To Zhou Enlai Regarding the Policy for
Dealing with Chiang Kaishek
(January 27, 1941)

1. We agree with the method of a gradual retreat.
2. We must, however, take into consideration the possibility of Chiang's arresting all of our men, and we must be prepared to deal with such a wholesale arrest.
3. The twenty-five men withdrawing from Xi'an, led by Li Hua, all had completely legal passports but were detained by the Sixteenth Army when they reached
Tongguan. Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] has already sent a telegram to Xiong
and Hu, asking them to order the release of our men. The outcome remains unknown.
4. Negotiations cannot be resumed if the twelve articles are not carried out; this
position is absolutely correct.
5. It is still possible to make use of the contradictions between Chiang and
Japan. Li Zongren has given orders to all army groups in deployment against the
enemy such that the enemy forces stationed in Xinyang and Yingshan moving
north to concentrate in Xin'andian total more than twenty thousand men, a hundred big guns, thirty armored cars, and twenty airplanes. These numbers, moreover, continue to increase, and they intend to invade northern Henan. Tang Enbo's
main forces are deploying a defense north of Queshan. Mo Dehong has ordered
his various troops in Shangcheng to deploy against the enemy, as the main forces
of the enemy army in Central China have concentrated near Xinyang, taking advantage of our elimination of the bandit armies. If the enemy makes a large-scale
attack, it must be the work of the Japanese bandits in concert with the pro-Japanese
elements, the aim being to threaten Chiang into surrender, and also a measure to
bring Chiang to ruin.
6. Our orientation is to seize upon the Southern Anhui Incident and the "January 17" order and refuse to let them go. Chiang is the one who instigated the split,
and it is Chiang who pushed us to a point where we cannot but stand in opposition
to him. The armed forces under our leadership have been declared mutinous, and
there is no way at all for us to maintain any relations whatsoever with Chiang.
Unless he rescinds the "January 17" order and carries out the twelve articles, there

is no room for us to negotiate with him, as Chiang himself has thoroughly destroyed any such possibility. The fate of the staff of our administrative offices is in
their hands, and they will decide whether to beat them or kill them. In any event,
each of us is prepared to be put to death. If they still subscribe to the belief that
when two armies encounter each other, no envoy should be killed, they will release our men to return to Yan'an; otherwise, they will do as they please with
them. Before they declare a complete split (that is, cancel the designation of the
Eighth Route Army and declare the Chinese Communist Party mutinous), we shall
keep a few staff members in our administrative office, in the hope that they come
to their senses. All this should be explained openly to Zhang Chong and others.
7. The circular telegram on inauguration of New Fourth Army commanders and
the circular telegram denouncing the pro-Japanese elements will be sent to you
later today.
8. If it is inconvenient to have the administrative office send out these kinds of
documents from Yan'an, then use indirect means to distribute them secretly, so as
to protect the safety of the administrative office.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 299-300, which reproduces it
from Wannan shibian.