On the Domestic Situation and the Tasks of Coping with Capitulation and Striving for a Turn for the Better in the Current Situation—A Telegram to Zhou Enlai

(November 3, 1940)

Comrade Pan Youxin’s[1] opinion is correct. We also judge that Chiang Kai-shek is still at a triangular crossroads and is currently still haggling over the German-Japanese negotiations. However, the present is one thing, and the future is another. According to objective estimates, the possibility of Chiang Kai-shek leaning toward Britain and the United States in the future is small, while the possibility of his leaning toward Germany and Japan is great, because the pressure and attraction of Germany and Japan are both very strong—the pressure being the severing of blood vessels and the bombing of Chongqing, and the attraction being the return of lost territories, profiting greatly during the great war, and jointly suppressing the Communists. Britain and the United States, however, will be powerless within two years, and Chiang Kai-shek cannot wait that long. Even beyond two years, Britain and the United States have no absolute certainty of victory; it is possible that the two sides will reach a stalemate, fighting for two or three years without a final outcome, waiting for revolution to emerge and settle them. It is also possible that the British Empire will be defeated fairly quickly, the old continent entirely occupied by Germany, Italy, and Japan, leaving the United States isolated, sighing at the ocean in despair, and waiting until revolution arises on the old continent before launching an offensive against Europe and Asia under the pretext of intervening in the revolution. In short, within one or two years, Chiang Kai-shek cannot rely on an Anglo-American victory. Only the Communist Party, the Chinese people (including the various middle factions and figures like Chen Cheng and Tang Enbo), plus Soviet pressure, can stop the capitulation of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. If these three kinds of pressure are well coordinated, there is still a possibility of such a turn for the better, and there is still time for it. What Chiang Kai-shek fears most is internal disorder and the Soviet Union; therefore, we can exploit this to intimidate him. If he wants to “suppress the Communists,” we must resolutely oppose “suppressing

[1] Pan Youxin was then the Soviet ambassador to China.

the Communists.” If, under the slogan of opposing civil war, we are not afraid of civil war, and when his “Communist-suppression army” advances, we dispatch 150,000 crack troops (with 300,000 supporting various base areas) to strike at his rear, win several major victories, and put forward conditions such as demanding the dismissal and punishment of He Yingqin (clearing the monarch’s side), the withdrawal of the “Communist-suppression army,” the continuation of the national policy of resisting Japan, the restoration of domestic peace, the implementation of the Three People’s Principles, the reform of political institutions, granting the people the freedom to resist Japan, the release of anti-Japanese political prisoners, and the convening of a national assembly (roughly like the eight demands of Zhang and Yang[1]). If, by then, Japan has already advanced southward, U.S.-Japan relations are tense, and Japan is too preoccupied to attend to other matters; if, by then, the various domestic middle factions and the middle forces within the Kuomintang come forward to offer support (organizing peace-persuasion groups, separating the battle lines, etc.); if, by then, certain individuals within the country and within Chiang Kai-shek’s clique take advantage of the chaos to rebel, engaging in activities not unfavorable to Chiang (these people are now urging Chiang to suppress the Communists, their aim being to create turmoil, place Chiang on a blazing fire, and seize the opportunity to replace him—such as He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi); and if, by then, the Soviet Union steps in again to mediate, such a turn for the better is possible. Perhaps China’s true turn for the better will only come at that time—who can say? This is the principle of birth through labor pains. But there is also the possibility that Chiang Kai-shek will become a Pétain and eventually a Wang Jingwei, which would mean a final great rupture. This possibility may even be greater, though it is hard to say. But since he is organizing a “Communist-suppression army,” we certainly cannot sit still and await death. We certainly cannot allow him to build ten or eight deep, multi-layered blockade lines stretching from Ningxia in the west to the seacoast in the east (a new Great Wall), trapping us in a pincer attack by Japan and Chiang and annihilating us while we remain completely motionless. Therefore, when the “Communist-suppression army” advances, we must inevitably strike out to change the situation and strive for a turn for the better. If, by then, Chiang Kai-shek becomes a Pétain, it will prove that we were right to strike, and we will change the banner of “clearing the monarch’s side” (or military remonstrance) to the banner of fighting traitors, fighting all the way to the end. This would be a national revolutionary war taking the form of civil war (the past and present anti-friction wars are also of this

[1] The eight demands put forward by Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng during the Xi’an Incident. The eight demands were: (1) Reorganize the Nanjing government and admit all parties and factions to share responsibility for national salvation. (2) Stop all civil wars. (3) Immediately release the patriotic leaders arrested in Shanghai. (4) Release all political prisoners nationwide. (5) Allow the people’s patriotic movement. (6) Guarantee the people’s political freedoms of assembly and association. (7) Faithfully implement the will of Premier Sun Yat-sen. (8) Immediately convene a national salvation conference.

nature). However, we must act with the utmost forbearance and do everything possible. At present, it is correct and necessary to do our utmost to delay the actions of Tang Enbo and Li Pinxian, agree to the northward movement of the Southern Anhui troops, agree to a peaceful resolution, call for the avoidance of civil war, and adopt a conciliatory attitude. We are now pursuing a two-sided policy: on the one hand, doing our utmost to strive for a turn for the better and avoid civil war; on the other hand, preparing to cope with capitulation and civil war, with the emphasis on coping with capitulation and civil war. Only in this way will we not suffer losses or fall into Chiang Kai-shek’s trap. Immediately preparing to deal with a dark situation is the central task of the entire Party. With this move, we will not repeat the mistakes of Chen Duxiu. However, the timing of the two actions—the bomb declaration and the military remonstrance and dispatch of troops—must be grasped very tightly and steadily; there must be no rashness, no mistakes. A single misstep at this moment will leave endless troubles for the future. This is a moment of historical transition, a moment of sudden change in the Chinese revolution, a moment when the big bourgeoisie is either withdrawing from or remaining in political power. Therefore, we must handle it with intense vigilance. I humbly present my humble views for your consideration.