Chungking, to General Yeh Chien-ying, Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army, for transmission to General Ho Ching-chih, Chief of the General Staff, and General Pai Chien-sheng, Deputy Chief of the General Staff:

A. Regarding operations:
B. Regarding defense areas:
C. Regarding organization:
Our army, isolated behind enemy lines, in order to achieve success in killing the enemy and fulfilling the strategic tasks assigned by the Supreme Command, has had no choice but to follow the principles set forth in the Three People's Principles and the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, arousing the masses and organizing guerrilla units, thereby exceeding the original authorized strength. This is an inevitable consequence of the relationship between tasks and organization. Yet, with a force of 500,000 men, we receive pay and provisions for only 45,000. Even a clever housewife cannot cook without rice, so we have had to seek assistance from the people. Thus, in areas behind enemy lines where there are enemy forces but no friendly troops, after driving out the enemy, we have established anti-Japanese political power and created anti-Japanese base areas, using the people's clothing and food to support the people's armed forces, resist the brutal enemy, and defend their own homeland. This is truly beyond reproach. Although we are thinly clad and poorly fed, fighting arduously and enduring all manner of hardships, the fact that we are not recognized by law and not supported by the rear areas causes immeasurable spiritual suffering. Hence, we have requested the Central Government to approve an expansion of our organization. The Central Government, in consideration of the facts, has agreed to a modest expansion, as indicated in the proposal. Our army was truly gratified to hear this. What we now request is that this be implemented promptly and that the authorized strength be somewhat increased, to comfort the hearts of the frontline officers and men and to cultivate a reliable force for the nation's resistance. This is not merely a case of "losing a bow to a Chu man and having it found by a Chu man," where there is no need for partiality; rather, it is precisely for the defense of the nation and the homeland that we rely on such capable defenders.

D. Regarding supplies:
The hardships behind enemy lines are as described above, and there is a particular shortage of ammunition, medical supplies, and other necessities. Our army has not received a single bullet or a single dose of medicine for fourteen months. Some rifles have only four or five rounds left, and some wounded men have only enough medicine for one or two applications. As a result, in battle we rely solely on hand-to-hand combat, and the wounded are left to their fate. Although we fully understand that the Central Government is also in a difficult position, the exceptional hardships of our army must be brought to your attention, in the hope of receiving even a modicum of assistance amid these difficulties. Other supply items have been listed in previous reports, and we respectfully request your consideration and instructions on all of them.

E. Regarding the border region:
The issue of the twenty-three counties of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region has remained unresolved for four years. Recently, over 200,000 troops have been stationed along the perimeter of the border region, mobilizing civilians to construct five blockade lines. Stretching from Ningsia in the west, along the Ching River in the south, to the riverbank in the east, spanning several provinces, this massive project has consumed enormous funds to build a "Great Wall" of blockade. Young students coming from afar to the north and personnel traveling to and from our army have been detained, secretly killed, or imprisoned in concentration camps. As a result, people along the roads are alarmed and suspicious, speculating either that a large-scale offensive is imminent or that preparations for compromise are underway. We find these rumors grating to the ear and exhausting to refute. Indeed, with the unresolved issue compounded by the blockade, it is no wonder that rumors arise, as "wind comes from an empty cave," giving rise to suspicion. It is only proper to request the Central Government to resolve the outstanding issue and halt the blockade, thereby dispelling the doubts of the military and civilians and strengthening the foundation of cooperation. This would require no more than a simple gesture.

F. Regarding the grand plan of unity and resistance:
We believe that the War of Resistance has now reached a critical moment, a once-in-a-millennium opportunity to strive for final victory. The situation of a prolonged and expanding imperialist war has taken shape, and the Japanese aggressors are busy dealing with the grave situation in the Pacific. If we can persist in the national policy of unity and resistance, avoiding compromise midway and averting the calamity of division, then our Chinese nation, under the leadership of our supreme leader and the Central Government, will surely find a path to independence and liberation. However, in view of the various intrigues and activities, both international and domestic, in recent months, we cannot refrain from speaking out. We have heard that the Japanese aggressors are maneuvering to induce China's surrender, employing both soft and hard tactics, combining inducements with pressure. Germany is adopting a policy of mediation, attempting to lure China into joining the Tripartite Alliance. Meanwhile, some elements within the country are instigating a so-called new anti-communist upsurge, attempting to clear the way for surrender. Through collusion between internal and external forces, they seek to end the War of Resistance with a so-called Sino-Japanese joint "suppression of the Communists," replacing the War of Resistance with civil war, independence with surrender, unity with division, and light with darkness. This scheme is extremely perilous and insidious. Word of it spreads along the roads, shocking and alarming all who hear it. The crisis of the current situation has never been as grave as it is today. We have fought on the battlefields, willing to sacrifice our lives without hesitation. If it benefits the nation, we would not refuse even ten thousand deaths. What we pray for is domestic unity, the avoidance of division, the continuation of the War of Resistance, and no change in national policy. Therefore, we strive to comply with the various points you have raised and intensify efforts to overcome the weaknesses of our subordinates. We also request the Central Government to clearly indicate its policy regarding the trend of the situation, reject international intrigues, curb domestic reactionary activities, and refute the talk of joint "suppression of the Communists," civil war, and surrender, so as to reassure the hearts of the entire nation's military and civilians. We further hope that politics will be improved, corruption eliminated, the people's livelihood adjusted, and the Three People's Principles implemented, so that the War of Resistance can be placed on a foundation of self-reliance. These matters concern the success or failure of the nation and the lives of generations to come. Feeling the danger in our hearts, we dare not refrain from speaking out. We respectfully request that you transmit this to the Generalissimo for his consideration and implementation. We await your instructions with the utmost anxiety and respect.

Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the 18th Group Army
Peng Teh-huai, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 18th Group Army
Yeh Ting, Commander of the New Fourth Army
Hsiang Ying, Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army
Jointly submitted on the 9th

Published according to the New China News of November 17, 1940, and revised according to Since the Sixth National Congress.

Notes
[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Tse-tung.
[2] This refers to the telegram sent by Chiang Kai-shek in the names of Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi on October 19, 1940 (Hao), to Chu Teh, Peng Teh-huai, and Yeh Ting. The telegram viciously slandered the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which were persisting in resistance behind enemy lines, and, based on the spirit of the Kuomintang's "Central Government Proposal" of July 16, peremptorily ordered the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army south of the Yellow River to withdraw to the north of the Yellow River within one month.
[3] Hao day, i.e., the 20th.
[4] For the incident in northern Kiangsu, see p. 301, n. 4 of this volume.
[5] Ma, i.e., the 21st.
[6] The incident in southern Shantung refers to the events in the summer of 1940 when the recalcitrant troops under Shen Hung-lieh created friction in the Laiwu, Yiyuan, and Mengyin areas of Shantung and attacked the Eighth Route Army's base areas at Huangchuang and Chishan, but were repulsed by the Eighth Route Army.
[7] This refers to the "Central Government Proposal" put forward by the Kuomintang on July 16, 1940. Its main contents were: abolishing the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and replacing it with the "Northern Shensi Administrative Office," under the leadership of the Shensi provincial government; reducing and restricting the defense areas of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army; and concentrating all the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army units operating south of the Yangtze River and throughout central China into the narrow area of Hopei and Chahar provinces north of the Yellow River.
[8] After the Lukouchiao Incident, Chiang Kai-shek made a speech at Lushan on July 17, 1937, in which he stated, "Once the war breaks out, every person, regardless of region or age, has the responsibility to defend the land and resist the enemy, and should be determined to sacrifice everything."
[9] This refers to Chiang Kai-shek's "Message to Compatriots in the Occupied Areas," published on August 13, 1938. It claimed that after thirteen months of resistance, victories had been achieved in four aspects: strategy, policy, morale, and diplomacy, and called on compatriots in the occupied areas to remain steadfast in their信念, not waver or fear, and struggle to the last breath.
[10] The Pingkiang Massacre refers to the incident on June 12, 1939, when the 27th Group Army of the Kuomintang, acting on Chiang Kai-shek's secret order, dispatched troops to surround the communications office of the New Fourth Army at Chiayi Town, Pingkiang, Hunan, and brutally killed six people, including Tu Cheng-kun, a staff officer of the New Fourth Army, and Lo Tzu-ming, a major general and adjutant of the Eighth Route Army. The Chüshan Massacre, also known as the Chukou Massacre or Chukou Incident, occurred on November 11, 1939, when over 1,800 reactionary armed forces of the Kuomintang from Chüshan, Hsin-yang, and Pi-yang counties in Honan besieged the留守 office of the New Fourth Army at Chukou Town, Chüshan County, and brutally killed more than 200 people, including wounded New Fourth Army cadres and soldiers, their dependents, and local civilians.

--- Notes

Your telegram of Hao (October 19) [2] has been received through Chief of Staff Yeh. In view of the gravity of the matter and the fact that the nation is at a critical juncture, we have, after repeated consultations by telegram, reached a unanimous opinion in the interest of the overall situation and the salvation of the nation. We hereby submit our reply and respectfully request your consideration and transmission to the Generalissimo for his instructions.


