To Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and
Zhou Enlai on Tactics for Dealing with
Chiang Kaishek
(January 25, 1941)

1. Regarding our handling of the Southern Anhui Incident and the Chongqing
Military Commission's January 17 declaration that the New Fourth Army is mutinous, see the January 20 order and speech by the Yan'an Military Commission.
We must firmly insist that this was planned by the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese faction (and not mention Chiang). We also firmly assert that the so called army discipline and military orders compelling us to move north, and all the
other counterrevolutionary actions happening in various places, such as arrests
and killings, were the work of the pro-Japanese faction on orders from the Japanese bandits. In this way we can acquire an advantageous position politically, and
Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang will be forced into a defensive position. It is
not that Chiang has already made peace with Japan, but we can still make use of
the contradictions between Chiang and Japan, even though they are very small.
2. Our strategy of January 20 is adequate to deal with either one of two situations: if Chiang is already prepared for a complete split, we shall meet his split
with a split; if he is not ready to effect an all-out split, we shall secure temporary
relaxation of tension by means of staunch opposition.
3. Our conciliatory attitude over the past three months (the telegram of the 9th
and the troop withdrawal from southern Anhui) has won sympathy from the middleof-the-road faction, but has given Chiang an opportunity to attack us. This attitude
should be put to an end immediately, and a shift should be made to a position of
staunch opposition and resolute struggle.
4. The step taken on January 17 was a very unwise move on Chiang's part. We
must take a firm hold of this and follow through in hot pursuit, without the slightest hesitation or compromise.
5. If a change is to be made, Chiang must first rescind the order of January 17
and make some other necessary indications; otherwise we certainly cannot make
any changes.

6. Chiang's scheme is to defeat us bit by bit, looking upon the [attack on the]
New Fourth Army as a local incident. We, however, cannot follow suit, and must
regard it as a national incident.
7. Politically assume the offensive and militarily employ a defensive stance for
the time being.
8. But Chiang has not yet made mention of the Eighth Route Army and the
Chinese Communist Party, so we too shall refrain from mentioning the whole of
the Guomindang or the Central Army. Personnel of the Eighth Route Army and the
Chinese Communist Party will not appear openly. We shall wait and see how Chiang
acts and then act accordingly. In this sense we remain on the defensive.
9. Within three months Germany is sure to attack Britain and Japan may very
well resume its attack on China. The world situation is bound to change, and
Chiang's arrogance might be abated. If Britain should be defeated fundamentally,
however, and Roosevelt is unable to do anything about it, Chiang would be more
likely to surrender.
10. What the middle-of-the-roaders say must not be disbelieved out of hand or
altogether believed. Only by adopting a stand of resolute struggle without the least
compromise can we truly win over the middle-of-the-road elements. Otherwise the
vacillating stance of the middle-of-the-roaders is objectively to Chiang's advantage.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, vol. 6, p. 297, where it is reproduced
from Wannan shibian.