All Our Units in Southern Anhui Must Move
Away by the End of December
(November 24, 1940, 2:00 A.M.)
Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:
1. You must prepare to complete moving away all troops by the end of December.
2. Xiyi [Ye Ting] must lead one unit to set out at once.
3. Everything must be completely taken care of within twenty days.
Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 585, where it is reproduced
from Mao's handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives.
The Essence of Chiang Kaishek's Current
Anti-Communist Policies and
Our Basic Orientation
(November 30, 1940, between 1:00 and 3:00 A.M.)

To Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying], and for transmittal to [Peng] Dehuai, Hu Fu
[Liu Shaoqi], and Xiang Ying:

We have taken note of your telegram of the 29th. This time our plan is to send two
telegrams. One is to He Yingqin, specifically asking him his rationale for halting
distribution of military provisions [to us]. This telegram was already dispatched
directly to He yesterday and is being sent at the same time to you and in a circular
telegram to the whole nation. Please let us know when you receive it. The other
telegram is to Chiang [Kaishek]. I hesitated over this for two days, but, after receiving your telegram, decided to send it out today, also directly to Chiang and to
you as well, and then dispatch a circular telegram after a slight delay. This time
Chiang, He, and Bai [Chongxi] all worked hand in glove, using such measures as
the telegram of [October] 19th, transferring troops, halting provisions, manipulating the atmosphere, and threatening our liaison offices. All were aimed at frightening us into making concessions, and they actually have no other magic weapons.
Li Renchao's estimate is absolutely correct and is what we have always said, which
is that they can neither surrender nor "suppress the Communists." This possibility
still exists. He only has scare tactics-he is trying to scare Japan, and he is trying
to scare us too. Except for these hooligan's tricks, he has no other way out. Chiang's
current characteristic is lack of stability both internally and externally (beset by
both internal and external crises). Under his rule, nothing is stable, be it military
and political affairs, financial and economic matters, culture, or popular sentiment. These crises are unprecedented in Chiang's history, and this is the internal
instability. He has no line of defense against the enemy or against us, and this is the
external instability. For the purposes of resolving these crises and stabilizing the
internal and external lines of defense, they have formed the alliance of Chiang,
Guangxi, and He (the anti-Communist united front of the big bourgeoisie, whereas
He and Bai have other objectives). Their central strategy is an offensive defense or

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 586-88, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.


pursuing the goal of defense through the use of offensive measures, but absolutely
not an overall strategic offensive, because this is impossible. All their scare tactics
and possible partial attacks against us have an offensive character. And they are
building blockade lines along the Jing River, the Wei River, the Yellow River, the
Huai River, and the Huainan railroad to achieve their goal of strengthening external lines of defense, so as to create an anti-Communist atmosphere, restrict our
activities, organize an anti-Communist alliance (on the basis of the alliance of
Chiang, Guangxi, and He), and achieve their goal of strengthening the internal
lines of defense. He is able to accomplish both of these things, which broadly
speaking means achieving his goal of defense. In essence, Chiang is the same as
he was in the past. He remains unchanged. He still has the dual policy of resisting
Japan and opposing the Communists, but toward Japan he is absolutely on the
defensive (no offensive position whatsoever), while toward us he maintains an
offensive position of defense. Thus the three points of (1) instability, (2) a dual
policy, and (3) offensive defense sum up Chiang's essence at present. Under these
circumstances, our basic orientation is one of outward moderation but resistance
in reality, some softness and some hardness, and giving tit for tat. Moderation is to
win over the masses; resistance is to protect ourselves. Softness is to give him a
chance to save face; hardness is to strike fear into his heart. As regards actual troop
movements, only two regiments of the 115th Division will be involved; the rest
will not be moved at all. But there should still be active preparations everywhere.
Apart from dealing with local attacks, over 70,000 crack troops can be moved at
any time to inflict a fierce and heavy blow on anyone who dares to launch a large-scale attack against us. The better prepared we are, the less likely they are to attack
us, in accordance with the principle that where there is precaution, there is no
danger. In reality, the scale of this anti-Communist attack cannot be greater than
last time, but only smaller, because we have become stronger and they have become weaker. This last point should not be passed down to lower levels, to avoid
laxity at lower levels. Feng Yuxiang's estimate is wrong. The idea that, if provoked, he will tear off his mask and strike out at random emanates from those who
are frightened by Chiang's hooligans. Actually, Chiang is someone who excels at
making calculations. He uses his hooligans only to scare people, but not to make
policy.

Mao Zedong

To Zhou Wen¹
(November 30, 1940)

Comrade Zhou Wen:

I have read both *Qunzhong bao* and *Dazhong xizuo*.² Your work is significant and
fruitful, and all of us are very pleased.

The characters on the cover of *Dazhong xizuo* are not very well written. How
would it be if you could please have them redone?

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 165, where it is reproduced from
the manuscript.
1. Zhou Wen (1907-1952), original name He Kairong, was a native of Sichuan. After
arriving in Yan'an in 1940, he became head of the Education Department of the border
region government and head of the Society for Reading Materials for the Broad Masses.
2. The newspaper referred to here as *Qunzhong bao* (The Masses) is the *Bianqu qunzhong
bao* (Border Region Masses), launched in March 1940 and aimed at a mass readership of
workers and peasants. *Dazhong xizuo* (Exercises in Composition for the Broad Masses),
first published in August 1940, was a periodical intended to provide guidance to basic-level
correspondents and beginning writers in improving their writing skills. Both were produced by the Society for Reading Materials for the Broad Masses.