Speech at the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China[1]

(December 4, 1940)

At present, there is a possibility of easing the friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. On November 30, Chiang Kai-shek sent someone to talk with Zhou Enlai, stating that the time for the Jiangnan troops to move out could be delayed and demanding that our army cease attacking them. Hu Zongnan’s attitude toward our army has also improved. Now, minor conflicts are unavoidable, but a major war will not occur. Japan’s policy is to recognize Wang Jingwei and overthrow the Chiang regime, but there is still a possibility of cooperation between Japan and Chiang. Japan may first close the main door (i.e., advance south to occupy the seaports) and then sweep the house (i.e., attack Chongqing, etc.), or it may first attack China’s interior. Looking back now, the view that the danger of U.S. inducement to surrender had passed after Konoe took office was correct. When the Guomindang advocated joining the Anglo-American bloc, our propaganda against joining the Anglo-American bloc was correct, but as a policy it was incorrect; both the Chongqing and Yan’an sides had shortcomings. Last year’s anti-friction war achieved a great victory, establishing base areas in various parts of Central China and expanding our army to 500,000 men. With the experience gained last time, Chiang Kai-shek does not dare to launch a large-scale "suppression of the Communists" this time. In addition, there are external reasons, such as the Wang Agreement, British and U.S. aid to China, and the Soviet Union’s policy, which make it difficult for Chiang to surrender. Within Chiang’s ruling circle, there are also contradictions between the pro-European-American faction and the pro-Japanese faction. Our Party has experienced three periods in its history.

[1] Part One is a portion of Mao Zedong’s speech on the current situation at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; Part Two is a portion of Mao Zedong’s speech delivered after listening to the speeches of Chen Shaoyu, Qin Bangxian, Kang Sheng, Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, and others at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

At the end of the Great Revolution, Chen Duxiu advocated uniting with everyone and ordered the suppression of the worker and peasant movements. In the Soviet period, during the initial uprisings, the policy of overthrowing everyone was implemented, which was corrected by the time of the Sixth Congress. But by the end of the Soviet period, it was again overthrowing everyone, estimating at that time that it was a decisive battle between the two paths of Soviets and colonies. The policy of eliminating rich peasants and small landlords was implemented, creating a Red-White antagonism. This "Left" policy caused the loss of nine-tenths of the army, and the loss in the Soviet areas was more than nine-tenths; all that remained was the Northern Shaanxi Soviet Area. In reality, the losses were even greater than during the Li Lisan line. The Zunyi Conference resolution only stated it was a military error, not a line error; in fact, it was a line error, so the Zunyi Conference resolution needs some revision. In the late Soviet period, the tide of the agrarian revolution ebbed, but the tide of the national revolution surged. The things of "uniting with everyone" and "overthrowing everyone" in these two past periods were indeed not Marxism-Leninism. The people in charge at the time considered them Marxism-Leninism, but in reality, these were all absolutism. Now our united front line is one of both uniting and struggling, not absolute uniting or struggling. On the issue of resisting Japan, we both support and struggle against the Guomindang. On the issue of opposing communism, there is also a distinction between the present and the future, that is, opposing communism also has its high and low tides. Before the fall of Wuhan, the Guomindang army retreated in disarray, and we could develop greatly when the Japanese army attacked and in areas close to the Japanese army. Therefore, the method toward Chiang should have been to act first and report afterward (e.g., Wang Zhen’s brigade going to Suide and Mizhi), or to act without reporting. This viewpoint is currently not understood only by Xiang Ying’s area, hence the army there has developed little. The Central Committee’s directive on the question of intellectuals was issued too late. On the issues of establishing political power and absorbing intellectuals, we once missed some opportunities. Our general political principle is to struggle within unity, and to unite within struggle; it is independence within unity, with unity as the primary aspect and independence as the secondary. Independent and self-reliant mountain guerrilla warfare; strategically, unified mountain guerrilla warfare is independent, that is, independent and self-reliant mountain guerrilla warfare within unity. We must prepare to summarize the united front policy (general policy), labor policy, land policy, anti-traitor policy, cultural policy, cadre policy, and organizational policy within political power, and propose the establishment of committees to take responsibility. The July 7 Resolution criticized the "Left" errors but did not give clear instructions on various specific issues.

Speech at the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

II

Summarizing past experience serves as an education for both those who made mistakes and those who did not. Understanding past mistakes can prevent repeating them in the future. The tendencies since the War of Resistance began were "Left" deviation in the early period of the united front (advocating opposition between the Soviets and the Guomindang), a period of Right deviation after the Guomindang-Communist cooperation, and again "Left" deviation after the anti-friction struggle. The December 1937 Conference denied the policy of independence and self-reliance and put forward the erroneous slogan "Everything must pass through the united front," which was not rescinded until the Sixth Plenary Session. On the question of strategy, the Luochuan Conference established independent and self-reliant mountain guerrilla warfare, but comrades at the front did not comply, and it was only correctly resolved by the December Conference and the Sixth Plenary Session. In summarizing past experiences and lessons, we should generally divide them into three periods: the Great Revolution, the Soviet period, and the War of Resistance. The overall error was not understanding the protracted and uneven nature of the Chinese revolution. At the end of the Soviet period, many "Left" errors were made because Marxism-Leninism was not integrated with reality. In summarizing various policies, regulations must be worked out. As for the assessment of the current situation, the tendency toward surrender has decreased (this time surrender was checked), and the anti-communist high tide has begun to recede (anti-communism will come again in the future). Song Ziwen may come to power; this is what is meant by the possibility of an improvement in the situation.