On Smashing Chiang Kai-shek’s Anti-Communist Plot[1]

(November 21, 1940)

1. So long as Chiang Kai-shek has not compromised with Japan, a large-scale “communist suppression” campaign is impossible. All his actions are meant to intimidate us into making concessions. The issuance of the “Hao Telegram” was intimidation; He’s speech at the memorial week was intimidation; Tang and Li’s[2] eastward advance was intimidation; Hu Zongnan’s concentration of four divisions to attack the Guanzhong area was intimidation; the order for Li Kenong to withdraw the liaison office was intimidation. He may yet stage other intimidating acts. Apart from intimidation, he has one other magic weapon, namely blockade; beyond these, he has no other reliable methods (of course, attacks on Zhang Yunyi and Peng Xuefeng are possible). Many middle-of-the-roaders have been cowed by him and are one after another demanding that we make concessions. We must skillfully present our arguments to reassure them.

Except for the conciliatory tone expressed in the article “Jia Telegram” and a minor concession regarding a small area in southern Anhui (in fact, we had long intended to move north, but now we deliberately want to delay it for another one or two months), we shall not yield an inch of territory elsewhere. Any attackers will be smashed. We have now prepared an iron hammer, and as soon as the political conditions are ripe, we must deal him a heavy blow. At present, all our propaganda articles are aimed at bringing about the ripening of these political conditions.

2. Apart from He Yingqin’s separate schemes (to instigate civil war), Chiang Kai-shek must have secretly informed Bai Chongxi of his magic weapon (intimidating the Communists into concessions). That is why Bai is making such a great show of it. In reality, Bai does not want to fight

[1] This is the main content of a telegram from Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Xiang Ying, Liu Shaoqi, and Peng Dehuai.

[2] Tang refers to Tang Enbo, then Commander-in-Chief of the 31st Group Army of the Kuomintang forces. Li refers to Li Pinxian, then Chairman of the Anhui Provincial Government of the Kuomintang and Deputy Commander of the 5th War Zone of the Kuomintang forces.

and is very afraid of a real fight breaking out. We should exploit this weakness to intimidate Bai. As for all those besides Bai who try to intimidate us, I should turn my own magic weapons against them to intimidate them in return. These magic weapons include: how the lower-ranking officers and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are seething with indignation; their requests for transfer south; the fact that we have not issued ammunition for fourteen months; the lack of food in North China; how the eastward advance of Tang and Li will inevitably provoke a major clash; how peace in northern Jiangsu will inevitably be shattered; the severe famine in northern Shaanxi this year; the starving people demanding to move elsewhere to find food, and so on.

These are all political offensives, and they should also be directed at those naive middle-of-the-roaders, to make them anxious and thereby influence that scoundrel Chiang Kai-shek.

3. Hu Zongnan has already issued orders to the 28th Division, the 24th Division, the Provisional 3rd Division, and the 8th Division to prepare for an attack on the gourd-shaped zone between the three points of Yijun, Chunhua, and Zhengning. A sudden attack will probably come within one or two weeks. Commander-in-Chief Zhu has already telegraphed Hu Zongnan ordering him to stop it, while on our side we are preparing a portion of our forces to strike back at him. As soon as Hu launches his attack, we shall initiate a local battle in northern Jiangsu in retaliation. For the purpose of cutting off Han and Huo and opening up the route between Anhui and Jiangsu, we shall suddenly capture a piece of territory between Huaiyin and Baoying. If successful, Huo will surely improve his attitude, and Han will be forced to submit. The direct justification for this is that Huo Shouyi[1] attacked our Peng Mingzhi, and Mo Dehong[2] attacked our Zhang Yunyi. We must immediately publicize this justification.

4. Only by combining soft and hard tactics, employing both simultaneously, can we smash Chiang Kai-shek’s schemes, check Yingqin’s capitulation, and win over the middle-of-the-roaders to our side. Relying solely on soft tactics or solely on hard tactics will not achieve the objective.

[1] Huo Shouyi, then Commander of the 112th Division of the 57th Army of the Kuomintang forces.

[2] Mo Dehong, then Commander of the 138th Division of the 48th Army of the Kuomintang forces.