Operational Deployment in Northern Jiangsu[1]

(November 19, 1940)

Hu, Chen, Huang, and inform Ye, Xiang[2]:

Your telegram of the 18th received. (1) There is a possibility of changes in the overall situation. We are striving to halt the offensive by Tang and Li[3].

(2) Your general policy for the immediate short term is to actively consolidate the troops and calmly observe changes while awaiting the opportune moment. As long as the army can fight, passivity can be transformed into initiative, as proven by the Huangqiao Campaign. (3) The main force of the Fifth Column must be positioned between the armies of Han and Huo[4] to sever their communications. Under no circumstances should they be allowed to link up. If this can be achieved, the attitude of Division Commander Huo will improve, and Han Deqin will also be brought to heel. (4) To achieve this objective, you should immediately prepare for a local engagement, namely, using the main force of the Fifth Column to set out from Donggou and Yilin, suddenly attack and occupy the two points of Fenggucun and Cheqiao, and then proceed to attack and occupy the areas of Pingqiao, Yangnian, Huangpu, and Anfeng, thereby opening up the connection between Eastern Anhui and Northern Jiangsu. Preparations must be completed within five days upon receipt of this telegram,

[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, to Hu Fu (Liu Shaoqi), Deputy Commander of the General Headquarters of the New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army in Central China, and Commander and Political Commissar of the Northern Jiangsu General Headquarters of the New Fourth Army and concurrently Commander and Political Commissar of the Fifth Column of the Eighth Route Army, Huang Kecheng.

[2] Ye refers to Ye Ting, then Commander of the New Fourth Army. Xiang refers to Xiang Ying, then Secretary of the New Fourth Army Sub-Commission of the CPC Central Committee and Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army.

[3] Tang refers to Tang Enbo, then Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s 31st Group Army. Li refers to Li Pinxian, then Chairman of the Kuomintang Anhui Provincial Government and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s Fifth War Zone.

[4] The armies of Han and Huo refer to the 89th Army under Han Deqin, Commander-in-Chief of the First Guerrilla Zone of the Kuomintang’s Jiangsu-Shandong War Zone, and the 112th Division of the 57th Army under Division Commander Huo Shouyi.

awaiting the order to attack. Currently, Hu Zongnan[1] is concentrating four divisions in preparation for an offensive against our Guanzhong Border Region. Once Hu launches his attack, we will have justification to attack the aforementioned areas. The southward movement of Division Commander Huo and the eastward advance of Division Commander Mo[2] will serve as your direct justification. You, especially Kecheng, should concentrate your efforts on carrying out this engagement. (5) The fundamental policy remains to draw Han over to our side and resist Tang and Li. After the victory in the aforementioned engagement, there is a possibility that Han may be brought to heel. (6) West of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway[3], resolute guerrilla warfare should be initiated to resist the expansion of Mo Dehong. Competent personnel should be dispatched to take command. Luo Binghui[4] should return to Eastern Anhui immediately.

Mao, Zhu, Wang

19th, 21–23 hours

[1] Hu Zongnan, then Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s 34th Group Army.

[2] Division Commander Mo refers to the 138th Division of the Kuomintang’s 48th Army, under Division Commander Mo Dehong.

[3] The Tianjin-Pukou Railway refers to the railway from Tianjin to Pukou, now a section of the Beijing-Shanghai line.

[4] Luo Binghui, then Deputy Commander of the Jiangbei Command of the New Fourth Army and concurrently Commander of the Fifth Detachment.