To the Central China Bureau, the Southeastern Bureau, the Northern Bureau, the Shandong Sub-bureau, the Southern Bureau, the Southern Committee [1], and the commanders of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army:  (1) Chiang Kai-shek has already decided to dispatch Li Xianzhou, Tang Enbo, and Li Pinxian [2] to launch an offensive against our forces in Central China and Shandong. The troops under Tang and Li are currently advancing eastward. Our Party and our army have the task of waging a just self-defense struggle to defeat this offensive and improve the overall situation.
(2) In addition to ordering the Jiangnan units to move north without delay and dispatching a contingent from North China to reinforce our forces in Central China, all Party organizations and military units in Central China and Shandong must be urgently mobilized to fight for the preservation of the anti-Japanese base areas and to repel the stubborn elements’ offensive.
(3) With regard to military command, until General Ye Ting arrives in northern Jiangsu, unified command shall be exercised by Deputy Commander-in-Chief Chen Yi and Political Commissar Liu Shaoqi; upon Ye Ting’s arrival in northern Jiangsu, unified command will be vested in Ye Ting, Chen Yi, and Liu Shaoqi. All units must fully obey their orders [3] and may not fail to comply.
(4) The Shandong Sub-bureau is placed under the jurisdiction of the Central China Bureau, which will exercise unified leadership over both Shandong and Central China.
(5) Throughout the country—North China, Central China, Northwest China, Southwest China, and Southeast China—there must be resolute opposition to the Kuomintang’s current offensive and its policy of high-pressure rule nationwide.
It must be pointed out that the danger of the Kuomintang’s actions lies in their ever-increasing erosion of the anti-Japanese resistance. This is detrimental not only to the Communist Party but even more so to the Kuomintang itself and to the entire Chinese people; it serves only the interests of the enemy and the pro-Japanese faction. If left unchecked, it will inevitably escalate into a nationwide civil war.
Considering that many soldiers in the anti-Communist forces are unwilling to fight, that most cadres are acting under duress, and that numerous senior generals remain wavering, we should not only focus on striking at these forces but also on winning them over, on strengthening the united front, and on employing flexible tactics.
(6) It is anticipated that the anti-Communist forces may advance under the slogan of “fighting the Japanese behind enemy lines,” without explicitly targeting the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army. Therefore, whether our forces should engage immediately upon the commencement of their attack or adopt a strategy of “courtesy first, then force” remains a matter worthy of careful consideration.
On this point, the Central Committee will issue instructions in due course, and you are encouraged to submit your views.
(7) Given that the struggle in Central China will be a protracted one and cannot be resolved in the short term, the campaign against friction must be closely integrated with efforts to expand and consolidate our base areas and to strengthen our armed forces.
In the course of this struggle, we should gradually weaken the anti-Communist forces while simultaneously building up and tempering our own strength, ultimately defeating the enemy.
Accordingly, we must address this situation with utmost urgency yet also formulate a long-term, patient plan, avoiding undue haste and any attempt to achieve complete victory within a brief period.
(8) Taking into account various international and domestic conditions, it is evident that the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist offensive and its policy of high pressure are doomed to failure and have no future. Therefore, the entire Party and the entire army must bolster their confidence in ultimate victory, refusing to be intimidated by the Kuomintang’s aggression and oppressive measures, and overcoming any potential pessimism.
(9) At present, the Central China Bureau’s task is to actively make preparations and marshal forces to crush this offensive, while the Southern Bureau’s task is to exploit existing contradictions to shake Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang’s resolve.
Although Chiang and the Kuomintang are launching this offensive with great fanfare, they are in fact deeply fearful of civil war and of a complete rupture of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC; hence, their resolve remains susceptible to动摇.
(10) In response to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang’s urgent demands for us to state our final position, we should reply with calm indifference. Following the issuance of the joint order from Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang Jia [4] and the telegraph [5], regardless of how they may hurl insults or intensify their attacks, the Central Committee and Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang will temporarily ignore them, allowing matters to reach a point where public outrage mounts and Chiang finds himself unable to maintain face. Only then will we publicly declare our stance.
This approach differs from that of lower-level and local Party organizations, which should express their positions as appropriate; nevertheless, it constitutes an effective method for dealing with the Kuomintang at present.
Since Chiang Kai-shek is anxious, we need not be.
Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript by the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
Notes [1] The Southern Committee refers to the Southern Working Committee of the CPC Central Committee.
[2] Li Xianzhou (1894–1988), from Qihe County, Shandong Province, was at the time commander of the Kuomintang’s 92nd Army. Tang Enbo was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang’s 31st Group Army. Li Pinxian served as deputy commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang’s Fifth War Zone and concurrently as commander-in-chief of the 21st Group Army, as well as chairman of the Anhui Provincial Government of the Kuomintang.
[3] The positions of Ye Ting, Chen Yi, and Liu Shaoqi mentioned here refer to their posts in the General Command Headquarters of the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army in Central China. This headquarters was established in mid-November 1940 pursuant to directives issued by the CPC Central Committee aimed at unifying command over the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army in Central China.
[4] Refers to Chiang Kai-shek’s telegraphic order dated December 9, 1940, mandating that the New Fourth Army south of the Yangtze River relocate to areas north of the river by December 31, and that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army south of the Yellow River move to regions north of the Yellow River by January 30, 1941.
[5] The “Jia telegram” refers to the joint reply sent on November 9, 1940, by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi. See pages 310–314 of this volume.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 603-6, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.