendous strategic victory and would clear
the way to the south for our troops in North China. The designation as the New
Fourth Army should be restored to the troops under Peng Xuefeng; if the North
China troops move south in the future they will also use the New Fourth Army
designation. The New Fourth Army has now been proclaimed by Chiang Kaishek a
mutinous army, so it is not bound by any laws (some founding members of the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 621-24, where it is printed
from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.
1. Peng Xuefeng was at the time commander of the Eighth Route Army's Fourth Column.
2. Zhang Yunyi was at the time deputy army commander and Second Division commander of the New Fourth Army.
3. Li Xiannian was serving at the time as commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army's
Hubei-Henan Advance Column.

Guomindang are fearful that bandits will be found everywhere in the provinces of
Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Henan). If this plan succeeds, Huang Kecheng⁴ should
prepare to expand into Henan. Second, you should order Zhang Yunyi and Deng
Zihui to expand into western Anhui. They should be made to understand that, to
repel the attack from the Guangxi armies, the main thing is to adopt the orientation
of developing on exterior lines, and that the Tongcheng base area is an ideal strategic base. As for the enemy attack this time, Mo Shujie⁵ has ordered his troops in
Shangcheng to meet the challenge, and if the enemy army turns to the main forces
of the Guarigxi army concentrated in the Dabie mountains after fighting Tang, Li,
and He, then Zhang and Deng can shift their main target area for development
toward western Anhui. Your telegram of reply last October said that the area between Chaohu and Wagehu is no more than 100 li and passage is very difficult. But
now we have base areas in Wuwei and Tongcheng, and even though they cover no
more than one or two xian, they are of greater strategic significance than large
expanses of base areas in the enemy rear and deserve particular attention. Third,
the directions for development for Li Xiannian are the three areas of western Hubei,
western Henan, and eastern Hubei, and eastern Hubei can be assigned right away
to the existing detachments of Xishui, Huanggang, and Ludong, and their political
leadership capabilities strengthened. Development in western Hubei and western
Henan will be pushed forward along with the advancement of the Japanese bandits. In all three areas mentioned above that are under Peng, Zhang, and Li, good
use can be made of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang, to realize our
strategic development. The second strategic center in Central China is the base
area in South China, which is made up of four parts: southern Jiangsu, southern
Anhui, eastern Zhejiang, and the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area. Southern
Jiangsu is the center of our concentrated forces in South China, and much effort
should be used in its management. We do not know much about the area, so we
hope you will send us a detailed report. In the future this area should prepare to
move into the Tianmu mountains. As for southern Anhui, people should be sent
across the river to guide the remnant forces in their fight against Japan in the area
around Wuhu and to build up a detachment of 2,000 to 3,000 men and rifles in a
year's time. They should make contact with the local Party organizations and prepare eventually to develop into the Huangshan and northeastern Jiangxi. Not everyone should cross the river; those who have already crossed the river may stay
for a period of recuperation, after which it may be considered to send them back to
the Wuhu area. The situation has changed drastically since January 17, and Xiang
Ying's erroneous policy in the past of moving southward would be correct if used
from now on. Even by Guomindang reports, the losses in southern Anhui amount

4. Huang Kecheng was at the time commander and political commissar of the Eighth
Route Army's Fifth Column.
5. Mo Shujie was at the time army commander of the Guomindang Army's Eighty-fourth Army.


to only over two thousand casualties and more than three thousand captives. Xiang's
troop originally totaled ten thousand, so it seems that about three thousand of them
may have broken through or been dispersed. You should be sure to send people to
guide them and gather them together. Those who have reached southern Jiangsu
should operate in southern Jiangsu and should not cross back over the river. Wireless communication should be strengthened in southern Jiangsu; there should be
at least five transceivers there. A transceiver should be set up right away in southern Anhui as well. Since Zeng Xisheng would prefer to engage in guerrilla fighting rather than do what he has been doing, you may have him lead the troops that
are now in Wuwei and order him back to southern Anhui in the future. If possible
and when necessary, you may also consider sending Sun Zhongde across the river
with Zeng Xisheng. As for eastern Zhejiang, meaning the delta area between Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Ningbo, our forces have always been weak there. The General
Command Headquarters should open up one more strategic base here and build
up through the Shanghai Party organizations a guerrilla base area in the region
(with the small amount of armed forces originally existing in Songjiang and other
places as a foundation). The Central China Bureau must pay attention to directing
the Party organizations in Shanghai. The fourth strategic base in South China is
the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area, where there are three small base areas
holding small amounts of arms and where the popular masses are very good [and
supportive]. You should start right now to learn about the region. Little Yao [Rao
Shushi] once made a detailed report on it, and we could send it on to you if you do
not have it. This region at present is to intensify underground work in preparation
for armed uprising in the future and for restoring the open base areas of the past.
The above constitutes the cardinal task for the four strategic bases in South China.
Third is the Jiangsu-Shandong War Zone. This is the primary base area in Central
China at present, where the main forces are, and where the greatest effort has been
made. It is also the place where we should prepare to destroy, within a year, large
numbers of anti-Communist armed forces that are amassed. But you should regard
this place as the starting point for western and southern expansion. With regard to
the overall task, its function is to produce cadres and as a place from which to send
troops westward and southward, just like the central Shaanxi plain [guanzhong]
during the founding Han emperor's time. We now have three large strategic bases:
North China, Jiangsu-Shandong, and the south (Fujian-Guangdong). The task for
North China is to deal with Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou; your
task is to take care of the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Border Region and the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area; the south's task is to manage to the north and south
of the five ranges. Given the circumstances in which Chiang Kaishek is attacking
only the New Fourth Army at present (his tactic of destroying [our forces] one by
one), in addition to your proposal to form four divisions, Huang Kecheng's and
Peng Xuefeng's units should be added to each form a division of the New Fourth
Army, making six regular divisions altogether. Although the overall situation has
changed greatly, the contradictions between Japan and Chiang can still be utilized,
and they remain the most fundamental of all the contradictions we can make use
of. No matter what sort of trouble Chiang Kaishek is making, he will only make
the kind of trouble that will be his own ruin. The Central Committee's resolution
on the new situation after January 17 will be sent to you within a few days.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang]

6. Zeng Xisheng had previously been head of the Second Department of the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee's Military Commission. In 1940 he was transferred to
the New Fourth Army's Military Department, and later that year led the effort to gather
together the troops dispersed in the Southern Anhui Incident.
7. Sun Zhongde was at the time deputy commander of the Sixth Brigade of the New
Fourth Army's Second Division.
8. This refers to the Central China New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army General
Command Headquarters, established in November 1940.