December 25, 1940

[This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China.]


In the present high tide of anti-Communist attacks, the policy we adopt is
of decisive importance. But many of our cadres fail to realize that the Party's
present policy must be very different from its policy during the Agrarian
Revolution. It has to be understood that in no circumstances will the Party
change its united front policy for the entire period of the War of Resistance
Against Japan, and that many of the policies adopted during the ten years
of the Agrarian Revolution cannot just be duplicated today. In particular,
many ultra-Left policies of the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution
are not merely totally inapplicable today in the War of Resistance, but were
wrong even then, arising as they did from the failure to understand two
fundamental points--that the Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic
revolution in a semi-colonial country, and that it is a protracted revolution.
For example, there was the thesis that the Kuomintang's fifth "encirclement
and suppression" campaign and our counter-campaign constituted the decisive
battle between counterrevolution and revolution; there was the economic
elimination of the capitalist class (the ultra-Left policies on labour and
taxation) and of the rich peasants (by allotting them poor land); the physical
elimination of the landlords (by not allotting them any land); the attack
on the intellectuals; the "Left" deviation in the suppression of
counterrevolutionaries; the monopolizing by Communists of the organs of political
power; the focusing on communism as the objective in popular education; the
ultra-Left military policy (of attacking the big cities and denying the role
of guerrilla warfare); the putschist policy in the work in the White areas;
and the policy within the Party of attacks on comrades through the abuse
of disciplinary measures. These ultra-Left policies were manifestations of
the error of "Left" opportunism, or exactly the reverse of the Right opportunism
of Chen Tu-hsiu in the latter period of the First Great Revolution. It was
all alliance and no struggle in the latter period of the First Great Revolution,
and all struggle and no alliance (except with the basic sections of the
peasantry) in the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution-- truly striking
demonstrations of the two extremist policies. Both extremist policies caused
great losses to the Party and the revolution.

Today our Anti-Japanese National United Front policy is neither all alliance
and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but a combined alliance
and struggle. Specifically, it means:

(1) All people favouring resistance (that is, all anti-Japanese workers,
peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen) must unite
in the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

(2) Within the united front our policy must be one of independence and
initiative, i.e., both unity and independence are necessary.

(3) As far as military strategy is concerned, our policy is guerrilla warfare
waged independently and with the initiative in our own hands within the framework
of a united strategy; guerrilla warfare is basic, but no chance of waging
mobile warfare should be lost when the conditions are favourable.

(4) In the struggle against the anti-Communist die-hards, our policy is to
make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our
enemies one by one, and to wage struggles on just grounds, to our advantage,
and with restraint.

(5) In the enemy-occupied and Kuomintang areas our policy is, on the one
hand, to develop the united front to the greatest possible extent and, on
the other, to have well-selected cadres working underground. With regard
to the forms of organization and struggle, our policy is to have well-selected
cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength and
bide our time.

(6) With regard to the alignment of the various classes within the country,
our basic policy is to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle
forces and isolate the anti-Communist die-hard forces.

(7) With respect to the anti-Communist die-hards, ours is a revolutionary
dual policy of uniting with them, in so far as they are still in favour of
resisting Japan, and of isolating them, in so far as they are determined
to oppose the Communist Party. Moreover, the die-hards have a dual character
with regard to resistance to Japan, and our policy is to unite with them,
in so far as they are still in favour of resistance, and to struggle against
them and isolate them in so far as they vacillate (for instance, when they
collude with the Japanese aggressors and show reluctance in opposing Wang
Ching-wei and other traitors). As their opposition to the Communist Party
has also a dual character, our policy, too, should have a dual character;
in so far as they are still unwilling to break up Kuomintang-Communist
co-operation altogether, it is one of alliance with them, but in so far as
they are high-handed and launch armed attacks on our Party and the people,
it is one of struggling against them and isolating them. We make a distinction
between such people with a dual character and the traitors and pro-Japanese
elements.

