The draft of the reply to the telegram from He and Bai has already been drawn up.
It says at the beginning that their "telegram of the 19th" has been received; as the
matter is of vital importance and the nation is in an extremely critical situation,
we have, taking the interest of the whole country into account and with a view to
the salvation of the nation, discussed it through telegrams many times. Having
reached a consensus, we are sending this telegram specially in reply and hope it
will be submitted to the supreme commander for his instructions to follow. The
remaining part is divided into (a) operations; (b) defense stations; (c) size of the
army; (d) provisions; and (e) the overall orientation of unity and resistance to
Japan. Five points in all. Point A explains that our army has always taken it as its
one and only mission to carry out the national policy, obey orders, and persist in
the War of Resistance; it then reviews briefly our past experience; finally it says
that it is true, as their respected telegram has pointed out, we have had some
incidents of discord with other armies, and it has been a painful experience for us;
every time that happened, we reported in written form to the higher authorities the
causes of the discord and put forward proposals as to how they could be eliminated. The incident in northern Jiangsu, which occurred not long ago, has been
related in detail in our telegram sent on the 21st. The incident in southern Shandong
has commanded our serious attention because of the complexity of the causes, so
we ask them, apart from subjecting the subordinate troops to the orders, to send
men over for a thorough investigation. Point B states in a brief manner that we
have every reason to obey the orders from the Center, but it is also proper to
describe to the higher authorities the awkward situations we subordinates are landed in. Our troops stationed in Central China are composed mostly of local people
who have joined in the army to defend their homeland, so it would be hard to
persuade them to go far away from home; that is why we proposed to the Center
through Zhou Enlai and sought the approval that we move only the main forces to
the north while letting the local troops stay where they are. We have just received
the telegram ordering us to complete the maneuver within a stated time. Yet we
request that the Center permit us to give consideration to public opinion and sentiment at the same time that we carry out the order, so that apart from the original
main forces, a painstaking effort can be made to persuade the more concentrated
local troops to obey orders and move northward. We also request an extension of
the time limit so as to allow more time for the persuasion to take effect, and to
prevent the occurrence of any further mishaps. Point C explains the reasons we
were compelled to expand our army in waging a war of resistance behind enemy
lines. The fact is that, of an army 500,000 strong, only 45,000 are provisioned,
and no one, however clever, can make bricks without straw, so there was no other
alternative but to request an expansion of the given size of our army. The Center
has, accepting a fait accompli, approved the expansion in its draft resolution; only
we wish to have it carried out at an earlier date so as to strengthen the morale of
the army. Point D relates the fact that we have received no ammunition or medicines for fourteen months and asks for such supplies, and other such matters.
Finally, point E states that war in the Pacific is pressing closer and closer each
day, which affords a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for a war of resistance. In the
meantime, Japan has intensified its effort to lure us into surrender; Germany is
trying hard to make peace; certain people at home have stirred up an antiCommunist high tide to clear the way for capitulation and joined with foreign
forces in instigation, with the intent of putting an end to the War of Resistance by
the so-called joint Sino-Japanese Communist suppression. We are giving our all
on the battlefield, ready to lay down our lives for the interests of the nation; what
we want is only a nation in unity and resistance, free from the disaster of capitulation and disintegration. It is requested that this be passed on to higher authorities and adopted. Please let us know quickly what you think so that we may revise
and send it out within the next few days.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 191-92, where it is
reproduced from Wannan shibian.

--- Notes

1. This message is part of the orchestration of a major campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to influence policy and sway public opinion, in concert with the reply of
November 9 to the Guomindang order of October 19. It should therefore be read in conjunction with the numerous other documents issued between November 6 and 16, which
form a consistent pattern.