On the Wannan Incident[1]

(January 15, 1941)

The defeat of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui was due, on our part, first of all to the lack of mental preparedness on the part of its leaders, Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping, for a counterattack against the diehards, and, secondly, to errors in command. The New Fourth Army could have moved north, but Xiang Ying vacillated; if not for his vacillation, the defeat could have been avoided. In regard to the Wannan Incident, we must launch a political counteroffensive on a national scale, adopting an attitude of extreme firmness, just as we did in the struggle against the first anti-Communist onslaught the year before last. Only by not fearing a rupture can we beat back the Kuomintang offensive. We must not believe all that the middle-of-the-roaders clamour about. The "Left" wing advocates an immediate large-scale fight with the Kuomintang, but we cannot carry out such a policy. The mistakes of Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping must be made known immediately, and the question of what to do about them is to be left for decision by the Seventh Congress.

[1] Part of Comrade Mao Zedong's speech on the Wannan Incident at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.