A. Since the signing of the Japan–Wang Jingwei treaty, the provision of American loans, Soviet aid, and our Party’s campaign against capitulation, the current capitulation crisis has been checked. Although the danger may arise again in the future, the present situation remains one of a war of resistance. Therefore, at this time, our military and Party personnel should not emphasize anti-capitulation propaganda as strongly as in the past; otherwise, not only will the nation…

C. Amid the current upsurge in anti-Communist sentiment, our policy is of decisive significance. Yet some cadres within the Party still do not understand that the Party’s policy must differ in principle from that during the civil war. It must be clearly understood that throughout the entire period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, under no circumstances will our Party’s policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front ever change. Many policies from the Soviet period can no longer be applied. In particular, during the late Soviet period, due to a failure to recognize the fundamental characteristic that the Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colonial country and its protracted nature, many excessively leftist policies were introduced. For example: regarding the struggle between the fifth encirclement campaign and the counter-campaign as a decisive battle between two roads; the elimination of the bourgeoisie (leftist purges against reactionary policies); the elimination of rich peasants (dividing up bad land); the complete elimination of intellectuals and the physical elimination of landlords (indiscriminate); excessively leftist military policies; and the organizational policy of attacking comrades within the Party, etc. Not only are these absolutely impermissible during the current anti-Japanese period, but they were also mistaken in the past. Such excessively leftist policies were the opposite of the right opportunism led by Chen Duxiu in the later period. The error of so-called right opportunism, in the late period of the Great Revolution, was all unity and no struggle; in the late Soviet period, it was all struggle and no unity (except for the basic peasantry). These are the clearest examples representing two extreme policies. And both these policies caused tremendous losses to the Party and the revolution.

D. Today’s policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is neither all unity and no struggle, nor all struggle and no unity, but a two-faced policy of both unity and struggle. Specifically stated: 1. All anti-Japanese people unite (or all workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals, and merchants unite), forming the Anti-Japanese National United Front. 2. The policy of independence and autonomy within the united front: both “unity” and independent “struggle.” 3. In terms of military strategy, it is independent guerrilla warfare under strategic unity, but without forgoing mobile warfare under favorable conditions. 4. When struggling against anti-Communist diehards, it is to exploit contradictions, win over the majority, oppose the minority, and defeat them one by one; it is to be reasonable, advantageous, and restrained; it is to strike and then pull, and after pulling, strike again; and to be neither so hard as to rupture the united front, nor so soft as to lose our own stand. 5. In enemy-occupied areas and KMT-ruled areas, the policy is, on one hand, to carry out work extensively, and on the other, to adopt a policy of concealment and elite preservation; in terms of organization and struggle, to adopt the policy of lying low for the long term, accumulating strength, and biding time. 6. In light of domestic class relations, the standard for our policy is to develop progressive forces, win over middle forces, isolate anti-Communist diehard forces, and strike at pro-Japanese elements. 7. However, toward the diehards, it is a revolutionary two-faced policy: that is, toward the aspect in which they can still resist Japan, it is a policy of unity; toward their resolute anti-Communist aspect, it is a policy of isolation. On the anti-Japanese side, the diehards also have a dual nature; therefore, toward their resolute aspect, we adopt a policy of unity; toward their wavering aspect (secretly colluding with Japan and not actively opposing the Wang faction and traitors), it is a policy of isolation and struggle. The diehards also have a dual nature on the anti-Communist side; hence, the KMT, in its relations with the CCP, has aspects where it can still resist Japan, which we unite with. The intense tension of the past six months is now giving way to a temporary, slight easing, which is what Chiang needs.

Policy,
Including the above-mentioned, based on the fourth volume of the History of the Chinese Communist Party by Guo Hualun, 1973.6 (revised and expanded edition)
Add “secretly” etc. ] For example, secretly colluding with the Japanese aggressors and not actively opposing Wang and anti-traitor elements, etc. Add “is” ~ policy is a policy of struggle and isolation. Six, therefore ~ therefore our policy also has a dual nature, that is, toward the aspect in which they are still unwilling to fundamentally rupture KMT-CCP cooperation, it is a policy of unity;
toward the aspect of their high-pressure policies and military attacks against our Party and the people,
it is a policy of struggle and isolation. Distinguish such double-dealing elements from traitors and the pro-Japanese clique.

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Directive on Current Policy No. 383

--- Notes

B. The Kuomintang still pursues a two-faced policy of opposing the Communists on one hand while resisting Japan on the other. Consequently, we too maintain a revolutionary two-faced policy of unity on one hand and struggle on the other. The KMT’s anti-Communist efforts, in addition to intensifying high-pressure policies within its own ruling areas, inevitably include military offensives against our forces in Central China. Moreover, it is constructing a “Great Wall of ten thousand li” in the northwest, creating a blockade against us. Therefore, we must particularly emphasize opposition to the offensives in Central China and the blockade in the northwest. Especially regarding their military attacks, we must resolutely wage a self-defense struggle to smash them. As for their attempt to force us to withdraw north of the Yellow River by a deadline, we must stress the following reasons to oppose it: 1. Our Jiangnan units have decided to move north as a gesture of concession. 2. Famine conditions in North China are gradually worsening, and there is a need for some forces to move south to find food; moving Central China forces north would be tantamount to sending them to their deaths. 3. Guerrilla warfare requires expanding the area of maneuver; being confined to a corner will inevitably lead to annihilation. 4. Most of the Central China forces are organized by the people to defend their homes, making it extremely difficult to move them. Such organizations are all in accordance with Chairman Chiang’s Lushan speech (“Regardless of north or south, regardless of age, everyone has the responsibility to resist Japan and save the nation”) and his repeated messages to compatriots in enemy-occupied areas, and are not without legal basis. 5. The entire New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army pin down half of the enemy’s forces; our countrymen have reported their great service to the nation, and they deserve reward, not punishment. 6. The Southern Anhui forces have already moved north as ordered; the forces north of the Yangtze face practical difficulties in moving, and are not deliberately defying orders. 7. The cause of the friction lies in the KMT’s issuance of anti-Communist orders (such as the “Measures to Prevent Alien Party Activities”) and the pro-Japanese clique’s instigation of anti-Communist actions (Shi Yousan is proof), not from our Party or our military. 8. Military pay is insufficient, and the authorized strength is far too small (500,000 men organized into only three divisions), which is extremely unfair; forcing New Fourth Army guerrilla units to move north is even more unreasonable. As for the prolonged withholding of military pay, it is unclear what place they intend for our forces, which is truly incomprehensible; therefore, we demand continued payment. 9. In areas under the New Fourth Army’s jurisdiction, such as southern Jiangxi, northern Fujian, western Fujian, the Hunan-Jiangxi border region, the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border region, southern Hunan, and the Hubei-Henan border region, allStay behind personnel have been massacred without any guarantee. Moving Central China forces north would only delight the Japanese invaders and would be detrimental to persisting in the war of resistance and defending Central China. The above ten reasons must be pointed out at every opportunity to resist the KMT’s vicious policy of moving us to a narrow area north of the Yellow River as a pretext for their schemes. (Unclear)