All units under our command have taken as their sole task adherence to the national policy, obedience to orders, and persistence in the War of Resistance. Over the past four years, we have resisted numerous enemy forces and recovered vast lost territories. Our achievements are evident to all our countrymen and have been commended by the Generalissimo in his successive orders. For instance, the current Hundred-Regiment Campaign in North China, which began on the 20th of August [3], has now lasted two and a half months and is entering its second stage. The Generalissimo has issued orders commending us most warmly, and the entire army is deeply moved. Similarly, the campaigns in eastern and southern Anhwei, which smashed enemy offensives, are also recent events. We do not presume to boast of our achievements but merely wish to demonstrate that our determination to adhere to the national policy, obey orders, and fight to the end in defense of the nation is thoroughly implemented throughout the army, without the slightest deviation. However, there have been some incidents of friction between certain units of our army and those of other armies, as mentioned in your telegram, which are truly distressing. The causes of these incidents and the measures for their elimination have been repeatedly stated by us in previous reports. Regarding the recent incident in northern Kiangsu [4], we have already reported in detail to the Generalissimo in our telegram of the 21st [5]. The incident in southern Shantung [6] also has complex causes that deserve serious attention. In addition to ordering the units in those areas to obey your commands and restrain their actions, we propose that the Central Government dispatch impartial officials to conduct a thorough investigation. If the fault lies with our troops, we will not shield them and are willing to accept punishment under national law. If the fault lies with others, we also request that the matter be handled according to the circumstances to clarify responsibility. As the ancients said, "Listen to both sides and you will be enlightened; heed only one side and you will be benighted." Justice lies in fairness. Moreover, in the exceptionally arduous conditions of resistance behind enemy lines, every instance of friction adds to the difficulties. No one who cares for the overall situation and does not specialize in fomenting friction would fail to wish for the elimination of disputes and unity against the enemy. Therefore, we advocate a thorough investigation to determine the rights and wrongs, with the aim of permanently preventing disputes and facilitating the War of Resistance. If you agree, we request that this be implemented.


The measures listed in the Central Government's proposal [7] were conveyed by Comrade Chou En-lai in July and August. We understand that the Central Government's intentions must be obeyed, but the difficulties of our subordinates should also be made known to the higher authorities. Most of the units in central China behind enemy lines were organized by local people to resist the enemy and defend their homeland. With their ancestral graves, fields, homes, parents, wives, and children in these areas, it is extremely difficult for them to disregard the atrocities of the enemy—rape, arson, and plunder—and move far away to North China. They are wholeheartedly following the instructions given by the Generalissimo in his Lushan speech [8] and his message to compatriots in the occupied areas [9], without any deviation. To suddenly order them to leave their homes and force them on the road would be a tragic affair. Since the Pingkiang and Chüshan massacres [10], the rear areas of the New Fourth Army, such as southern Kiangsi, western Fukien, the Hunan-Kiangsi border region, eastern Hupeh, western Anhwei, and southern Honan, have seen their dependents and留守 personnel subjected to brutal persecution without any protection. Now, with the order for the units in central China to move north, they fear a repetition of past tragedies and are terrified at the mere mention of it. Furthermore, in North China, the five calamities of flood, drought, wind, insects, and the enemy are equally severe. People are eating tree leaves, and corpses of starvation victims line the roads. The local military and civilian population already find it extremely difficult to sustain themselves, with some requesting to move south and others asking for transfers. We have been trying hard to restrain them and urge them to endure, but it is truly difficult to accommodate additional troops. For these reasons, we asked Comrade Chou En-lai to convey to the Central Government our request to allow the units north and south of the Yangtze River to continue resisting the enemy in their current positions. Once the enemy is driven out and the War of Resistance is won, they will naturally move to the designated concentrated defense areas. Now, in response to your telegram ordering a northward move within a time limit, we have repeatedly considered the matter and believe that both the execution of orders and the accommodation of public sentiment should be taken into account by the Central Government. For the regular units south of the Yangtze, we are earnestly trying to persuade them to consider the overall situation and obey the order to move north. We still request the Central Government to grant a generous time limit to allow thorough explanations, so as not to provoke other incidents and add to our boundless guilt. For the units north of the Yangtze, we temporarily request that they be exempted from transfer and instead be tasked with strictly enforcing military discipline, harmonizing with friendly forces, intensifying counterattacks against the enemy, and coordinating with frontal operations, so as to avoid excessive haste that would complicate matters. We are deeply troubled by this issue. If we accommodate local interests, we fear disobeying the Central Government's orders; if we obey the orders, we fear losing the support of the local people. The victory of the War of Resistance depends entirely on the allegiance of the people. With your foresight, you will surely not dismiss these words as empty talk. At a time when traitors and collaborators are scheming and rumors are rampant, it is imperative to coordinate all parties and unite against the enemy, lest we be exploited by the enemy and bring about the calamity of disintegration and division. We must avoid excessive pressure that would provoke mutual conflict and lead to a situation where both sides suffer. That would neither be the original intention of the Central Government nor our initial wish. If we become the snipe and the clam while the enemy plays the fisherman, it would be a case of things turning out contrary to our wishes, and regret would be too late. These are our heartfelt words, which we earnestly wish to express to you both. With your open-mindedness and grasp of the overall situation, you will surely be able to maintain and protect this difficult situation without our needing to say more.