Central Committee Decision on the Errors of Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping[1]

(January 15, 1941)

Ever since the beginning of the War of Resistance, Comrade Xiang Ying has had differences with the Central Committee on political principles and military policy. The speech Xiang Ying delivered in September 1937 at the Nanchang Kuomintang Provincial Headquarters' commemorative week already betrayed the stand of a Communist Party member. Thereafter, his understanding of the united front consistently fell into the error of Right opportunism. He failed to recognize the independence and militancy of the Communist Party within the united front; he never led any struggle against the Kuomintang's anti-communist policies, had long since become spiritually captive to the Kuomintang, and left the Southern Anhui forces mentally unprepared. On this issue, Comrade Yuan Guoping, Director of the New Fourth Army's Political Department, was entirely in agreement with Xiang Ying. The political work he led also forfeited the Party's independence and guided the New Fourth Army to conform to Kuomintang demands. For three years, Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping consistently paid lip service to Central Committee directives while opposing them in practice, made every concession to the Kuomintang, opposed northward development and development behind enemy lines, opposed expanding the New Fourth Army, opposed establishing anti-Japanese base areas, and stubbornly clung to their own opportunist line. They rarely reported to the Central Committee on the internal situation of the Party, government, and army under their leadership, operating entirely in their own closed system. Their disrespect for the Central Committee had, over three years, reached an extremely irregular degree. Regarding the various errors of principle committed by Xiang and Yuan, after the Central Committee had repeatedly and severely criticized them since last summer, Xiang and Yuan outwardly professed obedience, leading the Central Committee to believe they had changed; it is now proven that they remained unaltered. In other parts of the New Fourth Army, under the leadership of comrades such as Hu Fu and Chen Yi, either correct changes were implemented, as in Eastern Anhui and Southern Jiangsu, or they were never influenced by Xiang and Yuan's erroneous leadership from the start, as in Central Hubei and Huaibei. The New Fourth Army in these areas stands in stark contrast to the Southern Anhui contingent directly led by Xiang and Yuan (accounting for roughly one-third of the old troops, and one-ninth of the entire army). The northward movement of the Southern Anhui troops this time could have avoided losses, but Xiang and Yuan first hesitated and wavered, then sought their own dead end, plunging into the encirclement net of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist forces. Having just started and traveled thirty li, they halted again, lingering indecisively at Maolin Village south of Jing County, allowing the anti-communist forces to gradually close the encirclement. In the end, except for a portion that broke out under the leadership of Comrade Fu Qiutao (though they have yet to escape the larger encirclement), the main force of approximately seven thousand men was completely annihilated. This unit arrived at Maolin on January 5. After being encircled by seventy thousand anti-communist troops under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, Gu Zhutong, and Shangguan Yunxiang, they hastily engaged in battle. Except for a few individuals like Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping, who still displayed shameful cowardice and vacillation, all the officers and soldiers, under the leadership of Army Commander Ye Ting and Deputy Secretary of the Southeast Bureau Rao Shushi, fought fiercely against the anti-communist forces for seven days and nights, demonstrating the heroic spirit of Communist Party members and revolutionary soldiers. However, due to the leadership errors of Xiang and Yuan—lacking prior mental preparation and, when the event occurred, lacking flexible operational command and resolve—they consequently fell into defeat. This defeat is the result of Xiang and Yuan's consistent opportunist leadership and cannot be compared to an ordinary, accidental battlefield defeat. Whether internal treachery and conspiracy played a part in this defeat remains to be investigated, but many details are suspicious. When Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping were implementing their opportunist line, there were already comrades among the members of the New Fourth Army Military Commission Sub-Committee and the Southeast Bureau Committee who were dissatisfied with or opposed to Xiang and Yuan's errors. Many within the Party were dissatisfied with Xiang Ying's patriarchal attitude that suppressed the initiative of cadres. When Comrade Hu Fu in Eastern Anhui and Comrade Chen Yi in Southern Jiangsu conveyed the Central Committee's directives and carried out the work transformation, the resolute opposition of all local comrades to Xiang Ying's errors and their enthusiastic support for the Central Committee's line served as clear evidence. In order to correctly implement the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and victoriously carry out the struggle against Japan and traitors in the future, the Central Committee hereby makes the following decisions regarding the errors committed by Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping:

(1) The capacity for independent action fostered among military cadres, especially leading personnel in various independently operating areas, due to the characteristics of prolonged, dispersed guerrilla warfare, must absolutely not develop into disobedience to the leadership of the Central Committee and the command of the Central Military Commission; otherwise, it is exceptionally dangerous. The past case of Zhang Guotao and the present cases of Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping all failed due to disobedience to the Central Committee. The entire Party and army should be vigilant and draw lessons from this. When struggling against Zhang Guotao's Right opportunism, Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping also participated, but subsequently they followed a path similar to Zhang Guotao's disastrous course. All comrades who harbor individualistic heroism, that is to say, comrades with insufficient Party spirit, especially leading military personnel, must deeply examine themselves. It must be understood that Communist Party members who hold guns, if they do not obey the leadership of the Central Committee and the command of the Military Commission, no matter how self-righteous they consider themselves or what abilities they possess, will ultimately fail. Although at present we do not yet equate Xiang Ying with the renegade Zhang Guotao, and await future factual proof—if Xiang Ying did not die in battle and did not break out of the encirclement but was captured by the anti-communist forces, we still hope they can demonstrate the revolutionary integrity of Communist Party members after capture—Xiang Ying's opportunist errors must be pointed out. It must be anticipated that the environment of guerrilla warfare may still produce figures like Zhang Guotao or Xiang Ying in the future. This therefore heightens the importance of Party spirit education and study for the entire Party, especially among cadres and Party members in the military. This extremely important issue must absolutely not be underestimated. And for comrades who have already committed serious errors and refuse to obey the leadership of the Central Committee or higher authorities, timely prevention must be undertaken, along with transfer and disciplinary measures. This is also a lesson that should be drawn from the failure of Xiang and Yuan.

(2) At this moment of severe difficulty for the War of Resistance and the Anti-Japanese National United Front, when Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang are implementing a resolute anti-communist policy, our entire Party and army must take Xiang and Yuan as a warning. While steadfastly upholding the stand of resisting Japan, we must rigorously consolidate the ranks of our Party and army spiritually, politically, militarily, and in all organizational aspects, in order to smash the anti-communist offensives of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang and victoriously carry out the War of Resistance.

(3) Announce this Central Committee decision among the senior cadres of the entire Party and army, and launch a struggle against the errors of Xiang and Yuan, but for the time being, it must not be communicated to lower levels, and especially must not be announced outside the Party.

(4) Submit the errors of Xiang and Yuan to the Party's Seventh National Congress for discussion and disciplinary action.

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[1] This decision was drafted by Mao Zedong. On January 15, it was adopted at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and distributed to senior cadres of all Central Bureaus.