To Xiang Ying Regarding Whether the
New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui Has
Made Various Preparations to Cope with
Sudden Emergencies

(December 3, 1940)

Please tell me what you think concerning the following:
1. When under attack by certain forces, do the military department and the
southern Anhui troops have concrete ways to break through the enemy encirclement and avoid severe losses? With regard to these ways, is it more advantageous
to move southward to wage guerrilla warfare or to join forces eastward with Chen
Yi? Is it absolutely impossible to move northward by crossing the River?
2. Are the cadres within the Party fully prepared psychologically to confront
the possible attack by a certain force?
3. Are there any high-ranking and middle-ranking progressive officials and troops
among the friendly armies in southern Anhui and the regions south of the Yangzi
who, determined to resist Japan and sympathetic with our Party, during a sudden
emergency might provide cover for our troops or act in concert with our troops?
How is our united front work among the friendly armies nearby?
4. What is the intention of a certain party [i.e., the Guomindang] in the Third
War Zone? What is the attitude of the Central forces, such as Gu Zhutong, and so

--- Notes

on? What is Huang Shaoxiong's¹ attitude? Has the local Party, under the leadership of the Southeastern Bureau, made mental and practical preparations to deal
with sudden incidents by reserving cadres and preserving strength?