(8) Even among the traitors and pro-Japanese elements there are people with
a dual character, towards whom we should likewise employ a revolutionary
dual policy. In so far as they are pro-Japanese, our policy is to struggle
against them and isolate them, but in so far as they vacillate, our policy
is to draw them nearer to us and win them over. We make a distinction between
such ambivalent elements and the out-and-out traitors like Wang Ching-wei,
Wang Yi-tang [1] and Shih
Yu-san.[2]

(9) The pro-Japanese big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are against resistance
must be distinguished from the pro-British and pro-American big landlords
and big bourgeoisie who are for resistance; similarly, the ambivalent big
landlords and big bourgeoisie who are for resistance but vacillate, and who
are for unity but are anti-Communist, must be distinguished from the national
bourgeoisie, the middle and small landlords and the enlightened gentry, the
duality of whose character is less pronounced. We build our policy on these
distinctions. The diverse policies mentioned above all stem from these
distinctions in class relations.

(10) We deal with imperialism in the same way. The Communist Party opposes
all imperialism, but we make a distinction between Japanese imperialism which
is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which
are not doing so now, between German and Italian imperialism which are allies
of Japan and have recognized "Manchukuo" and British and U.S. imperialism
which are opposed to Japan, and between the Britain and the United States
of yesterday which followed a Munich policy in the Far East and undermined
China's resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the United States of today
which have abandoned this policy and are now in favour of China's resistance.
Our tactics are guided by one and the same principle: to make use of
contradictions, win over the many oppose the few and crush our enemies one
by one. Our foreign policy differs from that of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang
claims, "There is only one enemy and all the rest are friends"; it appears
to treat all countries other than Japan alike, but in fact it is pro-British
and pro-American. On our part we must draw certain distinctions, first between
the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries, second, between Britain and
the United States on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, third,
between the people of Britain and the United States and their imperialist
governments, and fourth, between the policy of Britain and the United States
during their Far Eastern Munich period and their policy today. We build our
policy on these distinctions. In direct contrast to the Kuomintang our basic
line is to use all possible foreign help, subject to the principle of independent
prosecution of the war and reliance on our own efforts, and not, as the
Kuomintang does, to abandon this principle by relying entirely on foreign
help or hanging on to one imperialist bloc or another.

To correct the lop-sided views of many Party cadres on the question of tactics
and their consequent vacillations between "Left" and Right, we must help
them to acquire an all-round and integrated understanding of the changes
and developments in the Party's policy, past and present. The ultra-Left
viewpoint is creating trouble and is still the main danger in the Party.
In the Kuomintang areas, there are many people who cannot seriously carry
out the policy of having well-selected cadres working underground for a long
period, of accumulating strength and biding our time, because they underestimate
the gravity of the Kuomintang's anti-Communist policy. At the same time,
there are many others who cannot carry out the policy of expanding the united
front, because they over-simplify matters and consider the entire Kuomintang
to be quite hopeless and are therefore at a loss what to do. A similar state
of affairs exists in the Japanese-occupied areas.

In the Kuomintang areas and the anti-Japanese base areas, the Rightist views
which were once prevalent to a serious extent have now been basically overcome;
those who held such views used to stress alliance to the exclusion of struggle
and overestimate the Kuomintang's inclination to resist Japan, and they therefore
blurred the difference in principle between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party, rejected the policy of independence and initiative within the united
front, appeased the big landlords and big bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang,
and tied their own hands instead of boldly expanding the anti-Japanese
revolutionary forces and conducting resolute struggle against the Kuomintang's
policy of opposing and restricting the Communist Party. But since the winter
of 1939 an ultra-Left tendency has cropped up in many places as a result
of the anti-Communist "friction" engineered by the Kuomintang and of the
struggles we have waged in self-defence. This tendency has been corrected
to some extent but not altogether, and it still finds expression in concrete
policies in many places. It is therefore most necessary for us to examine
and define our concrete policies now.

As the Central Committee has already issued a series of directives on concrete
policies, now only a few points are given here by way of summary.

