Directive on Launching a Large-scale
Antisurrender and Anti-Civil War
Movement to Counter Chiang Kaishek's
Anti-Communist High Tide

(November 15, 1940)

1. In accordance with the Central Committee's November 7 directive on the
current situation and the political stance adopted in the "telegram of the 9th" in
reply to He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi], jointly signed by Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai],
Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying],¹ with regard to Chiang Kaishek's present anti-Communist attack, it has been decided to adopt a policy of concessions in southern Anhui (i.e., to move northward) and a policy of self-defense in Central China
and on a nationwide basis to launch a large-scale movement against surrender and
civil war. This is in order to win over the middle-of-the-road forces, to strike a
blow against the plots and provocations of He Yingqin's pro-Japanese faction, to
neutralize Chiang Kaishek's anti-Communist assault, and to keep the resistance to
Japan and the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party
going for a period of time so as to gain for ourselves a reasonable and favorable
position in the country as a whole.²
2. Chiang has already resolved to put pressure on Central China, so we must
therefore prepare ourselves actively for self-defense. But Chiang also faces some
difficulties in his attacks:
First, if we adopt a moderate attitude, He Yingqin will be deprived of a pretext
for his provocations (although other pretexts can always be found), and Chiang
Kaishek and Bai Chongxi will have to take into consideration the position of the
middle-of-the-road forces. For this reason we should make known very widely the

contents of the November 9 telegram so as to deprive Chiang, He, and Bai of their
political capital.
Second, Chiang Kaishek is very much afraid of the Eighth Route Army's moving southward and especially of our striking out suddenly from Xi'an. So we should
spread propaganda to the effect that, if the other side attacks the New Fourth Army,
the Eighth Route Army cannot sit idly by and watch without going to its rescue
and request that the other side halt the actions of their twenty-nine divisions, because otherwise the Eighth Route Army will not let the New Fourth Army take a
beating. This sort of attitude should be appropriately disseminated all around as an
offensive stance toward the diehards [X][X][X], so that they will have something
to fear and not dare act foolishly.
Third, Chiang Kaishek is afraid that we will not move from southern Anhui but,
rather, disrupt his rear area. For this reason we must, on the one hand, make earnest preparations for moving our southern Anhui troops northward so that this can
be offered as a condition in exchange for the other side to ease up on its attacks
and, at the same time, demand that the other side promise to halt all military actions in Central China in exchange for our side's withdrawal of its troops from
southern Anhui.
Fourth, both Chiang Kaishek and Gu Zhutong are afraid that we might wipe out
Han Deqin. Hence we should spread the following impression all over: that we
have resolved the Northern Jiangsu Incident peacefully in accordance with orders
and will let bygones be bygones, but if Tang [Enbo],³ Li [Pinxian],⁴ Huo (Shouyi),⁵
and Mo (Dehong)⁶ do not halt their attacks, we will have no choice but to attack
Han Deqin. This impression should be created especially by beginning directly
with Han himself and with Gu Zhutong, as an indication that we can continue to
protect Han Deqin's safety, but in exchange for halting the attacks of Tang, Li,
Huo, and Mo.
Fifth, Chiang Kaishek faces another difficulty in his attacks, which is that until
he has actually settled on any conditions with the Japanese (if conditions were
agreed upon, the whole situation would be greatly changed), his theater of operations for Communist suppression is full of inconveniences. His large forces advancing eastward will have difficulty getting through the two Japanese blockade
lines, the Huainan railroad and the Tianjin-Pukou railroad; his large forces advancing northward would also have trouble getting through the enemy's fortress at
Huohe and the enemy bases to the north. If they were to use only small units, such

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 207-9, where it is reproduced
from Wannan shibian.

1. See above, the translation of this text.

2. This directive was issued in the aftermath of the Communist victory at Huangqiao and
of the "October 19 message" it called forth, when the New Fourth Army north of the Yangzi
was seeking to calm the situation and consolidate its gains, and the danger to Xiang Ying
and the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui was growing. Mao is here offering to move the
southern forces north of the river in return for cessation of the Guomindang moves against
the improved position of the Communists in central and northern Jiangsu.


3. Regarding Tang Enbo, see above, the relevant note to the text of September 19, 1940.

4. Regarding Li Pinxian, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940.

5. Huo Shouyi, a native of Liaoning, had served under Zhang Xueliang and was a divisional commander in the Northeast Army.

6. Mo Dehong (1894-1951), a native of Guangxi, had participated in the Northern Expedition and in the campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Red Army.
He was the commander of the 138th Army.