Military Dispositions for Dealing With the
Joint Attack on the Communists by
Chiang Kaishek and the Japanese
(November 3, 1940, 7:00 to 9:00 A.M.)1

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. The present anti-Communist high tide is preparation for direct capitulation.
The so-called uniting with England and America in resisting Japan is nothing more
than a smokescreen put up by Chiang Kaishek. Chiang has given orders for Tang
Enbo to lead a force of 100,000 to attack northeastern Anhui and for Li Pinxian to
lead a force of 50,000 to attack eastern Anhui. It is estimated that the first step of
their plan is to drive our army north of the Longhai railroad and set up a number of
horizontal and vertical blockade lines (there are five blockade lines around our
border region); the second step is to coordinate with the Japanese invaders to wipe
out our army. A serious danger exists that China and Japan might reach a compromise and that Japan and Chiang might join together in “Communist suppression.”
Although other possibilities exist, capitulation is the most probable. At present it
is extremely necessary to make such an estimation.

2. The central problem at the moment is the concrete strategy for combating
capitulation and anticommunism. There are presently two options: The first is a
political offensive and a military defense. This means to counterattack the anti-
Communist troops only in areas close to our base areas, and that our army does not
force its way into their rear; that we do not counterattack in their rear area until
Chiang’s capitulationist inclination is revealed to the whole nation. Should this
strategy be adopted, it would be sufficient to move 50,000 of our men south, while
the main force may remain on the various anti-Japanese fronts. If this strategy
were adopted, it would have one political advantage, which is that it would deprive
Chiang of his political excuses. But it would pose a political disadvantage on the
other hand, which is that we could not prevent capitulation with our actual strength.
Militarily it is disadvantageous, because our troops are bound to suffer severe
losses from joint attacks by the Japanese and Chiang once Chiang has successfully

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 569–71, where it is
reproduced from the handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
1. The time is indicated by a character signifying this two-hour period.

completed his network of blockade lines. The second is a political offensive as
well as a military offensive. This means that our army would not wait until Japan
and Chiang join forces to attack us but that, instead, we would select at least
100,000 to 150,000 crack troops from among our 500,000 men and have them
break into their rear in different directions, while the rest of our forces (the majority) would stay where they are and resist Japan. If this plan were adopted, it would
have a political disadvantage, because it gives Chiang political capital. In another way, however, it could have a political advantage, because it might prevent
capitulation (but not necessarily). Militarily it is advantageous, because it provides initiative, and could prevent the most severe joint attacks by both Japan and
Chiang (a joint attack is unavoidable, but its severity can be reduced).
3. No matter which strategy we adopt at present, if capitulation becomes a fact,
the outcome can only be a fierce civil war (national revolutionary war in the form
of a civil war), so it is necessary to consider the overall military deployments right
now. It is planned to divide the entire military command into three columns. The
left column is to consist of the armies south of the old Yellow River,2 its crack
troops totaling about 50,000 men, which will strike out from the area on the Hubei,
Henan, and Shaanxi borders. The right column is to consist of the armies north of
the Fenli line, the Zhengtai line, and the Cangshi line, its crack troops totaling
about 50,000 men, which is to strike out from the area on the Shaanxi, Gansu, and
Sichuan borders. The central column is to consist of the armies stationed in between these two areas, its crack troops totaling about 50,000 men, who will strike
in the direction of the left column or that of the right column, depending upon
future conditions.
4. It is of utmost importance to our future whether or not the concrete strategy
we have chosen at present is correct, so it is necessary to give it careful consideration. We hope to be informed of your opinion so that we can discuss it (Com-mander Zhu [De] will be going to Suide in a few days).

Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang]

2. Regarding the change in the course of the Yellow River in June 1938, see above, the
note to the text of March 5, 1940.