The organs of political power. The "three thirds system",
under which Communists have only one-third of the places in the organs of
political power and many non-Communists are drawn into participation, must
be carried out resolutely. In areas like northern Kiangsu, where we have
just begun to establish anti-Japanese democratic political power, the proportion
of Communists may be even less than one-third. The representatives of the
petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry who
are not actively opposed to the Communist Party must be drawn into participation
both in the government and in the people's representative bodies, and those
Kuomintang members who do not oppose the Communist Party must also be allowed
to participate. Even a small number of right-wingers may be allowed to join
the people's representative bodies. On no account should our Party monopolize
everything. We are not destroying the dictatorship of the big comprador
bourgeoisie and the big landlord class in order to replace it with a one-party
dictatorship of the Communist Party.

Labour policy. The livelihood of the workers must be improved
if their enthusiasm in the fight against Japan is to be fully aroused. But
we must strictly guard against being ultra-Leftist; there must not be excessive
increases in wages or excessive reductions in working hours. Under present
conditions, the eight-hour working day cannot be universally introduced in
China and a ten-hour working day should still be permitted in certain branches
of production. In other branches of production the working day should be
axed according to the circumstances. Once a contract between labour and capital
is concluded, the workers must observe labour discipline and the capitalists
must be allowed to make some profit. Otherwise factories will close down,
which will neither help the war nor benefit the workers. Particularly in
the rural areas, the living standards and wages of the workers should not
be raised too high, or it will give rise to complaints from the peasants,
create unemployment among the workers and result in a decline in production.

Land policy. It must be explained to Party members and to
the peasants that this is not the time for a thorough agrarian revolution
and that the series of measures taken during the Agrarian Revolution cannot
be applied today. On the one hand, our present policy should stipulate that
the landlords shall reduce rent and interest, for this serves to arouse the
enthusiasm of the basic peasant masses for resistance to Japan, but the
reductions should not be too great. In general, land rent should be reduced
by 25 per cent, and if the masses demand a greater reduction, the tenant-farmer
may keep up to 60 or 70 per cent of his crop, but not more. The reduction
in interest on loans should not be so great as to render credit transactions
impossible. On the other hand, our policy should stipulate that the peasants
shall pay rent and interest and that the landlords shall retain their ownership
of land and other property. Interest should not be so low as to make it
impossible for the peasants to obtain loans, nor the settlement of old accounts
be such as to enable the peasants to get back their mortgaged land gratis.

Tax policy. Taxes must be levied according to income. Except
for the very poor who should be exempt, all people with an income shall pay
taxes to the state, which means that the burden shall be carried by more
than 80 per cent of the population, including the workers and peasants, and
not be placed entirely on the landlords and the capitalists. Arresting people
and imposing fines on them as a means of financing the army must be forbidden.
We may use the existing Kuomintang system of taxation with appropriate
alterations until we have devised a new and more suitable one.

Anti-espionage policy. We must firmly suppress the confirmed
traitors and anti-Communists, or otherwise we shall not be able to protect
the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces. But there must not be too much killing,
and no innocent person should be incriminated. Vacillating elements and reluctant
followers among the reactionaries should be dealt with leniently. Corporal
punishment must be abolished in trying criminals; the stress must be on the
weight of evidence and confessions should not be taken on trust. Our policy
towards prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet or anti-communist troops
is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred
of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence
has been approved by the higher authorities. Among the prisoners, those who
were coerced into joining the reactionary forces but who are more or less
inclined towards the revolution should be won over in large numbers to work
for our army. The rest should be released and, if they fight us and are captured
again, should again be set free. We should not insult them, take away their
personal effects or try to exact recantations from them, but without exception
should treat them sincerely and kindly. This should be our policy, however
reactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the hard
core of reaction. As for renegades, except for those who have committed heinous
crimes, they should be given a chance to turn over a new leaf provided they
discontinue their anti-Communist activities; and if they come back and wish
to rejoin the revolution they may be accepted, but must not be re-admitted
into the Party. The general run of Kuomintang intelligence agents must not
be identified with the Japanese spies and Chinese traitors; the two should
be differentiated and handled accordingly. An end should be put to the state
of confusion in which any governmental or non-governmental organization can
make arrests. To establish revolutionary order in the interests of the war,
it must be stipulated that, with the exception of army units in combat action,
only government judicial or public security agencies shall be empowered to
make arrests.

