Dealing with the Military Deployment of the Japanese-Jiang Joint Anti-Communist Campaign[1]

(November 3, 1940)

Comrade Dehuai:

A. The current anti-communist upsurge is a direct preparation for capitulation. The so-called alliance with Britain and the United States to resist Japan is merely Jiang Jieshi’s smokescreen. Jiang has already ordered Tang Enbo[2] to lead 100,000 troops in an offensive toward northeast Anhui, and Li Pinxian[3] to lead 50,000 troops in an offensive toward east Anhui. It is assessed that their plan is, as a first step, to drive our army north of the Longhai Railway line, construct deep, multi-layered blockade lines (the blockade lines around the border region consist of five layers), and, as a second step, coordinate with the Japanese invaders to launch a pincer attack to annihilate our army. The danger of a Sino-Japanese compromise and a Japanese-Jiang joint "suppression of the communists" exists in a serious manner. Although other possibilities still exist, the possibility of capitulation is the main one. At present, making such an assessment is extremely necessary.

B. The central issue at present is the question of concrete tactics for opposing capitulation and opposing communism. There are currently two plans: First, political offensive and military defensive. That is, only counterattack the anti-communist forces’ offensives near our base areas; our army shall not strike into their rear areas, and we shall wait until Jiang’s capitulationist features are understood by the whole nation before launching a counteroffensive into their rear areas. If this plan is adopted, then transferring 50,000 troops southward at present will suffice, and our main forces will continue to hold fast to all anti-Japanese positions. If this plan is adopted, it is advantageous in one political aspect, namely, it can deprive Jiang of his political pretexts. But it is disadvantageous in another political aspect,

[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, to Peng Dehuai.

[2] Tang Enbo, then Commander-in-Chief of the 31st Army Group of the Nationalist Army.

[3] Li Pinxian, then Chairman of the Nationalist Anhui Provincial Government, Deputy Commander of the Nationalist 3rd War Zone, and concurrently Commander-in-Chief of the 21st Army Group.

namely, it cannot use actual strength to stop capitulation. Militarily, it is disadvantageous, because after Jiang’s deep, multi-layered blockade lines are fully completed, our army will inevitably suffer severe harm from the joint Japanese-Jiang pincer attack. Second, political offensive and military offensive as well. That is, without waiting for the arrival of the joint Japanese-Jiang pincer attack, our army will draw at least 100,000 to 150,000 crack troops from the 500,000-strong force, break through into their rear areas along several routes, while leaving the remaining troops (the majority) to continue resisting Japan in their original positions. If this plan is adopted, it is disadvantageous in one political aspect, because it gives Jiang political capital. In another political aspect, it might be advantageous, because it may stop capitulation (but not for certain). Militarily, it is advantageous, because it can seize the initiative and avoid the most severe Japanese-Jiang pincer attack (the pincer attack is unavoidable, but its severity can be reduced).

C. Regardless of which plan is adopted at present, if capitulation materializes, the final outcome will still be a severe civil war (a national revolutionary war in the form of civil war). Therefore, the entire military deployment must be considered now. It is proposed to divide the entire military region into three columns. The various armies south of the old course of the Yellow River shall form the Left Column, with its crack troops numbering approximately 50,000, preparing to advance to the border area of Hubei, Henan, and Shaanxi. The various armies north of the Fen-Li Highway, the Zheng-Tai Railway,[1] and the Cang-Shi Highway shall form the Right Column, with its crack troops numbering approximately 50,000, preparing to advance to the border area of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan. The various armies between these two areas shall form the Central Column, with its crack troops numbering approximately 50,000, which may advance in the direction of the Left Column or the direction of the Right Column, to be decided according to future circumstances.

D. Whether our concrete tactics at this moment are appropriate or not bears greatly on the future prospects; therefore, thorough consideration is necessary. I hope to receive your views in reply, so that we can discuss them (Commander-in-Chief Zhu[2] is going to Suide in the coming days).

Mao, Wang
Jiangchen

[1] The Zheng-Tai Railway refers to the railway from Zhengding to Taiyuan, i.e., the present-day Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan line.

[2] Commander-in-Chief Zhu refers to Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the 18th Group Army (Eighth Route Army).