The rights of the people. It must be laid down that all landlords
and capitalists not opposed to the War of Resistance shall enjoy the same
rights of person and property, the same right to vote and the same freedom
of speech, assembly, association, political conviction and religious belief
as the workers and peasants. The government shall take action only against
saboteurs and those who organize riots in our base areas, and shall protect
all others and not molest them.

Economic policy. We must actively develop industry and
agriculture and promote the circulation of commodities. Capitalists should
be encouraged to come into our anti-Japanese base areas and start enterprises
here if they so desire. Private enterprise should be encouraged and state
enterprise regarded as only one sector of the economy. The purpose in all
this is to achieve self-sufficiency. Care must be taken not to damage any
useful enterprise. Both our tariff and our monetary policies should conform
to our basic line of expanding agriculture, industry and commerce, and not
run counter to it. The essential factor in maintaining the base areas over
a long period is the achievement of self-sufficiency through a conscientious
and meticulous, not a crude and careless, organization of the economy.

Cultural and educational policy. This should centre on promoting
and spreading the knowledge and skills needed for the war and a sense of
national pride among the masses of the people. Bourgeois liberal educators,
men of letters, journalists, scholars and technical experts should be allowed
to come to our base areas and co-operate with us in running schools and
newspapers and doing other work. We should accept into our schools all
intellectuals and students who show enthusiasm for resisting Japan, give
them short-term training, and then assign them to work in the army, the
government, or mass organizations; we should boldly draw them in, give them
work and promote them. We should not be over-cautious or too afraid of
reactionaries sneaking in. Unavoidably, some such elements will creep in,
but there will be time to comb them out in the course of study and work.
Every base area must establish printing shops, publish books and newspapers
and organize distribution and delivery agencies. Every base area must also,
as far as possible, set up big schools for training cadres, and the more
and bigger, the better.

Military policy. There must be maximum expansion of the Eighth
Route and New Fourth Armies, because they are the most reliable armed forces
of the Chinese people in pressing on with the national war of resistance.
We should continue our policy of never attacking the Kuomintang troops unless
attacked and do all we can to make friends with them. In order to help the
building up of our army, no effort should be spared to draw those officers
who are sympathetic to us into the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, whether
they are members of the Kuomintang or are without party affiliation. Something
must be done now to change the situation where Communists dominate everything
in our armies by sheer numbers. Of course, the "three thirds system" should
not be introduced into our main forces, but so long as the leadership of
the army is kept in the hands of the Party (this is an absolute and inviolable
necessity), we need not be afraid of drawing large numbers of sympathizers
into the work of building up the military and technical departments of our
army. Now that the ideological and organizational foundations of our Party
and our army have been firmly laid, not only is there no danger in drawing
in large numbers of sympathizers (not saboteurs of course) but it is indeed
an indispensable policy, for otherwise it will be impossible to win the sympathy
of the whole country and expand our revolutionary forces.

All these tactical principles for the united front and the concrete policies
formulated in accordance with them must be firmly applied by the whole
Party. At a time when the Japanese invaders are intensifying their aggression
against China and when the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are pursuing
high-handed policies and launching armed attacks against the Communist Party
and the people, the application of the tactical principles and concrete policies
outlined above is the only way to press on with the War of Resistance, broaden
the united front, win the sympathy of the whole people and bring about a
turn for the better in the situation. In rectifying errors, however, we must
proceed step by step, and must not be so hasty as to cause discontent among
the cadres, suspicion among the masses, counter-attacks by the landlords,
or other undesirable developments.

NOTES


1. Wang Yi-tang was a big bureaucrat in the period of the
Northern warlords and a pro-Japanese traitor. He was recalled from retirement
by Chiang Kai-shek after the Northern China Incident of 1935 to serve in
the Kuomintang government. In 1938, he served as a Japanese puppet in northern
China and was made chairman of the bogus Northern China Political Council.

2. Shih Yu-san was a Kuomintang warlord who frequently
changed sides. He was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's 10th Army Group
after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, collaborated with the Japanese
armed forces in southern Hopei and did nothing but attack the Eighth Route
Army, destroy organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power and slaughter
Communists and progressives.


Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.